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ABSTRACT 
 
MEGAN MITCHELL: Implicit Bias, Colorblindness and Institutional Racism 
(Under the direction of Bernard Boxill) 
 
 
This dissertation concerns the nature and extent of institutional racism.  It consists of 
three articles, each of which draws upon the history of and current conditions facing black 
Americans to establish more general conclusions about institutional racism.   
In the first article, I observe that striking inequalities in education, income, 
incarceration rates and employment have persisted between black and white Americans 
despite a decline in explicit anti-black racism among whites and a rise in legislation intended 
to prevent many of the most virulent forms of discrimination. I ask, “Are these pervasive 
inequalities the result of institutional racism?” 
I notice that for some social scientists (I call them “structuralists”) the answer to this 
question is trivial.  They hold that racism is a system wherein advantages are divided along 
racial lines.  Consequently, institutions that create or support racial inequalities are, simply in 
virtue of that fact, racist.  
I maintain that the question is meaningful and the answer important.  Against the 
structuralists, I defend the view that institutions are only racist insofar as they perpetuate the 
racism of agents.  So, if current racial inequalities are the result of institutional racism, then it 
must be the case that the institutions that cause them were created or are currently sustained 
	   iv 
by racist individuals, who, consciously or unconsciously, express their racist beliefs and 
attitudes through the policies, practices, and organizational structures they adopt or maintain.   
However, if part of the motivation behind presenting a theory of institutional racism 
is, as I think it should be, to aid in its eradication, one might worry that this more restrictive 
theory will fail to yield any targets for political action.  The increasingly covert and 
unconscious nature of much agential racism could make it very difficult to prove that any 
specific institutional actions are racist.  I assuage this worry by demonstrating in the second 
article that the pervasive phenomenon of implicit racial bias is an instance of institutional 
racism. In the third and final article, I argue that colorblind policies and rational racial 
profiling, when perpetuated against black Americans by the state, are racist. 
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1. Two Conceptions of Racism 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
A great deal of confusion surrounds the correct content and extension of the terms 
“racism” and “racist.”  When, exactly, are we warranted in calling someone a racist?  Can 
only people be racist?  What about symbols? Can a non-racist person have racist thoughts?  
Behaviors? What if someone says something racist— does that make her racist?  What would 
it take to make a statement racist? And when, exactly, is an institution racist? 
 All these complexities could leave one wondering whether it is pointless to engage in 
the question at all.  Why care if someone or something is racist?  Perhaps we could all agree 
that some act is disrespectful or harmful, without having to further show that it, or the person 
who committed it, is racist.  What does calling it racism add to our understanding of these 
people or institutions and their thoughts and actions?  Maybe it is best to just avoid the term 
altogether, especially since labeling a person or an action racist often only serves to inflame 
tensions and shut down dialogue. 
 I think the question of whether or not some agent or action is racist, as opposed to 
disrespectful, harmful, or even vicious, is important (Mitchell). Finding out that an action one 
has taken or a belief one holds is racist should, and often does, fill one with a greater level of 
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dread than the discovery that one has been disrespectful or vicious.  This is due in part to 
racism’s sordid history; many of humanity’s most despicable acts and widespread atrocities 
have been justified by racist attitudes and ideologies.  Racism has motivated actions that 
reach far beyond normal, everyday injustices.  It has been used to justify and motivate 
treating human beings as if they were not human. 
Consequently, discovering that one is a racist or has acted in a racist manner is to find one 
has fallen in with a particularly terrible crowd. Though, like other moral wrongs, racism 
admits of degrees, recognizing its history gives us special reason to avoid it; Not only do we 
do not wish to be associated with those horrific people and their actions, but also, by 
endorsing racist thoughts and actions we open ourselves up to the possibility that we, too, 
could commit them. 
 Unfortunately, the seriousness of racism as a moral wrong tends to make it difficult to 
talk about at all, much less reach agreement on its content and extension.   When discussing 
racism, there is a tendency to go towards one of two extremes—either everything is racist or 
nothing is.  Both of these extremes lead to absurdities and both should be resisted.  We risk 
trivializing the term if we use it too liberally, but it may well be true that more things are 
racist then we currently suspect.  And, if that is the case, then people could end up expressing 
racism, and performing racist actions, while sincerely believing themselves to be non-racist.  
Due to the dangers associated with racism, we ought to be especially concerned to recognize 
when we are acting on it.  This should spur us to get clear on its conditions.   
Accounts of racism can be divided into two main camps.  Most theories in the 
philosophical literature either assume or explicitly argue for and endorse what I will, for the 
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purposes of this paper, term the ‘agential’ conception of racism. 1 They use ‘racism’ to 
describe a quality that is found, in its most fundamental form, in individuals.  Within this 
approach, debates are waged over whether the essential component of racist is attitudes, 
beliefs or behaviors, and exactly which attitudes, beliefs and behaviors are racist.2   
Among sociologists and anti-racism activists, one often encounters a very different 
conception of racism, which is seemingly at odds with (or at least an addition to) the agential 
account. On this ‘structuralist’ account, the term ‘racism’ denotes a system in which 
advantages are divided along racial lines.  Individuals and discreet institutions are racist to 
the extent that they participate in that structure.  Those who participate by simply ‘going with 
the flow,’ and so reap the benefits of their privileged position in that society without actively 
endorsing the racial division, are ‘passive’ racists.  Those who subscribe to positive attitudes 
towards or endorse the belief that the hierarchical relationship between racial groups by 
ought to obtain are ‘active’ racists.3   
These two frameworks offer us very different starting points.  The agentialist begins 
with individuals and explains all instances of racism in terms of their beliefs and attitudes.  
The structuralists begin with the structure as a whole.  Though individuals occupy roles in the 
structure and some of them are likely racist, none of them need be racist (or ever have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Glasgow (2009) also uses the term ‘agential’ to describe one species of accounts of racism but in a somewhat 
different fashion.  For Glasgow, to call something ‘agential racism’ is to mark it off from ‘institutional racism.’  
I resist this usage because, as I will argue, there is an understanding of institutional racism such that it is also 
agential.   
2 For example, see Garcia (1996), Shelby (2002), Blum (2002), Glasgow (2009). 
3 While structural accounts of this sort have sometimes been referred to as ‘institutional’ accounts (for example, 
by Pierce, 2013) I think we ought to resist this move.  First, I will argue that agential racism can also be 
institutional.  Individuals’ attitudes and beliefs can move into and through institutions, both public and private, 
as they are drawn on by those creating policies, structuring organizations, dictating internal practices, and 
assessing costs. Second, on a structuralist picture discreet institutions are racist in the same way that individuals 
are.  They either passively participate by upholding the system, dividing privileges along racial lines, or actively 
participate by expressing racist attitudes and beliefs.  
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racist) for the structure to be racially unjust.  The structure can be racist even if no agents 
hold or have ever held racist attitudes or beliefs.  Thus, we might think of them as bottom up 
and top down approaches.4   
These conceptions also have different extensions; they diverge with respect to the 
phenomena they pick out as racist. In fact, the structuralist claims that the agentialist cannot 
pick out all instances of racism.  There are certain uniquely structural racial injustices that the 
agentialist approach does not capture.  Recognizing a central usage of “racism” as a synonym 
for “racial injustice” could leave us wondering whether the structuralist is right.  By 
concentrating on the actions of individuals, perhaps the agential account does miss the bigger 
picture. If justice is not primarily a matter of the attitudes and beliefs of individual agents but, 
fundamentally, a quality that pertains to our institutions and the principles by which they are 
regulated, is it not possible that institutions could be racist or racially unjust even if no 
individual agent involved, in the past or presently, could rightly be termed ‘racist?’ In other 
words, could practices that are not properly thought of as the racist actions of any agent, 
institutional or otherwise, be racially unjust?  This is the question that accounts of structural 
racism urge us to consider.  And the question is important— If some (or most) of the 
problems that plague racially marginalized groups are unjust in this way, should we not 
revise our usage of the term ‘racist’ to cover, or even privilege, those harms? By casting our 
net too narrowly and refusing to invoke the moral reprobation that comes with calling a 
particular injustice ‘racist,’ we might allow for serious racial injustices to continue 
unchecked.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Pierce (2013) refers to these as micro- and macro-analyses of racism.  He writes that microanalyses or 
“individualistic approaches tend to favor moral, ethical or psychological methods, and [macro-analyses or] 
structuralist approaches tend to favor socio-political and economic methods” (p 1). 
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Building on this structuralist worry about the limited nature and scope of agential 
racism, my aim is to discover if there is anything that the structuralist can say about racial 
injustice that cannot be captured on the agential account.  If there is, then there is at least one 
(albeit defeasible) reason to prefer the structuralist account to the agential one.  Of course, 
the import of this additional structuralist insight would have to be weighed against the 
various advantages of the agential account before we could decide on the all-things-
considered, best account of racism.  However, if the structuralist account adds nothing to the 
content of the concept of racism, it would stand at a considerable disadvantage when stacked 
against the more familiar and intuitive agential conception. 
In adjudicating this dispute, my first task is to describe what racial injustice amounts 
to on each of the two accounts.  For the agential account, this requires showing how that 
theory might be extended to talk about institutions and institutional arrangements.  On the 
structuralist account, where injustice is deducible from divisions in institutional power, this 
means showing how certain states of affairs, because of the unintentional but nevertheless 
non-accidental practices which give rise to them, can be said to be racially unjust rather than 
unjust for other reasons.   
Using these accounts, I argue that the structuralist claim to possess some deeper 
insight about the nature of racial injustice, which cannot be captured by the agentialist, is 
false; So long as the agentialist agrees with the structuralist about the content of the concept 
of injustice and its scope, then she is able to express nearly everything that the structuralist 
can about racial injustice.  The only difference is that the agentialist will not agree with the 
structuralist that a relation is unjust just because it non-accidentally divides power along 
racial lines even if it arises in such a way that no one could have reasonably predicted its 
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appearance.  While the agentialist can easily argue that justice demands such power divisions 
be undone and the victims compensated (and that a failure to do so would be racist), the mere 
instantiation of such relationships, on the agentialist view, would not be a racial injustice.   
I argue that this consequence of the agential view is, in fact, a point in its favor, as it 
leaves room for the possibility of accidents (human and non-human) that, although 
lamentable, are nevertheless, not unjust. This is pragmatically important because the 
appropriate response to instances of truly accidental harm is likely to be quite different from 
that of cases of intentional or negligent wrongdoing.  Moreover, the agential view is a more 
flexible theory when it comes to describing institutional racism, compatible with a wide 
range of views about the nature and scope of justice. 
2.  The Two Conceptions of Racism 
Naturally, there are some points of agreement between structuralist and agential 
accounts of racism.  Both, for example, acknowledge that there is some special social 
category called ‘race’ (biological fiction though it may be) into which people are often sorted 
and which can be related, in some important way, to ill treatment.5   However, on the major 
questions of exactly who and what is racist and, most importantly, why it is racist, there 
appears to be significant and seemingly irresolvable disagreement between the two views.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Hoyt (2012) writes that both conceptions are ways of pointing out or rejecting the “false and pernicious idea 
that people can and should be sorted into subgroups based on arbitrary phenotypic markers, assumed to have 
attributes that correspond with the markers, valuated on the basis of the possession or lack of possession of the 
markers and treated differentially according to the valuations” (p. 226).  This characterization of the 
commonality is somewhat too broad.  It does not go any way towards specifying the specific sorts of 
phonotypical markers that we generally think of a “racial markers” and which, for the most part, are distinct 
from, for example, “sex markers.”  There seems to be agreement among most proponents of these two views 
that race-based mistreatment can be picked out and separated from other forms of wrongdoing motivated by 
attitudes towards and beliefs about people with certain phenotypical features.   
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The following section will spell out exactly what that disagreement consists in, by exploring 
what each has to say about racial injustice.   
I begin with the agential account because I suspect that, due in part to the fact that it 
takes its cues from ordinary language analysis, it is the more familiar and intuitive of the two. 
Whether or not we should trust those intuitions is, of course, a matter of some debate (though 
not one I will broach here).6  In what follows, I provide a brief sketch of the agential account 
and demonstrate how, on this view, institutions can come to be racist. Assuming that justice 
is a matter of the arrangement of our basic institutions, then unless ‘racial injustice’ is not 
actually a synonym for ‘racism,’ by giving an account of agential institutional racism, I will 
have articulated a theory of agential racial injustice. It is this theory, the structuralist will 
argue, that is insufficient to capture all of the dimensions of racial injustice.   
2.1  The Agential Conception of Racism 
As I indicated briefly in the introduction, the agential account of racism is, in its most 
basic form, concerned with the qualities possessed by individuals.  Racism is a matter of an 
individual holding certain attitudes and/or beliefs.7 I will not attempt to adjudicate the dispute 
over precisely which property (or properties) is (are) essential.  The crucial point is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Tatum (1997) for example, in her discussion and critique of the agential account recounts the following about 
when she teaches the structuralist conception of racism: “Someone in the group is usually quick to point out that 
this is not the definition you will find in most dictionaries.  I reply, “Who wrote the dictionary?’” (p. 9). 
7 I will leave to the side views on which racism is, most fundamentally, a matter of individual behavior since 
they introduce unnecessary confusion and, I think, have been adequately refuted.  (Philips, 1984 is the most 
influential proponent of the behavioral view, but neither he nor any other theorists have defended it in recent 
years).  However, I want to leave open the possibility of hybrid and disjunctive views such that either behaviors, 
or beliefs, or attitudes (or a combination any two) are necessary for racism. 
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whatever that property turns out to be, it must be such that it is evaluable according to the 
dictates of morality or rationality, or some other scale appropriately applied to agents.8    
 The agential theory can be extended to describe and evaluate institutions, and thus, 
racial injustice via what Joshua Glasgow (2009) has termed the ‘genetic thesis.’  According 
to this thesis, from racist agents, racist attitudes and/or beliefs can spread upwards and 
through the various institutions in which those agents participate and find expression in the 
structure and policies of those institutions. Take, for example, an instance of institutional 
racism that respects the genetic thesis:9 
Imagine a town in which there are significant economic and social disparities between 
two racial groups (say, the ‘pinks’ and the ‘greens’) because the local government passed a 
series of laws that explicitly prevented one group (the pinks) from buying property in a 
particular area of town, where otherwise, the pinks would have liked to live in.  The 
lawmakers imposed this restriction because, as greens, they disliked the pinks, found their 
skin color distasteful and took it as a sign of an underlying bad character.  So, to avoid the 
pinks, green lawmakers bought land in one area of town along with other greens and passed 
legislation to prevent the pinks from living there.  At some later date, the greens discovered 
that there was a large amount of oil under their land.  They were paid huge sums of money by 
the local government for the right to extract this oil, making them all fabulously wealthy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 On some of these views, it is important to calling the relevant attitude or belief ‘racist’ that the agent who 
possesses it stand in such a position that she could reasonably evaluate or revise it.  For example, Garcia (1996) 
argues that a person who holds negative attitudes towards a particular racial group because she was raised in a 
racist culture and have never been exposed to any opportunities to revise those attitudes is ignorant, but not a 
racist.  Shelby (2002) and Appiah (1990) both of whom defend the doxastic model, agree that racism cannot 
simply be a matter of holding false beliefs but that those beliefs must also be irrational.  However, there are 
other agential accounts on which racism is a form of, or closely parallels, mental illness.  On such a view, we 
might appropriately evaluate the content of the beliefs and attitudes (or compulsions and impulses) that make up 
‘racism’ according to rationality or morality, without requiring that the agent herself be in a position to do so.   
9 This example is modified slightly from Glasgow’s original for reasons I will make clear in the next section. 
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The pinks didn’t benefit at all from the discovery of the oil and though they enjoyed a 
reasonable standard of living via other means, they were not anywhere near as wealthy as the 
greens. 
This, I take it, is a familiar example of institutional racism, in line with the way in 
which we normally understand why the legally sanctioned enslavement of black Americans 
and the Jim Crow laws in the American South were racist.  The racist attitudes/beliefs of 
green individuals were inserted into and expressed by the institutional mechanisms of the 
town government. The genetic thesis explains why any direct consequences of those 
institutional expressions are racist.  Just as individual behaviors motivated by racist attitudes 
and beliefs are racist, institutional behaviors that are so motivated are also racist.  The 
discriminatory laws instituted by the greens on the basis of their racist attitudes towards or 
beliefs about the pinks prevented the pinks from owning land that they otherwise might own.  
Even if we assume that had the pinks, and not the greens, owned all the oil rich land then the 
government still would have paid the same amount to extract the oil, (in other words, the 
amount paid and its recipients was not an action dictated by any racist beliefs or attitudes), 
the current wealth disparity is a consequence of a initial racist restriction on property 
ownership. Thus, the disparity is not merely a racial one, but a racist one.  
One of the essential aspects of the genetic thesis, which is captured by the above 
example, is that because institutions can outlast their creators, institutions with policies 
created or sustained by racists are capable of expressing racist beliefs and attitudes and 
carrying out racist acts even if no members of that institution are currently racist.10  Once 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Glasgow (2009) argues that such cases, in which an institution perpetuates racism that is not held by any of 
its current members, are instances of “pure institution racism” and cannot be adequately accounted for on a 
reductive agent-based account.  A reductive agent based account is “a time-slice thesis, which holds that for 
every institution at every moment it is racist, its racism is based in the racism of some agent at that moment” (p. 
	   10 
racist attitudes and beliefs have been introduced into an institution’s policies or 
organizational structure, the institution can remain racist even if those individuals who 
created the racist policy are long since retired or dead.11  
Agreeing to the genetic thesis, however, does not yet introduce the concept of 
institutions as anything over and above the joint actions of individuals.  The genetic thesis 
could, it seems, equally apply to ordinary, non-institutional relationships. For example, 
suppose I ask you to do me a favor and, because we are friends and you have a general 
disposition to fulfill my requests, you do.  As it turns out, the favor I ask you to perform is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74).  By contrast, “the genetic thesis is a historical thesis, which holds that for every institution, at every 
moment it is racist, its racism at least partly originated in the racism of some agent at some point up to the 
moment at which the institution is racist” (p. 74).  Glasgow’s claim that an institution’s racism must stem “at 
least partly” (not wholly?) from the racism of some agent is a puzzling one, and has led others, including Pierce 
(2013), to misunderstand Glasgow’s view about the nature of institutional racism.  On what basis might we 
condemn other parts of the institution (those that did not originate in a racist agent) as racist?  Glasgow rejects 
the structuralist view that resources divided along racial lines can, in themselves, be racist.  However, he writes, 
“even if the genetic thesis is correct, that is, even if rightly calling institutions ‘unjust’ or ‘racist’ is contingent 
on their having come about or being sustained in such-and-such a manner, we still have reason to deny that the 
injustice or racism themselves consist in the beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors of the individuals who once 
generated or sustained such institutions.  Most directly, those who are otherwise engaged in a dispute over 
whether racism is subject to the genetic constraint can come to an independent agreement on what cases to 
recognize as cases of racism: they can agree that racism is not necessarily found in the agents themselves.  And, 
most fundamentally, it is plausible that what makes the present state of affairs in Real Estate objectionable is 
not that long-dead generations had racist attitudes that led to it but that it itself is racist.  We don’t look at a 
society like that in Real Estate and object that the ancestors who set things in motion were racist but that it is, at 
present, perpetuating unjust racial inequality.  Thus it seems that institutional racism can be present at t without 
any agents who interact with the institution at t being responsible for that racism” (p. 76).  I think the most 
plausible interpretation of this statement by Glasgow (2009) and his earlier claim that the past attitudes or 
beliefs are only partly responsible for the racism, is that the institutional reaction to past injustice is itself 
racist—it disrespects the victims of the earlier racial injustice and compounds their harm. Institutions, then, 
must be apt for moral condemnation, as Glasgow argues that “racism” is always a term of moral disapproval.  
Exactly how we should think about the moral character of institutions is not a question that Glasgow explores in 
much detail. Are institutional reactions the expressions of present attitudes of disrespect or disregard on the part 
of individuals or some attitude that is not reducible to the individuals who make up the institutions?  He seems 
to think that laws can express attitudes in a manner that is not reducible to the attitudes of the lawmakers, 
writing, “prochoice advocates hardly seem to betray conceptual confusion when they assert that antiabortion 
laws fail to respect a woman’s right to choose…” (p. 83) and “Antimiscegenation laws failed to respect rights of 
intimacy and love and the people whose rights were at stake” (p. 83).  He also claims that societies can be 
disrespectful but admits that this way of talking could be shorthand for saying something about the authority 
figures in a society or some number of institutions taken together.  
11 The agential account, more so than the structural one, preserves certain features of the initial formulation of 
the term, as introduced by Carmichael (Ture) & Hamilton (1967), who argued that that institutions are racist 
when their policies and actions are intended, often through subtle and covert means, to subordinate one racial 
group to another.   
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harmful to blacks and I have requested it because of my anti-black racist attitudes.  Even if 
you are unaware that the action you perform is harmful and motivated by my bad attitudes 
towards black people, it still seems right to describe the action as racist (though we ought not 
describe you as such, on the agential account, because you lack the relevant beliefs and 
attitudes).  The same would be true if I asked you to do me a favor but died before you 
carried it out.12  Thus, it seems that there may be instances in which the genetic thesis could 
be applied fruitfully to describe why some individual actions are racist, although the 
individual who performs them lacks racist attitudes or beliefs. Nevertheless, it does not 
follow that the actions he performs are properly described as institutional. 13   
A full account of agential, institutional racism requires not only an account of the 
pipeline by which institutions can come to express racism (a fully developed version of the 
genetic thesis that includes the conditions on which it is applicable), but also an account of 
what makes an instance of the genetic thesis institutional.  This raises a host of complicated 
questions about the nature of institutions themselves—What structure, aims and policies are 
properly thought of as institutional?  Must those aims be explicit and those policies codified? 
Can violations of those policies, if they are widely tolerated, be thought of as institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 One question that could arise in these cases is whether or not the action is properly thought of as belonging to 
the person who requested it or the person who carried it out.  If the action belongs to the former, then it might 
not be a true case of the genetic thesis, since the racism has not transferred from one entity (capable of 
performing actions) to another. 
13 In other words, in order to differentiate between these cases of action at a distance by individuals and what we 
would want to call “institutional” racism, we would need some additional criteria that mark off institutions and 
institutional relationships from relationships among individuals.  That they are candidates for applications of the 
genetic thesis is not enough. Instead, a satisfactory account must provide criteria for distinguishing certain joint 
actions from other, interpersonal, non-institutional joint actions.  Possibilities include functional or teleological 
accounts of institutions, as well as group agency accounts.  Spelling out exactly what features are necessary and 
sufficient for institutional, as opposed to individual or interpersonal action, is a question I leave to the side, 
though it is an important component of any fully fleshed out agential account of institutional racism. 
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actions?  Must institutions possess agency in order for their actions to express racism?14  Or 
is it sufficient that an institution be the mouthpiece of a particular individual in order to be 
thought of as expressing racism?   
I will not address these questions here. So long as some form of joint action, or action 
through others is possible, then agential racism is possible that is not purely individual.   We 
can define institutions and institutional actions according to some criteria such that it does 
not require that an institution do or be anything beyond an entity that performs particular 
actions (perhaps those aimed at a certain set of goals).  For my purposes, the only claim the 
reader need accept is that if anything counts as an institution then surely a state does.  I take 
the inclusion of the state as an institution to be a desideratum of the correct account of 
institutions.  So, we can call the actions of a state ‘institutional actions’ even if that means 
nothing more than an individual expressing his will through the coordinated behavior of 
others. 
 Finally, before turning to the structuralist view, I want to briefly address how an 
agential conception of racism might account for the phenomenon of systemic racism.  We 
certainly want the ability to acknowledge on the agential view that our institutions, like 
individuals, might interact with one another and that there may be certain situations in which 
talking about “institutional racism” is insufficient to describe the widespread racist attitudes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This discussion of the conditions of institutionalization of racism raises another possibility for when 
institutions can be racist on the agential account that does not depend on the genetic thesis.  It is possible that 
some institutions are not merely aggregates of individuals acting in conjunction with one another, but actually 
possess agency of their own that is not reducible to the agency of those involved.  See List & Pettit (2011). 
Thus, it is possible that a group of individuals who are non-racist might come together to form an institution, or 
group agent, and though, as individuals, they harbor no racist attitudes or beliefs, they together create a racist 
group agent.  I don’t argue here that group agency of this sort is, in fact, possible or spell out the conditions 
under which it might obtain.  Instead, I just wish to highlight that if group agency is possible, then this seems 
like a distinct sort of institutional racism that would be agential, but that racism would not be captured by the 
genetic thesis.  
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and beliefs in a particular society and their pervasive expression in institutional policies.  For 
example, it seems right to say that, at least prior to the Civil Rights Act, anti-black racism in 
the U.S. was not merely institutional but systemic, given the large number of institutions 
involved in the perpetuation of racist attitudes and beliefs.  On the agential account then, 
perhaps a system is racist when the majority of the institutions of that make up that system 
are racist.  This is a description of an aggregate of agential actions and should not be thought 
of as picking out some entity ‘x’ that is a system and to which we can ascribe moral 
properties.  Consequently, if institutions are agents, then ‘systemic racism’ is a way of 
speaking about an aggregate of institutional actions, calling each of them racist and merely 
noticing that ‘there appear to be a lot of racist institutions around here’.  If institutions are not 
agents then it is another way of assigning the term ‘racist’ to an aggregate of individual 
agents who interact in (independently identifiable) institutions and who have managed to 
enact individual racism in those institutions.15 
2.2  The Structuralist Conception of Racism: Three Interpretations 
Having articulated the agential view, including its individual and institutional 
expressions (and, potentially, its extension to systems), I turn now to the structuralist 
approach.  My aim here is to present the most compelling version of this view, which takes 
systems or structures as the proper object of the term ‘racist,’ and the racism of institutions 
and individuals to be, at least in some instances, derivative from those racist systems of 
which they are members.  To accomplish this, I first want to discuss and dispense with two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 One interesting question that arises in describing individuals and institutions as racist is whether or not we 
can call someone or something racist when it has no responsibility, morally or epistemically, to change.  This 
worry arises particularly in cases where the aggregate of individual actions, each of which is fairly innocuous on 
its own and creates, we might think, little or no responsibility to change, can have devastating consequences 
when a large number of people perform it.   
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common views that, though often understood as structural accounts of racism, collapse into 
an agential account on further analysis.   
Structural Account #1: P+P=R 
At times, a view quite similar to the one I will articulate here is billed as a 
structuralist-style alternative to agential accounts of racism.  This is the “P+P=R” (power 
+prejudice = racism) theory. This formulation was first penned by Pat Bidol (1970) and has 
since been adopted by countless antiracist activists.16  It is useful in introducing people to the 
differential impact of prejudice when it is accompanied by power. Insisting that racism is 
always accompanied by power makes abundantly clear that the harms that a prejudiced group 
can cause when they control institutions are, in general, far more severe and far-reaching than 
those a prejudiced minority are capable of enacting. This, in turn, helps makes sense of why 
we often judge the prejudiced attitudes of a white person more severely than those of a black 
person.17  However, it places too much emphasis on personal prejudice (individual attitudes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16Bidol (1970)’s view is summed up in a manual by the National Education Association (1973). The manual 
states, “When the racial prejudice of the majority group in a society is reinforced by the culture and institutions 
of that society, then the prejudice becomes racism…In the United States at present, only whites can be racists, 
since whites dominate and control the institutions that create and enforce American cultural norms and values” 
(p. 12)  It continues, “In our society it would be very difficult for any individual to be racist all by himself.  If 
everyone just had his own individual prejudices, which were never reinforced by the society, racism would not 
exist. But when those individual racial prejudices are reinforced by the culture, we have institutional racism.  
Thus, all white individuals in our society are racists.  Even if a white American is totally free from all conscious 
racial prejudices, he remains a racist, for he receives benefits distributed by a white racist society through its 
institutions.  Our institutional and cultural processes are arranged as to automatically benefit whites, just 
because they are white” (p. 13)  The manual goes on to further distinguish between three types or levels of 
racism, individual, institutional and cultural.  Institutional racism exists when “the social systems of the culture 
[are] rigged in some way to distribute the benefits differentially and preferentially to whites” (p. 14).  Cultural 
racism, on the other hand, seems to be largely a matter of having white bodies as the assumed norm for all 
fictional characters, religious figures, etc. (p. 15). 
17 Blum (2002) rejects the P+P=R account and argues, “Power does play a role in the moral seriousness of 
instances of racism, but not in its existence” (p. 39).  He continues, “…I contend that the racial identity of the 
victim (and, to a lesser extent, the perpetrator) is indeed morally pertinent.  Hatred of blacks against whites is 
not a primary form of racism; hatred of whites against blacks is.  Some forms of racism are central and 
paradigmatic, others secondary.  The former have defined for us what racism is.  They are more directly tied to 
the rationale…for the intense moral opprobrium carried by the term ‘racism.’ That rationale involved 
oppression, hatred, and discrimination against people of color, and most especially blacks and Native 
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and beliefs) to be considered truly structural.  Though structures play a role in this account by 
giving context to individual prejudice, they are not the primary explanatory features. 
Individuals co-opt or create structures and use those structures to enact and enforce racist 
policies. Whites who benefit from those structures, though they may not be consciously 
prejudiced, are considered racist not simply because they receive advantages from them, but 
because they are complicit in institutions that continue to express racist attitudes, even if all 
those who possessed the relevant attitudes are dead.  
However, it is useful to note that many of the same criticisms that are often leveled 
against the structuralist view are also engaged to critique the P+P=R formula.  In particular, 
some critique the view for failing to respect the ordinary usage of the term, ‘racism,’ and, 
consequently, ostracizing whites who feel as though they are unfairly targeted by this 
conception.  The power condition is generally taken to mean that blacks, who lack the 
relevant power, cannot be racist.  A white and a black individual might say the very same 
thing, on this account, and the former would be racist while the latter would be merely 
‘prejudiced.’  Thus, apart from the well-known difficulty in making precise the “power” 
condition such that all and only whites possess power sufficient to make their prejudice 
racist, the P+P=R account is unapologetically revisionist.  In general, a black person who 
expresses negative attitudes towards whites because they are white is thought to be racist.  
But, accepting that this and all other structuralist accounts are revisionist, I will make no 
appeals to ordinary language in my critique. Though an account that respects our ordinary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Americans, by whites, not the reverse.  Everything else being equal, greater moral opprobrium rightly attaches 
to racism by whites against people of color than the reverse.  This is the most important moral asymmetry in 
racism”(p. 43-44).  This strikes me as a more plausible justification for our divergent judgments in such cases 
but it is an agential, not a structural, account.   
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language usage of the term might be preferable in some small way, it is far more important 
that our account be capable of capturing everything we agree, upon reflection, is racist.   
Structural Account #2: Racism without Prejudice 
 A second structuralist approach, similar in some ways to the first, was first articulated 
by David Wellman in his influential work, Portraits of White Racism (1977, revised 1993).  
Since then, social theorists have adopted and rearticulated it and it has emerged as one of the 
dominant, if not the dominant account, of racism in the sociological literature.18  In fact, 
P+P+R is likely a less sophisticated species of this view. As such, Wellman’s structuralism is 
vulnerable to many, though not all, the same critiques as the aforementioned approach.  
However, it is useful to examine it separately as it has several advantages over its more 
simplistic formation. 
According to Wellman (1993), racism is the "culturally sanctioned beliefs, which, 
regardless of intentions involved, defend the advantages whites have because of the 
subordinated position of racial minorities,” (xi).  Tatum (1997) expounding on Wellman’s 
view writes that, “racism is a system of advantage based on race” (p. 127).  The system, she 
argues, is made up of cultural messages, institutional policies and practices, beliefs and 
actions of individuals. Racism is present whenever it is better to be white in American 
society, which given the existence of pervasive and persistent racial disparities, it nearly 
always is.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See, for example, Pinderhughes (1989); Tatum (1997); Adams, et al. (1997).  In his review of Elizabeth 
Anderson’s “The Imperative of Integration,” (2010) sociologist Michael Emerson (2011) chastises Anderson for 
wading into the “somewhat tired debate of what and who is racist” arguing that her use of the term “seems to 
ignore the extensive social science work devoted to understanding and defining the term—such as the misuse of 
collective power that results in diminished opportunities for some racial groups (p. 318).”   
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What is essential to Wellman’s theory is that race plays an explanatory role in the 
position that individuals occupy within American society, but it does so for reasons other 
than prejudicial beliefs about various racial groups.  Blacks are, by and large, deprived of 
goods and services that white Americans enjoy and that denial is defended in terms that make 
no reference to racial superiority or inferiority.  Unlike past justifications for the white 
privilege, a white person who defends her advantages does so without prejudicial intent. 
Instead, writes Wellman (1993), “The terms in which middle-class professionals defend 
traditional institutional arrangements are, strictly speaking, not examples of racial prejudice.  
They are neither overtly racial nor, given these people’s interests, misinterpretations of 
‘facts.’  However, while the sentiments may not be prejudiced, they justify arrangements that 
in effect, if not in intent, maintain the status quo and thereby keep blacks in subordinate 
positions” (p. 33).   
So, without supposing prejudicial intent, how exactly, does one’s race work to 
explain an individual’s position in American society?  Take a familiar example:  Disparities 
in housing between whites and blacks are, in some cases, created and sustained by the 
mortgage industry practice of awarding home loans on the basis of one’s credit.  If blacks 
tend to have lower credit scores than whites, then they will struggle to secure home loans.  A 
white person who receives a loan when a black person does not could cite her higher credit 
score and argue that, in general, the practice of awarding home loans in this way is 
economically efficacious.  She need not express any bad attitudes towards blacks to defend 
her privileged position.  The structure affords her that privilege, on the basis of her 
membership in the white racial group, and she acts rationally and without malice when she 
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defends it.  The system she participates in is racist, in that it advantages her because she is 
white, even if she has no racist intent when she secures her loan or defends her privilege.   
Though this is one possible interpretation of the structuralist view (and quite likely 
the one that Wellman was attempting to articulate), it is relatively uninteresting.  It trades 
heavily on the notion of conscious prejudicial intent and, unlike a truly structural approach, 
agents are required for racism.  Most Americans, one would hope, are sufficiently aware of 
some of the devastating consequences of past anti-black racism that any defense they might 
launch of policies that maintain racial disparities would be an exercise in willful ignorance. 
Whites occupy an advantaged social position vís a vís blacks because of centuries of 
uncompensated harms perpetuated against blacks.  Even postulating that the advantages 
whites enjoy are not the result of discrimination against blacks, the current condition of the 
black population is most assuredly due, at least in part, to past racial injustice. So though the 
mortgage industry’s practice might be perfectly sound on its face, whites who defend it and 
the advantages they secure from it are disregarding the rights of black citizens.  They are 
failing to acknowledge that flagrant violations of blacks’ rights led to their lower credit 
scores and reduced options now.  
Imagine I have good reason to suspect that your pen was stolen before class and you 
were denied or unfairly discriminated against in all of your attempts to procure a new pen. I 
then insist that my having a pen for class entitles me to certain privileges, like the ability to 
take a test. You, I assert, ought not be permitted to take that test because you failed to bring a 
pen to class.  There is little question, in this scenario, that I have acted badly.  Even if I insist 
I have nothing against you, in particular (I am just defending the classroom pen rules, which 
are a generally fair way of solving pen-related problems), I act callously towards you when I 
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refuse to acknowledge the hardships that you have endured and how they affected your pen-
less status.  I may not have stolen your pen, or limited your ability to procure another, but I 
can certainly be accused of failing to care, or care enough, about you.  The same could be 
true of Wellman’s modern racist.  Though she expresses egalitarian views, she refuses to 
acknowledge how past injustices have rendered what would otherwise be egalitarian or 
colorblind policies, racist. 
If this is the correct interpretation, then structural racism simply collapses into an 
agential account, though the agents may not have explicit anti-black attitudes or beliefs.  
Whites are racist in that they exercise a willful disregard for blacks when they defend the 
advantages they enjoy because of past racism.  They need not express racist beliefs because 
defending current colorblind practices, given the lack of sufficient compensation for past 
racial injustice, is sufficient to maintain white privileges.  But, it is also a way of 
disrespecting blacks, so that defending those practices without acknowledging the suffering 
of black people is still racist.19   
As I said, this is a relatively uninteresting way of understanding Wellman (1993) and 
Tatum (1997)’s structuralist account, even if it turns out to be the correct interpretation.  A 
second reading is more sophisticated, and it might be what the whites Wellman describes 
would claim, were they pressed to think more deeply about the source of their advantages.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 It is possible that some white Americans who defend their privilege in securing a home loan, and the 
mortgage companies who use this metric, are unaware that whites’ higher (and blacks’ lower) credit scores are a 
result of past racial injustice.  Those people, one might argue, are truly without prejudicial intent when they 
defend their advantages. They articulate a “what’s mine is mine” defense of the advantages they possess 
because they do not even recognize them as advantages. They think that what they have, they earned and what 
blacks lack, they deserve.  Quite likely, those who are not sufficiently aware of the history of anti-black racism 
in the U.S. to draw inferences about the fairness of the credit industry are morally culpable for that ignorance.  
However, that some may not be does not erase agential wrongdoing from the picture entirely.  That atrocities 
are swept under the rug does not erase responsibility.  Thus, the state might still be at fault for failing to make 
information about the wrongdoings committed against blacks, and their lingering effects, more widely available.   
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On this interpretation of the structuralist account, the past injustices against blacks are 
recognized, their lingering effects are acknowledged, but white advantages are defended on 
the grounds that no white person now, nor any state or private industry, is responsible for 
those injustices.  Nor, it is claimed, could they bear that responsibility without incurring an 
unacceptable level of harm.  If this is the case, then the mortgage industry could perpetuate 
racial disparities through their credit score based loan policy without harboring any racist 
attitudes.  The agents involved may even sincerely regret that the practice produces bad 
outcomes for blacks, but they realize that, if they were to revise their practices and offer 
loans to blacks with lower credit scores, many companies would go out of business. They 
cannot be held responsible for rectifying injustices that they did not commit, especially if 
they would suffer devastating consequences were they to attempt to. 20   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It is these considerations that led me to change the initial intuition pump I offered from Glasgow (2009)’s 
initial formulation.  In the original case, Glasgow argues that, intuitively, a mortgage industry is racist if it 
offers mortgages to those with better credit ratings in a society that, several hundred years in the past, supported 
a system of state sponsored slavery for which reparations were never made.  Many of us (though certainly not 
all) would probably be inclined to accuse the state of racism for any “race-neutral” policies they enacted, given 
its past actions. It is not at all clear that the mortgage industry (or rather, the particular institutions that make up 
that industry) could be so accused unless they too were part of the original discrimination. Clearly, the mortgage 
industry is exacerbating racial inequalities caused by racism and we might object to their practice on this basis. 
However, were we to criticize the companies for failing to consider this preexisting disparity when crafting their 
policies, we would still have to present an argument for why this failure makes the company policy racist.  In 
other words, how is such an action indicative of the agent who created it having beliefs and/or attitudes that are 
racist?  My worry is that without such an argument, a failure to draw a distinction between institutions which 
are actually racist and those that are conducting “business as usual” in a society with a racist past could lead to 
the absurd conclusion that racial injustice in a society’s past makes all current institutions unjust which 
exacerbate racial disparities.  For example, a Reconstruction Era black family’s practice of passing on their 
traditions and accumulated knowledge could, given that no members of the family received any formal 
schooling, exacerbate racial disparities by making their children less well informed than white children whose 
families also pass on their traditions and knowledge.  But we would not want to say that the black family was a 
racist institution.  To do so would deny the very aspect of racism to which the genetic thesis draws our 
attention; namely, there must be a special sort of causal relationship between a racial disparity and an agent’s 
racism, and that racism must be taken up by (or inserted into) an institution in order for that institution to be 
considered racist.  Thus, the agentialist must be prepared to provide an account of institutional uptake (when an 
institution is a possible purveyor of racism), what it takes for an institution to express racism (institutional 
responsibility) and what our collective responsibility is to regulate against institution racism. 
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Similarly, whites who receive the loans need not cite racial superiority as grounding 
their claim to money.  They need only refer to their higher credit score and the fact that they 
cannot be held responsible for injustices that they did not commit.  They would also deny 
that they have any responsibility to aid whites who are poor because of past injustices.  
Furthermore, though they may regret that the system is set up to favor them, they would be 
much worse off were they not to take advantage of the home loans that their credit score 
affords them.   
I will revisit this interpretation in the following section.  I think, in fact, it is the 
correct diagnosis of how it is that there can appear to be racism without racist agents.  When 
structuralists claim that an agential account cannot make sense of some racial disparity, what 
they actually mean is that a narrow individualist picture of moral responsibility cannot. It 
may well be true that neither the mortgage industry nor any individual who secures a loan is 
at fault for current racial disparities in housing.  But it does not follow that the racism is not 
agential.  First, agents were responsible for perpetuating injustices against blacks and one 
consequence of those injustices is that blacks today have lower credit scores.  Though the 
mortgage industry may not be at fault for using credit scores, the current state of black 
homeownership (including, for example, the homes blacks own, do not own, and the 
geographic locations of those homes) express past racism.  They are the product of racist 
attitudes and bear those attitudes in their continued existence.  So, for example, the existence 
of the almost exclusively black North Lawndale neighborhood of Chicago, with a homicide 
rate triple the national average and poverty rate twice that of the rest of Chicago, is an 
expression of racism (Coates, 2014). It was created by the discriminatory practice of 
‘redlining’ and so is a direct consequence of racist attitudes.  
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Second, if we think, that justice is not only about our current actions, but also a matter 
of taking into account how past agents, acting wrongly, may have affected current conditions, 
then it is not the case that the practice today is devoid of agential racism.  Perhaps, for 
example, the state is responsible for allowing past injustices to continue to affect blacks’ 
ability to secure home loans.  Alternatively, it may be that we are all, as a collective, 
responsible (in a forward-looking sense) for creating a more just system that will take those 
past injustices into account.  That no single agent, be it a corporation or an individual, is 
responsible does not rule out the possibility that as a collective, we may be. 
So, why, if a sophisticated theory of collective responsibility (either backward or 
forward-looking) for past injustice would explain such cases, are structuralists instead 
committed to developing an account that does not appeal to agents and agential wrongdoing, 
individual or collective? Perhaps the move towards structuralism is purely pragmatic.  The 
structuralist recognizes that there are a huge number of potential problems involved in 
tracing current racial inequalities back to their source in the attitudes and beliefs of agents 
and so recommends revising the term.  That is the best way, they might think, of addressing 
the pressing issues of the American black population.  
They may be right.  Given that the culpable agents are likely long since dead or 
dissolved, the counterfactuals needed to prove culpability are likely to be extremely difficult 
to evaluate.  Furthermore, even if that issue were resolvable, there is little chance that the 
subsequent task of convincing present Americans to atone for past harms would succeed.  
White Americans would continue to defend their privilege despite the fact that it is the 
consequence of brutal racism against blacks.  They might continue to insist that because they 
were not responsible for that racism, they are under no obligation to give up the many 
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advantages that they currently enjoy.  Collective responsibility theories are controversial and 
especially unlikely to be accepted by those who occupy a position of privilege.  Thus, 
frustrated with the practical impossibilities of this project, the structuralist might decide that 
the more politically efficacious move in the fight to end racism is to redefine the term itself 
to attack its consequences—namely, those advantages that whites have because they are 
white.  Seeing the obvious injustice in a society where black people consistently end up on 
the bottom, structuralists might have become frustrated in the attempt to show that deciding 
home loans purely on the basis of credit scores is, in fact, racist and so move to an account 
that avoids the complicated task of assigning motivations to persons long dead. 
But a pragmatic decision is not the only potential explanation of the structuralist 
move. Though it might accurately describe some structuralists’ motivations, it assumes that 
the agential account is basically the right way to understand how racial disparities come 
about.  As such, it is not capable of truly capturing the structuralists’ basic contention that at 
least some racism can only be explained in terms of systems. However, there is a third, and 
final, structural account that offers a purely (though not exclusively) structural account of 
racism.  I turn now to Sally Haslanger (2004)’s account of racial oppression. 
Structural Account #3: Unintentional, Non-Accidental Racial Harms 
According to Haslanger (2004), structural racism (or, as she prefers to call it, ‘racial 
oppression’) is “crucially concerned with power” (p. 98).21  In instances of structural racism, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Though Haslanger (2004) declines to label her account as one of ‘racism,’ preferring to refer to the 
phenomenon as ‘racial oppression,’ the position she articulates is a clear account of racial injustice.  As she 
writes, “In cases of structural oppression, the focus is on our collective arrangements—our institutions, policies, 
and practices…” (Haslanger, 2004, p. 100-101).  The examples she gives range from Jim Crow laws to cultural 
norms.  As I am assuming that anything that is racially unjust is also racist, I will consider her position an 
account of racism. And, since I am not relying on an ordinary language critique of her view, she has nothing to 
fear from this assumption. Thus, for the remainder of this paper, I will treat Haslanger’s formulation as a 
reliable and sophisticated articulation of a structuralist account of racism. 
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the harm to individuals or groups is a result of unjust arrangements of institutions that 
misallocate power and so doing, fail to accord human beings their proper moral status.  For 
example, regardless of the benevolence of the dictator or her epistemic abilities, one might 
claim, as Haslanger (2004) does, that an absolute dictatorship is unjust in itself.  She writes,  
Tyranny is wrong not because (or just because) tyrants are immoral people intentionally 
causing harm to others but because a tyrannical governmental structure is unjust.  Theorists 
will vary on what exactly constitutes its injustice, but key considerations include such matters 
as the fact that tyranny is not a structure in which individuals count as moral equals. (p. 100) 
In other words, given some understanding of human beings’ moral status, this just isn’t the 
sort of relation that one person should stand in to another.  To the extent that the dictator uses 
his position to cause harm to his citizens, he is guilty of abuse of power but the structural 
wrong exists regardless of how he chooses to act (Haslanger, 2004, p. 100). 
 Some structural wrongs are clearly the product of the intentional actions of agents.    
Jim Crow laws, for example, are unjust institutional arrangements that are the expression of 
agents’ racist attitudes and beliefs. But some, Haslanger (2004) argues, are brought about by 
social and cultural practices for which no agent, either group or individual, is responsible. 
They are unorganized, uncoordinated, collective endeavors that include everything from 
transportation and administration to our rules of etiquette and linguistics (Haslanger, 2004, p. 
105). Nevertheless, they result in power relations that are unjust in themselves. As Haslanger 
(2004) writes, “…the oppressive structures in question may be intentionally created or 
not…those responsible for the structure may even be acting benevolently and with the best 
information available” (p. 103).   As such, there appear to be a number, perhaps a quite large 
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number, of practices that bear illegitimate power relationships without any agent having 
behaved wrongly in creating or sustaining the practices.22   
Some of those practices, Haslanger (2004) argues, non-accidentally (but 
unintentionally) divide that power along racial lines (p. 114).  Haslanger (2004) proposes that 
a non-accidental correlation can be established counterfactually.  For a group to be oppressed 
as a group, being a member of that group must be causally relevant to the oppression suffered 
(p. 114).  Take causal relevance to be a matter of close possible worlds; members of some 
group G are oppressed as Gs if, in the closest possible world where the current members of 
group G are non-Gs, they would not be harmed by the unjust policy. Thus, black men are 
oppressed as black men by racial profiling if, in the closest possible world in which they are 
white men, racial profiling would not harm them.  If we are tempted to refer to those 
practices as racially unjust, it seems we must admit that there are racial injustices that arise 
without racist agents. 
Consider the case of social norms:  In many places in the Reconstruction era 
American South, blacks were expected to address whites by their titles and last names, while 
whites addressed blacks by their first names.  This expectation, an instance of an illegitimate 
power relation between whites and blacks, might have been expressed to a greater or lesser 
degree by any particular individual (and as such, we may hold them more or less 
blameworthy for its maintenance) but need not have been the intentional creation any 
particular racist individual.  It is, if not historically accurate, at least conceivable that this 
norm arose not because some racist white wanted to assert her power over blacks but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 As Haslanger  (2004) puts it, “If power resides in the relationships created by practices, and no individual 
agent is responsible for a particular practice, then there is an important sense in which the distribution of power 
may be unjust and yet the injustice not be properly explicated in terms of an agent’s wrongdoing” (p. 104). 
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because, while enslaved, many blacks had no last name.  During slavery, even an anti-racist 
white person who wanted to demonstrate respect in addressing an enslaved black person 
would have had no choice but to refer to her by her first name.  For the enslaved black person 
to show the same respect to a white individual, however, would have involved calling her by 
her title and last name. Once firmly established, this practice might have continued after 
emancipation, when freed blacks acquired surnames. Though the whites who perpetuated it, 
particularly those who actively enforced it, might have been blameworthy for maintaining it, 
they were not responsible for creating the practice with its corresponding power relation.   
3.  Extending the Agential Account 
If Haslanger (2004) is correct and racial injustices, in the form of illegitimate and 
non-accidental power differentials, can arise without racist agents, then the structuralist has a 
distinct advantage over the agentialist. Agentialists can explain why the power relationship 
instantiated by something like Jim Crow laws is racist but seems at a loss to explain how a 
power relations stemming from uncoordinated, collective activities could be racist.  With 
respect to the former, they could argue that Jim Crow laws were the product and expression 
of objectionable racist attitudes and beliefs of U.S. lawmakers and those laws, once made, 
could continue to express those attitudes and beliefs even if no one in power currently agreed 
with them.  But, with respect to the latter, what could they say? Agentialism, as the name 
suggest, requires agents.  More specifically, it requires that those agents be the bearers of 
racism and express that racism through the practices they engage in and the power 
relationships to which those practices give rise.  However, in this case the racism is in a 
practice that is not properly thought of as the action of any agent or agents.   
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This would seem to be a strong point in favor of the structuralist account.  After all, I 
mentioned at the outset that if there is some aspect of racism that the agentialist simply 
cannot capture or capture as well as the structuralist, but the structuralist can capture all of 
the phenomena that the agentialist can, then we have reason to embrace the structuralist 
account.23 But, if the agentialist can also say everything that can be said by the structuralist, 
then we have no content-based reason to prefer the structuralist account, and we will have to 
move to other methods for evaluating the two. We might consider pragmatic reasons (which 
Haslanger (2004) argues point in favor of a structural approach but which I will argue favor 
an agential one) or how we use the term in ordinary language. Thus, a form of racism that 
arises without agents would seem to be exactly what the structuralist account needs to gain 
an advantage over the more familiar agential account.   
Unfortunately for the structuralist, I think we should not be too quick to discount the 
agential view. For the structuralist to assert that certain power relations are unjust she must 
make two claims: First, she must claim something about the nature of justice, namely, there 
are some relationships that are inconsistent with the moral status of human beings and so, 
oppressive and wrong in themselves. Second, she must claim something about the scope of 
justice, namely that it can be applied to the uncoordinated and collective activities of human 
beings.  I will address these claims in turn, arguing first, that oppressive relationships can 
only arise as a result of intentional human activity.  Second, I argue that even if we were to 
ignore that argument, extending the scope of justice beyond the reach of intentional human 
activity would make it impossible for us to preserve a distinction between injustice and 
unfortunate accidents. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Or, as Haslanger (2004) puts it, “a theoretical reason to reject the [agential] approach is that is cannot account 
for some forms of injustice for which no [agent] is responsible” (p. 105). 
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Glasgow (2009) attempts to resist the structuralist conclusion on intuitive grounds by 
presenting the case of a natural accident that gives rise to power relation between two parties.  
One party is, through no one’s intention or negligent action and unbeknowst to all parties 
involved, completely at the mercy of the other.  Glasgow (2009) writes,  
Accident. At time t, a society is arranged such that one person has almost all of the 
wealth and power, while the other million people live in dire poverty with no power. 
This distribution fails to maximize utility or real freedom, was not arrived at through 
free transfers, can be reasonably rejected by just about everyone, and fails to conform 
to principles that would be chosen from a fair initial position.  (In short, the 
distribution fails to satisfy any remotely plausible theory of distributive justice.) It 
arose when a freak accident killed off everyone except those trapped in a mine plus 
its one bunker-protected media baron, who alone can open the mine. The media baron 
has no way of knowing that the accident spared but trapped those in the mine, so he 
does not know that he has all the power (p. 75). 
 
 Given that, on the structuralist account, we are concerned primarily or crucially with 
power distributions, and in this scenario, the power lies completely in the hands of one 
individual, the situation described is potentially unjust.  To determine with certainly whether 
or not it is actually unjust, we need to discover if it causes the trapped individuals unjustified 
harm—are they disabled or disempowered by the institutional arrangements? Is the power 
arrangement inconsistent with respect to the moral status of the million? Glasgow argues that 
even if we answer those questions affirmatively, it is hard to see this as a case of injustice 
rather than as an unfortunate accident.  However, he admits that since ‘racism’ is a term that 
picks out not only individual moral failings but also social injustices, if we assent to the 
structuralist notion that certain relationships are unjust in themselves, then the distribution of 
power described might be morally condemnable (in the sense of unjust) even if no agent is 
condemnable (in the sense of morally culpable).  The million are oppressed by the one.  
That conclusion, however, is mistaken. Haslanger (2004) claims that just as 
dictatorship is wrong in itself or inherently oppressive so, too, are the illegitimate power 
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relations created between races by the unintentional, uncollected actions of individuals.  But 
what, exactly, is an illegitimate power relationship?  Presumably, not all inequalities in 
power are illegitimate.  A doctor has more power than a patient on the operating table but 
that relationship does not seem oppressive in itself.  Illegitimate power relations are at odds 
with our status as moral agents or violate our human dignity.  What sort of power relation 
might, apart from any harm they cause or are likely to cause, violate our human dignity? 
Building on Haslanger (2004)’s example of the absolute dictator, one plausible candidate is 
the relationship of domination. 
Recent literature in the republican tradition has done much to explicate the concept of 
domination.  As Philip Pettit (1997) understands it, domination occurs when one party has 
“the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in some of the other's choices” (p. 52).  Apart 
from any harm that it causes, domination is wrong in itself because it is a violation of our 
status as free agents.  Thus, an absolute dictator is, by definition, oppressive of his subjects 
regardless of how he acts.  He always has the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with their 
choices.   
 We need not agree with Pettit’s particular version of domination but we can use it to 
illustrate an important point about oppressive power relations—namely, for some 
relationship to be a power relationship, illegitimate or not, it requires more than inequality, 
even when those inequalities are extreme. Just as illegitimate power relationships require a 
specific sort of inequality (one that is violates our human dignity), power, too, must be of a 
certain sort to separate it from mere potential.  Pettit (1997) calls it a ‘capacity,’ but we could 
also term it a ‘readiness.’  He writes,  
…the capacity to interfere must be an actual capacity, as we might call it—a capacity 
that is more or less ready to be exercised—not a capacity that is yet to be fully 
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developed: not anything like the virtual capacity of the musically gifted person who 
has yet to try out the piano. Consider a collection of people who, if they were to 
constitute themselves as a coherent agent, would have a ready capacity to interfere 
with someone. Or consider the agent, personal or corporate, who would have such a 
capacity, did they only recognize the presence of the potential victim, or the 
availability of causal modes of contact. In such cases there is only a virtual capacity 
to interfere, not an actual capacity, and I shall not say that there is domination. There 
is virtual domination, we might say, but not actual domination. Virtual domination 
may be something for republicans to guard against, of course, because of the future 
dangers it represents. But it does not yet constitute the central evil to which they are 
opposed (p. 55-56). 
 
Unlike a dictator, the media baron in the bunker lacks the capacity to interfere with 
the trapped million because he is totally unaware that he possesses that power.  That this 
capacity be actual, and not merely potential, is an essential aspect of illegitimate power 
relations, even if they are understood outside of Pettit (1997)’s framework of domination.  
Without this distinction, oppression would result whenever any members of society could 
bring about an illegitimate power relationship. But this result would be absurd.  I could, 
perhaps, if I crafted a careful plan, spent years accumulating resources, and got very lucky, 
come to dominate some other person or persons, but I do not thereby oppress them. 
Consider the following case: Suppose that the CDC were to develop a new vaccine 
that protects the population against a deadly disease but has the completely unintended and 
unexpected side effect of making everyone inoculated slightly more racist against blacks.  
The government mandates the vaccine without first testing it for this effect because no 
vaccine had ever been known to have such an effect.  Even if the agentialist and the 
structuralist agree that this situation created a harmful power relation that was non-
accidentally divided along racial lines, the agentialist could not call the relationship itself 
racist.  Like the media baron, the white population may now have a virtual or potential 
capacity for domination but, if they do not recognize blacks as potential victims and take no 
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steps to use this unfortunate event to their advantage, they do not dominate. However, in the 
interest of guarding against actual domination, an agentialist could still insist that the 
government intervene to restore racial equality, compensate the victims and check all future 
vaccines for this side-effect and that a failure to do so would amount to racism.   
 Returning to Haslanger, we can now ask ourselves if uncoordinated actions of 
individuals are capable of producing the capacity for domination all on their own.  Can they 
give rise to structural wrongs in the form of illegitimate power relations that are wrong in 
themselves?  I think the answer is, absolutely.  As a result of many activities of other agents, 
oppressed groups find themselves in a position such that they are vulnerable to the arbitrary 
will of another.  To use Marilyn Frye (1983)’s famous illustration, they are caged in, unable 
to move in any direction, trapped by bars that may have each been created without the 
realization that the others already existed.  And so, they are dominated.  Many people, not 
just one, have the capacity to interfere with them on an arbitrary basis.  However, unlike the 
million who are trapped by the mine, and the vaccine that causes racism against black people, 
this domination is not the result of some freak accident.  It is the product of intentional 
human actions.  That these actions were uncoordinated is not to say that they had to have 
been.  And if we think that relationships of domination ought to be guarded against, then 
when domination arises in this way it is the product of a great deal of neglect.   
Noticing that our uncoordinated activities, including the social and cultural norms we 
create and employ, have created illegitimate power relations between racial groups, the 
agentialist can declare that these activities, and their coordination, are within the scope of 
justice.  We are required, collectively or as a state, to pay attention to the relationships 
between our actions and guard against their domination. That there might be some action that 
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none of us is individually morally responsible for performing but nevertheless, is required of 
us collectively is an intuitively plausible claim.  For example, some have held that we have a 
collective moral responsibility to enter into political society and regulate our behavior 
according to the laws of that society.  (We may also have a collective moral responsibility to 
dissolve that political society or refuse to be bound by some of its laws.)  Others have noted 
our collective responsibility to feed the hungry or protect the defenseless.  If Haslanger 
(2004) is correct, and cultural norms and other uncoordinated human activities give rise to 
domination, then it is our collective responsibility to arrive at some scheme for engaging in 
that regulative activity, and failing to do so is an expression of racist disregard.  However, the 
agentialist does not have to arrive at this conclusion.  Given a different view about the nature 
of justice, the agentialist might argue that social norms fall outside its scope.  
To argue that power relations can arise for which no individual can be held 
responsible but that are nonetheless racially unjust is not, then, the same as claiming that 
racial justice extends beyond the scope of moral responsibility, understood collectively. 
Though it may well be true that no individual or collection of individuals intended to produce 
the total result, they had a collective moral responsibility to prevent it.   Presumably, what 
makes it the case that the power relation instantiated by the media baron and the harmful 
vaccine is unfortunate, but not unjust, is that some natural disasters (the unpredictable ones) 
that produce harmful power relations fall outside the scope of justice.   
And so, unlike the structuralist, the agentialist must admit that there are some human 
activities that, though they may create potentially harmful power relations, are not unjust.  
These are the true accidents of human interaction, like the vaccine case, which could not 
have been predicted and which no one was prepared to regulate against.  But perhaps, we 
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should not only be concerned with power differentials that are created by intentional, and 
sometimes neglectful, human interaction.  Maybe injustice is present before any intentional 
actions take place. Might the scope of justice extend beyond the scope of any agent’s (or 
agents’) moral responsibility?  
 If Haslanger (2004)’s view rests on the claim that no agent is responsible (including 
collective agents), she is committed to the claim that it is the power relation, independent of 
any actual agential capacity, that is unjust.  But, noticing this, it is hard to see how the 
structuralist can avoid defending the counter-intuitive position that unpreventable natural 
disasters can independently create injustice.  What reason do we have for limiting the scope 
of justice to the sphere of human activity if not for the fact that we often take human activity, 
uncoordinated and collective though it may be, to be the sort of thing that can (whether or not 
it ought) be regulated?  By eliding the difference between the content of our claims about 
justice and the scope of those claims, the structuralist implausibly asserts that justice applies 
to power relations whenever and however they arise, or is forced to assert a division between 
the sphere of human activity and the rest of the natural world as a matter of brute fact.   
Far from being a limitation, the agentialist’s inability to declare that inequalities 
created by human accident or natural disaster are racist is actually an advantage of the theory.  
Even if we could assert that some phenomenon is racist without recognizing a connection to 
the attitudes and beliefs of agents, we ought not.  To do so would not only trivialize racism 
and stretch the application of our concepts of justice and injustice beyond recognition but 
could also blind us to the dangers of ignorance and the need for vigilance in the face of the 
unknown.  That human beings can suffer in ways that we did not cause and cannot fix is not a 
new idea.  They may be born sick or mentally disabled or lose themselves to dementia or 
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mental illness.  But, to argue that the mere instantiation of such circumstances is an injustice 
is to refuse to engage in the messy and complicated task of carving up responsibility, both 
individual and collective. 
4.  The Messy and Complicated Task of Carving Up Responsibility 
As I mentioned briefly above, the strong account of collective responsibility that 
would allow the agentialist to capture (almost all) the racial injustices described by the 
structuralist is not a necessary feature of the agentialist picture.  Just as the agential account 
is compatible with a number of different views about what, exactly, the wrong of racism 
consists in and what institutions can be thought to instantiate that wrong, it is also compatible 
with a number of different views about the scope of our collective responsibility.  For 
instance, the agentialist can set the scope of justice more narrowly, arguing that certain sorts 
of human activities, though they might produce harmful power relations, cannot be properly 
understood as racist because they are too diffuse and thus, incapable of expressing anything 
that could be thought to be connected to some agents’ racist attitude or belief.  They might, 
for example, argue that social norms cannot be properly thought of as the bearers of racism 
because they are incapable of the necessary uptake of individual attitudes or beliefs.  Laws, 
meanwhile, might be a prime example of institutional entities that can express the attitudes 
and beliefs of their creators.  Alternatively, (or additionally), an agentialist might argue that 
there are many instances of non-accidental racial harms (such as the structuralist describes) 
that lie outside the scope of individual or collective responsibility. Some agentialists may 
even deny there is a realm of collective responsibility that is more than the aggregate of 
individual responsibility, and may even construe that individual responsibility in such a way 
as to rule out any obligation not to perpetuate the injustices of past agents. 
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 These questions of collective responsibility are complicated and unlikely to be easily 
resolved.  Structuralists attempt to side step these worries by arguing that certain power 
relations are, themselves, unjust but in doing so they commit themselves to the claim that the 
scope of justice is implausibly large.  Agentialists might try to side step the issue as well, by 
offering an account that neglects to tell us which of our institutions (from laws, to social 
norms, to transportation systems) can be the bearers of racism (in other words, which are 
capable of expressing agential racism), what it takes for those institutions to express racism 
(is it enough that they perpetuate past racial injustices or must they go further to be thought 
of as racist?) and what our responsibility is to guard against these expressions of racism.  The 
strength of the agential account is its flexibility.  It is capable of capturing a number of 
accounts of the wrong of individual and institutional racism.  But it is flexible precisely 
because it leaves so many questions unanswered and any theorist hoping to offer a 
comprehensive account of institutional racism must be prepared to fill in those gaps.   
In the meantime, however, the agential structure gives us room to explore the possible 
contours of racial injustice in our actual world.  By filling in those gaps in different ways we 
can begin to discover points of common agreement between different plausible theories of 
agential racism, institutional uptake, and collective responsibility.  Those common points 
provide initial targets for anti-racist political action. And, ultimately, the aim of a theory of 
racism, institution or individual, is not simply to gain conceptual clarity but to aid us in 
alleviating the suffering of many real victims of racial injustice.   
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2.  Implicit Racial Bias and Institutional Racism 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The term  ‘aversive racism’ has been around since the 1970s to describe the cause of 
subtle signs of biased or avoidant behavior towards blacks by whites who profess to be non-
racist.24  However, over the last 20 years psychologists have gathered an impressive amount 
of evidence not only about the ubiquity of these racially-biased attitudes but also an apparent 
mismatch between them and individuals’ consciously-held beliefs and attitudes.  This 
phenomenon is known as implicit racial bias.25 
 In this paper, I present ample evidence that white subjects who harbor these implicit 
biases exhibit behaviors indicative of racial bias against blacks.  But, this literature also 
suggests it is possible they do so without being aware either that they have these attitudes 
(they believe themselves to be non-racist) or that they are acting upon them.  In fact, these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Joel Kovel (1970) was the first to draw a distinction between aversive and dominative (conscious) racism.  
Though the distinction he described has been modified, the term ‘aversive’ has survived as a way of marking 
out a type of racism that does not include conscious or explicit race-based antipathy.  Exactly what aversive 
racism does include, however, is a subject of much debate, some of which will be addressed in this paper.  
25 For the purposes of this paper, I will use “implicit bias” interchangeably with “implicit racial bias” and I will 
concentrate my discussion on anti-black implicit racial biases.  But implicit biases are not confined to the realm 
of race.  Researchers have also used the implicit association test to discover implicit biases in any number of 
domains, including other social groups (genders, and sexual orientations).    
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attitudes may be no more than associative tendencies caused by a mere awareness of 
common racist stereotypes and attitudes.  I argue that this interpretation of the biases and 
individual agents’ relationships to them presents problems in accounting for implicit biases 
on any backward-looking theory of moral responsibility.  That, in turn, makes it difficult to 
say that implicit biases are racist, if racism is not simply a matter of differential consequences 
but must stem from the bad attitudes (including hatred, inferiorization, or disregard) of 
agents.   
However, I argue switching to an institutional account of racism makes it possible to 
explain how the discriminatory behaviors that these biases lead to are racist, even if the 
biases themselves and the agents who harbor them are not.  I outline how an institutional 
account of this sort might go, distinguish it from other common conceptions of institutional 
racism, and end by briefly addressing some questions that arise for the moral responsibility 
of the relevant institutions.   
2.  Implicit Racial Bias: What Is It and What Does It Do? 
Perhaps the most famous tool used to measure this phenomenon is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT).  In an early experiment using the IAT by Greenwald, et al. (1998), 
white college students were asked to link stereotypically white and black names with 
pleasant or unpleasant words.  They were told to move as quickly as possible and a computer 
recorded the speed with which they were able to perform each task.  The students moved 
significantly slower when asked to associate black names with pleasant words and white 
names with unpleasant words than the reverse. The variance in response time was taken to 
reveal people’s implicit biases towards the two races because, as previous research on 
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associative tendencies had shown, the stronger the association between the two concepts, the 
more quickly the subjects would respond.  
Participants in the experiment were also asked to fill out confidential questionnaires 
that measured their explicit racial biases towards the two racial groups. The study found that 
the presence of implicit biased behavior was much greater than self-reported explicit bias.  
For the vast majority of the participants, their explicit racial bias against blacks measured at 
zero, finding them neutral for racial bias or indicating a preference for blacks over whites.  
However, all except one participant was found to exhibit anti-black prejudice on the IAT 
(Greenwald, 1998, 1475).   
In the decade and a half since this study, IAT tests have been widely used to confirm 
the existence of and further explore implicit racial biases.  They have discovered (among 
many others) implicit associations between Blacks and hostility, laziness, unintelligence, and 
athleticism.  Other tests that require subjects to make split-second decisions have also 
uncovered implicit biases. A study by Payne (2006) found that subjects are more likely to 
mistake a tool for a gun when primed with a black face. In addition to these more 
straightforward response-time measures, a variety of other tests designed to measure 
subjects’ automatic associations between two objects have consistently found whites hold 
negative implicit bias towards blacks.26  Studies using subliminal messaging (to prevent test 
subjects from self-censoring) have also revealed whites’ implicit biases against blacks.27   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See, for example, Blair (2001), Dovidio, et al. (2001) 
27 For example, an early study by Dovidio, et al. (1997) presented subjects with a subliminal sketch of a black 
or white person (flashing it on a computer screen so quickly that they were not consciously aware of it) and then 
measured how long it took them to decide whether or not a particular characteristic (“good,” “bad”) could be 
used to describe a person generally.  Shorter response times were taken to reveal greater association between the 
subliminal sketch and the characteristic.  White subjects consistently tested as having greater association 
between the subliminal black face and negative characteristics, and the white face and positive characteristics, 
despite the fact that they were neither aware of the face nor that the test was measuring their racial attitudes.   
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While the results of the IAT are certainly startling, they likely would not be as 
troubling (and would not have inspired such a great deal of psychological research and 
philosophical analysis) if implicit biases only affected participants’ behavior in interactions 
with computers.  However, since the IAT was first performed, a plethora of studies have 
confirmed a correlation between an individual’s score on an IAT and her social behavior, 
including how she judges and decides.28  For example, in experimental settings, whites with 
implicit biases against blacks are more likely to talk and smile less and make more speaking 
errors when interacting with a black, rather than a white, interlocutor.  They make less eye 
contact, sit farther away, and blink more often— all microbehaviors associated with 
unfriendliness (McConnell and Leibold, 2001). In other words, agents with implicit bias 
perform small-scale racial discrimination. Because agents are not attending to these 
behaviors— how often do any of us think about the number of times we blink our eyes while 
engaging in conversation?— they are often the sites of subtle biases that the agents are 
unaware they are displaying and may not be aware they have. 
However, to say that these subtle nonverbal behaviors are performed unconsciously is 
not to imply that they are without effect.  Without realizing it, we all pick up on the subtle 
nonverbal behavior of those around us.  We may not notice what it is about someone that 
gives us the impression that she is uncomfortable around us or dislikes us but, nevertheless, 
we get the message.29  And the same is true for blacks interpersonal interactions with whites 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 A meta-analysis of 122 IAT reports by Greenwald, et al. (2009) found that the automatic associate process 
recorded by the test was a reliable measure of social behavior (more so than self-reported attitudes).  And, 
important for my purposes here, “For 32 samples with criterion measures involving Black—White interracial 
behavior, predictive validity of IAT measures significantly exceeded that of self-report measures” (p17). This 
research is not without exception. Gehring, et al. (2003), for example, hesitate to claim that scores on the IAT 
are necessarily linked to racially biased behavior or unconscious racial prejudice in the individual. 
29 Word, et al. (1974) found that, under experimental conditions mimicking job interviews by white 
interviewees for both white and black applicants, the black applicants received less immediacy (increase in 
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who have implicit biases.  When asked to report on their experience of such an interaction, 
one study found that white subjects generally assess it positively (Dovidio, et al., 2002).  
They reflect on their conscious attitudes and deliberate actions to judge the experience. 
However, black participants generally judge that the whites they interacted with hold 
conscious racial prejudices. They pick up on whites’ unconscious nonverbal behaviors and 
judge the interaction by those.30 
The mixed messages that whites send in these interactions by verbally expressing 
non-racist views or friendliness but giving off nonverbal cues that they dislike or distrust 
their interlocutors can create anxiety for blacks.31   And that, in turn, could create a looping 
effect such that blacks, in interactions with whites, will send back nonverbal signals of 
unease and discomfort that put whites on guard or cause them to judge blacks as hostile and 
prejudiced.  More worrisome is the fact that whites’ negative microbehaviors not only affect 
how blacks’ perceive them but also affect blacks’ performances.   One study found that when 
whites with implicit bias were teamed up with blacks, their team solved problems less 
efficiently than interracial teams with either non-implicitly biased whites or explicitly biased 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
physical proximity or visibility), more speech errors and a shorter interview time.  In a second experiment, 
white applicants were exposed to these same conditions (they were given a shorter interview time, less physical 
proximity and exposed to more speech errors) and they performed worse in the interview than whites in the first 
experiment.   
30 One possible explanation for whites’ seemingly unfriendly and racist behavior in interactions with blacks is 
that they are nervous or anxious about appearing racist and so, display microbehaviors indicative of that 
discomfort or anxiety.  Garcia (2011) levels a similar objection against Faucher and Machery’s (2009) 
contention that his theory of volitional theory of racism is inadequate because it fails to account for implicit 
bias. He wonders why, exactly, we should think behaviors that indicate discomfort are racist unless they stem 
from an objectionable cognitive or non-cognitive attitude. If this hypothesis is correct then implicit biases, 
despite the well-established predicative validity of IATs, are not causing these behaviors.  Rather, implicit 
biases are inert as mental states and the behaviors are a response to unrelated discomfort or anxiety.  However, 
given the predictive validity of the IAT for these behaviors, I find this hypothesis implausible.  If implicit biases 
are not active, in some way or another, in this process then it odd that they are co-occur with these 
microbehaviors such that they can be used to predict the presence of the behaviors.  Nevertheless, I remain open 
to the possibility that implicit biases are highly correlated with, but not caused by, implicit biases. 
31 See Hyers and Swim (1998) and Shelton (2000).  
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whites (Dovidio, et al, 2002). Moreover, apart from the effects of the implicit biases 
themselves, the combination of overt friendliness with subtle indicators of unfriendliness can 
also cause harm.  Dovidio and Gartner (2000) write, 
These different perspective and experiences of white and blacks in interracial 
interaction, which happen inadvertently and occur daily, can have summative effects 
over time and help to contribute to the climate of misperception and distrust that 
characterizes contemporary race relations in the United States…The mixed messages 
that aversive racists often convey can create fundamental miscommunication in 
interracial interaction and produce divergent impressions among interactants that can 
undermine their ability to interact efficiently in task-oriented situations as well as 
effectively in social situations. (p24)32 
 
This perceptual divide between blacks and whites with respect to whites’ attitudes and 
behavior towards blacks appears to have persisted, with a recent Gallup poll (2013) showing 
that while 67% of whites are satisfied with the way blacks are treated in society, only 47% of 
blacks are. 
 There are other indications that implicit biases may be playing a role, not only in our 
interactions with computers or inside the lab, but also in our daily lives. These include a well-
known experiment by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) that demonstrated that when 
employers are presented with identical resumes topped with either white or black names, they 
are overwhelmingly more likely to call the white candidate in for an interview than the black 
one. Other experiments have uncovered similar results.  An IAT study by Green, et al. (2007) 
of 287 physicians at four academic medical centers in major metropolitan areas found that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 One could argue that blacks’ mistrust of whites is the initial instigator of these microbehavioral loops.  In 
other words, whites’ negative microbehaviors are response to the negative microbehaviors of blacks.  If that 
were true, however, one would expect that white participants would issue a negative report when asked their 
impressions of an interracial interaction but the opposite is generally true; Whites report feeling positive about 
the interaction.  But perhaps whites’ microbehavioral responses to black microbehaviors happen at an entirely 
unconscious level.  Given whites’ societal dominance, they could less aware of microbehaviors than blacks 
because knowing and managing blacks’ opinions of them has fewer consequences for how they live their lives. 
However, if this were the case then individuals possess two independent but highly correlated unconscious 
processes (implicit biases and unconscious microbehaviors) rather than one interrelated process. 
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though the doctors registered no explicit bias against black patients, their IAT results showed 
an anti-black bias.  The stronger that bias, the greater the likelihood that the doctors would 
treat white but not black patients with thrombolysis.  Another study published by the 
consulting firm Nextions (2014) found that supervising lawyers not only rate the same memo 
draft lower when they are told that it was written by a black rather than a white associate, but 
they actually find more of the intentional errors planted by researchers when they believe that 
the author was black.33 
These real world cases do not prove definitively that implicit biases cause 
discrimination.  In the study of attorneys, for example, it is possible that those individuals 
held explicit racist attitudes that caused them to rate the black associates lower than the white 
ones.  After all, they were given neither an IAT nor an explicit attitudes’ test.  The same is 
true of the resume test.  It is possible, though statistically unlikely, that researchers who 
discover these subtle biases in real world settings are encountering all and only the actions of 
conscious racists and not those with implicit bias.  Furthermore, most studies of implicit bias 
(both generally and cited here) use U.S. white college students as test subjects and may ask 
them to perform tasks that are beyond their level of competence. A study that finds that these 
college-aged test subjects discriminate against black employees when asked to perform a 
hypothetical managerial task does not prove that experienced managers who test as implicitly 
biased will do the same.  The study of physicians mentioned above would seem to tell against 
this hypothesis because that population was given both the IAT and an explicit attitude test 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Furthermore, the qualitative comments the supervising lawyers provided for the white associate were more 
positive than those for the black associate. A similar experiment by Moss-Racusin, et al. (forthcoming) focused 
on gender bias among faculty in science departments across the U.S.  Researchers found that when presented 
with an identical resume for a laboratory manager position, topped by either a male or a female name, both male 
and female faculty members rated the male applicant more competent and hirable.  
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(testing as anti-black on the former and egalitarian on the latter).  They were also asked to 
adjudicate a case that they would be likely to encounter in their workplace. But, again, those 
cases were hypotheticals.  Perhaps, when dealing with actual patients, only those individuals 
with explicit racial bias would discriminate.  It is possible that those with implicit biases 
perform behaviors in a hypothetical experimental lab that are indicative of racial 
discrimination (facial expressions of unfriendliness, for example) but only those with explicit 
racist beliefs and attitudes act on these behaviors in real life.34   
This conclusion strikes me as implausible given the accumulation of evidence that a 
biased rating on the IAT (combined with either the same biased or a neutral rating on explicit 
measures) is predictive of agents’ real-world behavior.35  But, prediction does not prove 
causation.  There is an alternate explanation for these real-world results that is far more 
plausible than the hypothesis that they influence agents’ behavior in the laboratory but not 
outside; Perhaps most people hold conscious anti-racist beliefs and attitudes but are hesitant 
to self-report due to a general shift away from the social acceptability of explicit racism.   It 
would not be hard for those individuals to fake explicit non-racist attitudes on self-report 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Garcia (2011), for example, expresses skepticism over the claim that those who test as biased on the IAT will 
discriminate in real-world settings.  He writes, “What reason is there to think the spontaneous, quick, 
unthinking, unconscious, conceptual associations evidenced in these association or identification tests will also 
manifest themselves in a tendency (statistical tendency, e.g., or a psychological inclination) to racially 
discriminatory (and racist) actions when subjects act with time, deliberation, attention and care in such self-
consciously careful, thoughtful, even painstaking endeavors as deliberating about hiring or promoting 
employees, admitting candidates for education or training programs, grading tests taken in school or at work, 
leasing to or relocating tenants, processing loan applications, siting public facilities, convicting or paroling 
defendants, voting, and so on? That connection cannot be inferred, but requires independent empirical support.  
Without it, the tests results may have little to do with the more serious and consequential spheres of racial 
discrimination” (p. 259).  Garcia is right to point out that implicit biases are far less likely to influence behavior 
when individuals are given time to deliberate.  However, as the studies of physicians, attorneys, and NBA 
referees (as well as the weapons bias test) indicate, I think he underestimates the frequency and potential impact 
of split-second decisions.   
35 For example, Greenwald has collected a list of 59 independent studies demonstrating the predictive validity of 
the IAT on real-world behavior including voting and political attitudes, mental health, medical (including the 
study of physicians’ racial biases cited above), employment, education, forensics and relationships.   
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tests.  If this is true, then implicit biases are not actually implicit at all.  The test is simply a 
better way of measuring an agent’s explicit racist attitudes and beliefs.  Any discriminatory 
behavior they cause is actually the result of agents’ conscious racist beliefs. 
 It is likely true that some of the participants in these studies hold conscious racist 
attitudes or beliefs and are lying on their self-reports.  However, the fact that reporting such 
attitudes has become less socially acceptable is one indication that the prevalence of 
conscious racist beliefs has decreased.  At least some whites agree that racist beliefs and 
attitudes are morally wrong and yet large percentages of whites continue to harbor implicit 
racial biases.  As a study by Bobo (2001) of racist attitudes in the U.S. found, “The single 
clearest trend in studies of racial attitudes has involved a steady and sweeping movement 
towards general endorsement of the principles of racial equality and integration” (p. 269). 
Furthermore, subtle biases of this sort can show up even in situations where the parties are 
thought to be strongly incentivized not to behave in a biased manner; A study by Price and 
Wolfers (2010) of black and white NBA referees found that despite extensive training to 
perform their duties impartially, referees showed a slight but statistically significant own-race 
bias when calling fouls. 
However, I do not want to dismiss the possibility that implicit bias tests measure 
conscious attitudes that individuals are reluctant to admit. I will revisit this claim, along with 
the psychological literature that supports it, in the next section.  Instead, supported by the 
empirical evidence, I want to assume simply that the results of implicit bias tests are 
predictive of behavior that should be of moral concern.  Whether or not these behaviors are 
caused by implicit bias, let’s agree that the behaviors are real, show up in real-life situations, 
and that their effects are harmful. Although the discovery of racial discrimination in NBA 
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games might not inspire the same ire as discrimination in the medical field, both should leave 
us troubled.  Even in individuals who are highly trained, heavily scrutinized and incentivized 
to make non-biased decisions, these subtle, discriminatory behaviors appear.  These biases 
are particularly likely to manifest in situations that demand rapid decisions.  And though the 
biases may be subtle, their consequences need not be.  A snap-second judgment can have 
devastating effects.  I mentioned earlier a study that showed subjects were more likely to 
mistake a tool for a gun when primed with a black face.  Might they also be more likely to 
mistake a wallet for a gun, as police apparently did in 1999 when they shot 23-year-old 
Guinean immigrant Amadou Diallo 19 times?  That implicit biases are harbored by and 
appear to affect the behavior of highly trained experts in sports and medical fields should 
make us wary that others, including the police, might be equally susceptible. 
Of course, it is not news to any of us that, despite trying our best to act well, we can 
do devastating and wrongful harms to others.  But, the literature on implicit bias drives home 
exactly how common and how easy this might be.  Even more disturbingly, it suggests that 
many of us could be (perhaps unintentionally) harming a particular set of people, a racial 
group, because they are members of that group.  And this realization naturally directs our 
attention to the question of whether or not our implicit biases, and we ourselves are racist.  It 
is this question to which I turn now.  
In the next section, I briefly review the current debate over the nature of implicit 
biases, their moral status, and individuals’ moral responsibility for them.  In doing so, I 
address three related questions: (1) Are implicit biases racist? (2) Are the behaviors they 
cause racist? and (3) Are agents with implicit bias racist?  I argue that while many 
interpretations of implicit biases and their cause can be accounted for on some backward-
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looking, individualist picture of moral responsibility (and so, are racist), one plausible 
interpretation of what implicit biases are and how agents come to have and act upon them, 
cannot.  I show that if that interpretation is correct, we would be forced to admit that implicit 
biases, the troubling and discriminatory behaviors they cause, and the agents who harbor 
them are not racist. 
3.  Are Implicit Biases Racist?  The State of the Debate 
Despite the fact that the phenomenon of implicit bias is both well established and 
widespread, it is unclear exactly what these biases amount to and what their connection is to 
theories of racism; more specifically, are implicit biases, the behaviors they cause, and/or the 
agents who harbor them racist?  This set of questions has received some attention in the 
philosophical literature. However, because implicit biases are not confined to the realm of 
race but occur in response to any number of social groups, the broader question of whether or 
not the biases are immoral (and the agents who harbor them are blameworthy for those biases 
and the behaviors they cause) has been asked with a great deal more frequency.36  Continuing 
developments in the psychological literature, as well as uncertainty as to how to interpret 
those results has led to a host of divergent individualist moral analyses.  While philosophers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Implicit biases have received a fair amount of attention in philosophical literature lately (even spawning the 
Implicit Bias & Philosophy International Research Project and a forthcoming two volume collection due to the 
interesting questions they raise in epistemology and ethics.  However, with a few notable exceptions, including 
Faucher and Machery (2009) Garcia (2011), Kelly and Roedder (2008), very little work has been done to bridge 
the divide between literature on implicit bias and accounts of racism. In the psychological literature, it has 
sometimes been assumed that the term appropriately applies and implicit biases have been labeled as a type of 
‘aversive racism.’ See, for example, Dovidio and Gaertner (2004). Less still has been written on the relationship 
between implicit bias and institutional racism but several interesting accounts have linked implicit bias to 
justice, more generally. For example, Miranda Fricker (2007) has argued that implicit biases are a form of 
“epistemic injustice,” while Sally Haslanger (2014) contends that the U.S. education system perpetuates the 
implicit ideology of racialization that regulates blacks to inferior positions vís a vís whites.  (On Haslanger’s 
view, racialization just is the creation of a racial hierarchy.)  Given the tight connection between ‘institutional 
racism’ and ‘racial injustice’ perhaps these could be considered theories of implicit bias as institutional racism 
though they are different from the view I will explore here. 
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are generally united in their concern for the harms that implicit biases may cause, and 
generally committed to the view that such harms should be rectified, they are divided on the 
moral status of both the biases themselves and the individual agents who harbor them.   
 However, given substantial unanimity among philosophers that the harms caused by 
implicit bias are of moral concern, attempting to discover whether or not the biases 
themselves are immoral, much less racist, might seem like a pointless exercise.  If we agree 
some behavior ought to be rectified, why care if it is racist?  Why think it deserves some 
special label that sets it apart from both the harms it causes and from the many other ways in 
which it is possible to be vicious towards other human beings? 
 In this question, there are two significant critiques of engaging in the project of 
showing that implicit biases are racist.  The first is a fairly familiar criticism of backwards-
looking arguments for moral responsibility; why should we care about establishing fault if 
we all agree that we have a responsibility to rectify the harm?  We could instead concentrate 
on fixing the problem and cease the unproductive activity of finding someone at fault for it.  
Though I lack the space to respond to this argument in full, I do want to flag a suspicion that 
while blame can sometimes be counter-productive it can also serve to motivate political 
action.  Finger pointing, when it is done tactfully, can take problems as vast and seemingly 
insurmountable as implicit racial bias and begin to break them down into more manageable 
demands for change. 
The second critique is more specific to my task.  Why should we care if implicit 
biases are racist, in particular, as opposed to vicious or hateful in some other way? There are 
a great many bad attitudes that one can adopt towards other people that fail to accord them 
their proper moral status and that failure should always trouble us, regardless of whether or 
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not it is based on race or some other, morally arbitrary feature.  The question of whether 
these biases are racist does not and should not decide whether or not we should care about 
them.  Nevertheless, I think the answer is important. In the last several centuries, some of 
humanity’s most deplorable crimes have been committed in the name of or rationalized away 
by racist doctrines and attitudes.  The genocide of the indigenous people of the Americas, the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade, the Holocaust, and the slaughter of Chinese at Nanjing all had 
racist ideologies at their center.   Racism, it seems, is a particularly awful way of being bad.  
The justificatory work such attitudes and ideologies have performed represents the worst in 
humanity.  Recognizing this, racism is a moral wrong we should take particular care to avoid.   
Some philosophers shy away from the term, preferring to reserve it for particularly 
vicious or deliberate expressions of bad attitudes.37 I do not want to restrict it in this way.  
Like most moral wrongs, there are gradations of racism; we need not think ourselves a Nazi 
because we discover we hold a racist belief, or have acted on a racist attitude.  But, finding 
ourselves in the ranks, if only in thoughts and attitudes, of those who committed such 
unimaginable atrocities should give us pause. Even the less virulent forms of racism, though 
less worrisome in themselves, might be easier to inflame into the truly bad kind. Racism, we 
might think, is a particularly dangerous form of immorality. So, though one need not be 
awful to be racist, among types of badness, it is an awful one to be.  Much more so than 
‘lazy,’ or ‘rude,’ the label ‘racist’ is a serious one, and the discovery that our behavior is 
racist should be taken seriously.   And so, it is of particular importance whether or not some 
moral wrong is racist.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See, for example, Anderson (2010), Garcia (1996). 
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That both the label and the wrong it denotes are serious, however, is not to say that its 
proper application is well understood.  Even less clear is when and under what circumstances 
a particular harm counts as “institutional racism.”  Due to this country’s history of racist 
oppression, an institutional policy that has a differential impact on racial groups, 
disadvantaging a group that was previously discriminated against, is often assumed to be 
racist.  And, given that history, differential impact is often an important, though not a 
sufficient, condition for racism.  In actuality, institutional racism is much more complex.  It 
requires examining the attitudes and intentions of institutions and/or the individuals who 
make them up, their organizational structures, and the scope of their moral responsibility, as 
well as their behaviors. Discussing how a particular phenomenon like implicit bias is an 
instance of institutional racism is one way of increasing clarity about institutional racism 
more generally and raising (if not always answering) some of the tough questions about how 
and when the concept appropriately applies. 
My goal in this section is to begin that process, by connecting recent empirical and 
philosophical literature on implicit biases to theories of racism. I show how individual 
theories of morality and moral responsibility might account for implicit bias and how their 
ability to do so depends on what, exactly, those biases are and how we interact with them as 
moral agents.  To facilitate this process, I will assume that racism is always immoral. Agents, 
their attitudes, and their actions can all be racist, though when actions are racist it is because 
they stem from racist attitudes. This assumption is useful because it allows for a fairly 
straightforward connection between the concept of racism and various theories on moral 
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status of implicit bias and biased agents.  Moreover, it is also an assumption that is well 
supported by the current literature on racism, and upheld by most of the dominant theories.38  
In order to ensure that every possible (non-consequentialist) way in which implicit 
biases and biased agents could be racist is fully explored, and no plausible interpretation is 
ignored due to controversial, pre-theoretical commitments about the nature of racism, I will 
adopt a hybrid view of racism on which both cognitive and affective attitudes can be racist.39 
Racist cognitive attitudes consist in inferiorizing beliefs (beliefs that they are inferior) about 
a member or members of a racial group because she(they) is(are) member(s) of that group. 
Racist affective attitudes are expressions of antipathy, disrespect, or disregard for a member 
or members of a racial group because she(they) is(are) member(s) of that group.40 Either is 
sufficient for racism, but they need not be full descriptions of the wrong that racism often is.  
In many cases, treating people in a racist manner includes treating them as if they were not 
human. Though I will not explore it here, I take it that there are more and less inferiorizing 
cognitive attitudes that one could have and degrees of affective attitudes one could hold such 
that not every racist belief or affective attitude is as bad as every other, but all racist attitudes 
are immoral.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Nevertheless, this assumption is neither universal nor entirely uncontroversial.  While “racism” is generally a 
term of moral condemnation in our ordinary language, Charles Mills (2002) and Tommie Shelby (2002) argue 
that whether or not racism is immoral cannot be stipulated ahead of offering an account of the concept.  They 
claim that to do so unfairly stacks the deck against doxastic account of racism (on which racism is primarily a 
matter of beliefs).  Here, I assume that, while not all racial generalizations need be racist, I follow Blum (2002) 
in asserting that certain inferiorizing beliefs are (even if they do not stem from or co-occur with attitudes of 
hatred or disregard). This helps to make sense of cases of racial paternalism, which might present problems for 
an account, like Garcia’s (1996) that focuses exclusively on the connection between racism and certain negative 
affective attitudes.  So, though I assume that racism is immoral, I make room for the possibility of racist beliefs 
unconnected to vicious attitudes of hatred or disregard. 
39 Adopting a more restrictive view on which, for example, only beliefs can be racist could unnecessarily 
truncate the discussion if implicit biases turn out to be associations or affective attitudes.   
40 I take “disregard” to include a broad spectrum of objectionable affective attitudes including culpable 
ignorance (turning a blind eye towards one’s actions and beliefs) and insensitivity.   
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That being said, I want to leave room for the possibility that beliefs and attitudes that 
are characteristically racist can fail to be so if they stem from genuine ignorance.  Beliefs that 
seem racist may, in fact, be naïve.  Attitudes that appear hateful may turn out to stem from 
fear or confusion.  However, ignorance is not a blanket excuse.  Inferiorizing beliefs offend 
against what we all know to be human beings’ proper moral status, and so are racist even 
when the people who hold them do not do so out of hatred.  Paternalistic attitudes towards a 
racial group are racist.41  Vicious attitudes or expressions of disregard are racist if those who 
hold them could have done better.  Yet, a behavior is not racist just because it offends a racial 
group.  It is racist only when it is a product of inferiorizing beliefs or the affective attitudes 
described above. 
A few additional caveats before I begin: First, I assume that if implicit biases 
(whatever they turn out to be) are racist then the unconscious discriminatory behaviors (as 
described in the preceding section) that are their direct consequence are racist.  However, 
even if implicit biases are racist, that does not entail that the agents who harbor them are 
racist.  Instead, I will explore a number of possible excusing conditions under which an agent 
might have, and act on, racist implicit bias without being properly understood as a racist. 42  
Second, if implicit biases are racist, and if the agents who harbor them are at fault for those 
biases, then, I assume, those agents are properly referred to as “racists.” In other words, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Blum (2002). 
42 This view is different from one in which beliefs and attitudes can be racist irrespective of their relationship to 
the individual. For example, Anderson (2010) distinguishes between racism which she reserves for “judgments 
of serious vice” and racial stigmatization which, she argues is a “broader concept” that does not require a 
connection between the stigmatizing behavior and some objectionable attitude or belief on the part of the 
individual who performs it.  For example, the actions of a hotel guest who hands his keys to a black 
businessman, believing him to be a member of the hotel staff expresses racial stigma (given stereotypes and 
power relations that keep blacks in a subordinate role) even if he was completely unaware of such stereotypes 
and just made a mistake.  She writes, “Conduct expresses stigma if it insults or disadvantages the stigmatized 
group in ways that fit the stigmatized ideas…” (p 48-49).    
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apply the term “racist” to any individual who is properly understood as morally responsible 
(at fault) for her racist attitudes, implicit or otherwise. 43  Finally, I assume that an agent 
could be racist even if her implicit biases are not racist, if the biases stem from her racist 
character.  I make these assumptions because, in presenting these individualist accounts of 
the immorality (or not) of implicit bias and implicitly biased individuals, my goal is not to 
rule them out.  Instead, I hope to show that although there are many possible phenomena for 
which these individualist pictures can account, there is at least one plausible, minimalist 
interpretation of the nature of implicit bias that the individualist picture cannot accommodate.  
I argue that if this minimalist interpretation is correct, implicit biases are racist, albeit on an 
institutional, rather than an individualist, framework. 
3.1  What Is the Bias Itself? Implicit Biases as Mental States 
Implicit biases are often referred to as unconscious racist attitudes; Individuals who 
harbor implicit biases are typically unaware of them.44 However, to say that an implicit bias 
is unconscious is not to say that it (and the person who holds it) is not racist.  Most, if not all, 
plausible theories of racism make room for the possibility that one can harbor unconscious 
beliefs and attitudes that are properly termed ‘racist.’  In terms of assessing their racism, 
unconscious attitudes are subject to the same evaluation as consciously held ones:  are they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 This marks a departure from theorists like Blum (2002) who wants to reserve the term “racist” for individuals 
with particularly vicious beliefs or attitudes, or whose character is marked, in some significant way, by their 
racism. My aim here is not to deny that may be a better use of the term.  I only intend to use it to mark out when 
a person is at fault for their racist attitudes and beliefs. 
44 Here, I mean to indicate that implicit biases are unconscious insofar as the agents who harbor them are 
unaware of the existence of the attitude.  They would lack what Gawronski, et al. (2006) have termed “content 
awareness.”  They may also lack “source awareness” or “impact awareness” (they may be unaware where their 
attitude comes from or the effect it has on their behavior, respectively) but those features, I would argue, are 
less central to assessing a) whether or not the attitude itself is racist and b) whether or not the agent who harbors 
it is racist.  However, they are not completely unimportant.  I will revisit some potential implications of impact 
awareness for moral responsibility later in this section.  
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vicious, disrespectful, disregarding or inferiorizing to members a racial group because they 
are members of that group? If so, then they are racist.   
For example, imagine a landlord who consistently fails to rent rooms to a particular 
racial group.  When queried about his decision, in each particular case he cites his suspicion 
that the tenant would have been ‘too loud’ as his reason for refusing to rent the property.  
This phenomenon is robust over a variety of circumstances including those in which it was 
clear that some tenant of another racial group whom he did rent to was, in fact, more likely to 
be loud (a large, white family, for example, vs. a single, black female.)  
After gathering data over a period of time, we bring it to the landlord’s attention.  He 
is shocked to see the evidence that he has acted it in a discriminatory fashion.  But, when he 
reflects upon his behavior and pays attention to his thoughts when he is around black people, 
he begins to notice that he does expect them to be louder than white people.  He avoids 
sitting near them on buses or in other public spaces and is reluctant to rent apartments to 
blacks, even when he has good reason to believe the individual in question will be just as 
quiet, if not quieter, than a white renter.  He admits that, though he was previously unaware 
of it, he harbored unconscious negative attitude about blacks because he believed that black 
people are louder than whites and it caused him to discriminate against black applicants.  He 
had an unconscious racist attitude.  Perhaps implicit biases are unconscious attitudes like 
that, and so, are racist. 
However, it could be that implicit biases are not attitudes, conscious or unconscious, 
but mere associative tendencies.  In their paper reviewing the philosophical implications of 
implicit bias, Kelly and Roedder (2008) formulate this minimalist construction in a 
particularly helpful and intuitive manner: they write that on this view, “…an implicit attitude 
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is simply a tendency to associate one concept with another, in the way that, for instance, the 
concept salt might prime the concept pepper” (p. 528).  So an agent’s high rating on an IAT 
might be, from a cognitive perspective, nothing more than a strong tendency to associate 
Blacks with unpleasant rather than pleasant words.   
Unlike unconscious beliefs or affective attitudes, perhaps associative tendencies are 
not properly subject to moral evaluation.  Garcia (2011) argues that without an account of 
how the individual associates the two concepts, it is impossible to know whether or not the 
association is racist.  An association between, say, blacks and guns could be caused by the 
knowledge that blacks are more likely to be the victims of violent crimes rather than the 
belief that they are more violent than whites or more likely to perpetrate crimes (Garcia, 
2011).45  However, the point is not merely that we do not know why the individual with 
implicit bias is associating the two concepts and so, cannot know for sure if they are racist.  
Rather, the more interesting result is that if an individual’s implicit biases are merely 
associative tendencies (and the individuals possess no cognitive or affective attitudes that 
account for the associations), and those associative tendencies are too minimal as mental 
states to be apt for moral evaluation, then there is nothing in the individual that can properly 
be called “racist.” Implicit biases, on this view, might be harmful but they are not robust 
enough, as mental states, to be racist.   
3.2  Are Agents at Fault for their implicit Biases? 
Even if it turns out that implicit biases are unconscious racist attitudes, it may be that 
agents with implicit biases are not at fault for them.  And so they are not, as I have stipulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 As Garcia (2011) writes of implicit bias, “How, it needs to be explained, is the implicit bias that consists in 
mere association of concepts tied to prejudice and thus to real psychological states (either affective, cognitive or 
volitional)…?” (p. 256).   
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that the term will be used, racist.  On my account, a racist agent must, in some sense, endorse 
such attitudes and beliefs.46  The attitudes must be, on some plausible interpretation, hers.  
To determine if they are hers, we might ask: Could individuals with implicit biases have had 
different attitudes?  This question can be posed in (at least) three different ways:  First, are 
agents who have implicit biases aware of them or could they be rightly criticized for failing 
to be aware of them?  Second, is it within an agent’s power to change such biases?  Third, if 
an agent becomes aware of and finds she cannot change her implicit biases, does she embrace 
them?  Or does she disavow them and the actions they cause her to perform, wishing 
sincerely that she could act differently?47   
Let’s begin with a discussion of whether or not agents are aware, or should be aware 
of their biases, and so, at fault for them. In the case I described above, the landlord was 
unaware that he had a racist attitude towards blacks. But is that enough mitigate his 
responsibility? Is the landlord not a racist, because he was unaware of his racist attitude?  Not 
necessarily.  One could argue that had the landlord been paying attention to his actions, he 
would have noticed that he harbored a racist attitude.  It was not buried deep within his 
subconscious, but was available to him if he vigilantly searched his psyche.  And, raised in a 
racist culture, where racist attitudes are quite easy to pick up, maybe the landlord was 
morally obligated to regularly subject himself to such self-examination.  So, that his racist 
attitudes were unconscious does not necessarily absolve him of the charge of racism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Even if implicit biases are mere associative mental states an individual could still be at fault for them, 
depending on how she came to possess them and how she reacts to discovering she possesses them.  I will 
return to this point later in this section.   
47 In other words, is she responsible in the sense that she is accountable for them or are they merely attributable 
to her?  Robin Zheng (forthcoming) argues that we ought to employ the latter account of responsibility when 
talking about implicit bias, given the difficulty of knowing if excusing conditions obtain when individuals act 
on implicit bias.  
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Early research on implicit biases, which found a marked divergence between white’s 
self-reported explicit attitudes and their implicit attitudes, hypothesized that the gap was due 
to the fact that the subjects were unaware of their implicit attitude and so, could not report 
it;48 The whites tested appeared to genuinely believe that they were non-racist. However, 
more recent tests have called this conclusion into question, showing that the divergence 
between white subjects’ explicit attitudes and their implicit biases is lessened when whites 
believe that the IAT is capable of accurately measuring their racial attitudes (Gawronski, et 
al., 2006).  When whites are not incentivized to respond in a socially desirable way, their 
self-reported explicit attitudes towards blacks are more negative, and thus, more closely 
match the results of the implicit bias tests (Nier, 2005). Decreasing the time that subjects 
have for deliberation when completing self-reports also increases correlation (Gawronski, et 
al., 2006). These data, along with other studies examining the effects of motivational and 
deliberative factors on subjects’ self-reports, suggests that whites are actually conscious of 
their so-called ‘implicit’ attitudes.  If this is true then implicit bias tests are just a means of 
showing that white subjects are lying about what they consciously feel and believe about 
blacks.  They hold conscious anti-black attitudes.  
Regardless of whether or not someone with implicit bias is aware of her biases, she 
may still not be responsible for them if it is not in her power to change them.  As Garcia 
(1996) might ask, in assessing whether or not an agent is racist, ‘Are the negative attitudes 
volitional?’ Perhaps an agent harbors conscious racist attitudes, which are revealed by 
implicit bias tests, but sincerely desires to rid herself of them. She is convinced by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See, for example, Banaji (2001), Cunningham et al., (2004), Jost et al. (2002), Phelps et al., (2000) and 
Rudman et al., (1999).   
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evidence that her racist beliefs are false and bad attitudes unwarranted but she cannot stop 
thinking and feeling them. 
Of course, on certain pictures of how our cognitive attitudes are formed, this will 
seem absurd.  Surely, if she were truly convinced that her beliefs were false, then they would 
not be her beliefs.  The beliefs she had would have changed. (Although, importantly, this 
need not be the case for noncognitive attitudes, which seem capable of sticking around well 
after we have decided they are unwarranted.  The same is true of our perceptual experience.  
If the evidence that a stick remains straight when dipped in water is convincing, then 
although our perceptual experience of the stick may never change and our feelings about the 
stick might take a very long time to change, our beliefs about the stick and its form are 
altered.  We no longer behave as though the stick becomes bent each time we dip it in water.)   
However, early studies suggested that this was not the case for implicit biases.  
Researchers discovered that even after subjects were made aware of their implicit biases, 
they were unable to revise them despite the fact that they appeared to be convinced that the 
attitudes revealed were false or immoral. One possible explanation for this result is that 
subjects were unable to truly hold the opposing view. Irrespective of their professed attitudes 
and beliefs, the subjects were actually unconvinced.  Still, numerous studies have shown that 
implicit biases, are unaffected by what one might think of as these traditional modes of belief 
and attitude revision. One possible explanation is that implicit biases are automatic 
associations and not full-fledged attitudes.  Attitudes, cognitive or noncognitive are our 
responsibility because we can control them.  They are revisable.  Automatic associations, 
however, lie outside our control and if implicit biases are those it may be that individuals are 
not at fault for them. 
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And yet, recent studies have shown that implicit biases (or the behavior they give rise 
to) may be at least partially under an agent’s conscious control.  However, strategies for 
altering biases or mitigating their effects are not intuitive.49  They cannot be overcome 
simply by drawing one’s attention to the falsity, irrationality or viciousness of a biased 
attitude.  But if when individuals are taught strategies for overcoming their biases they can 
change, then provided such strategies are not extremely difficult or time-consuming, they 
might well be morally responsible if they continue to exhibit implicit biases, even if the 
biases are mere automatic associations.50   
Such a view would seem to absolve subjects of fault who currently exhibit implicit 
bias, be they conscious or unconscious attitudes, but (through no fault of their own) have no 
learned strategies for eliminating that bias, of racism. But, it may be that an agent’s current 
inability to control such attitudes does not actually mitigate her responsibility.  We might ask 
how the subject came to possess such attitudes and if it was ever in her power to have 
developed different ones.  To draw upon an earlier example, imagine that the landlord, 
having become aware of his racist attitude, sincerely desires to change it but finds that he is 
unable to.  We might still be tempted to argue that he is at fault for his attitude, and therefore 
racist, if he could have, at some point in the past, formed a different one.  Unlike a person 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See, for example, Kawakami, et al. (2000); Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg (1996); Karpinski & Hilton 
(2001); Rudman & Borgida (1995); Dasgupta & Greenwald (2001). 
50 On the other hand, if implicit biases are not fundamentally different mental states from our consciously held 
attitudes (or they are, in fact, conscious attitudes), then it is possible that the fact that they are not subject to 
traditional modes of revision is indicative of a problem with those modes.  Maybe our traditional understanding 
of the sort of control necessary for moral responsibility was misguided.  Agents were always morally 
responsible for attitudes that they held because they failed to subject them to these sorts of revisionary strategies 
because the old strategies of revision were fundamentally misguided. Alternatively, one might argue that agents 
are no more morally responsible for any other attitudes than they are for implicit biases because, prior to the 
insights gleaned by modern psychology, they could not have revised any of their attitudes.  Such revisions, 
when they do occur, are a matter of dumb-luck and not a consequence of rational reflection or meditation on 
one’s moral values. 
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who was raised in a culture that was so thoroughly steeped in racist attitudes that she never 
had a chance to develop non-racist ones, the landlord cultivated his biases, though they are 
now impervious to change.  The biases are connected, in the right way, to beliefs or attitudes 
that the agent was responsible for.  Similarly, if those with implicit biases can no longer 
change them, they might still be responsible for them, and thus racist, if biases developed 
because the individuals held objectionable attitudes or beliefs.  The biases might also turn out 
to be racist, even if they are mere associative tendencies, because they stem from some 
immoral feature of the agent who develops them. 
Finally, if implicit biases are mere automatic associative tendencies and an agent with 
implicit bias is unaware of her bias, cannot control it and was not in control of the 
development of the biases, she still might be a racist if those biases are indicative of her deep, 
underlying character.  Perhaps, when discussing the agent’s moral responsibility for implicit 
biases (and moral responsibility, generally) the important question is not whether she is 
aware of the biases or could alter them, but whether or not those biases are indicative of 
whom she really is. The fact that the disassociation between an agent’s explicit, self-reported 
biases and her implicit biases lessens when motivational factors like social desirability are 
controlled for would seem to tell in favor of the hypothesis that implicit biases are indicative 
of an agent’s deeper character.   
Implicit biases could be activated by the mere knowledge of cultural stereotypes, 
whether or not an agent endorsed them.  If this were true, then implicit biases would not be 
indicative of an agent’s deep character.  Just knowing of the existence of a particular racial 
stereotype or that some people harbor negative attitudes towards a racial group would be 
insufficient evidence of anything objectionable in the agent herself, even if that knowledge 
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caused her to act in a discriminatory fashion.  Of course, after becoming aware that they 
harbor biases because of their knowledge of common racist stereotypes and attitudes, and 
that such biases are harmful to particular racial groups, individuals might be racist if they do 
not take steps to excise those biases.  They act with disregard for the victims of their 
discriminatory behavior.  Once made aware of these biases and strategies for changing them, 
perhaps agents could be blamed for failing to change the features of their individual lives that 
make them more likely to act on implicit biases. And even if they could not, as individuals, 
change their behavior, perhaps they would nonetheless be morally required to advocate for 
institutional changes that would compensate the victims or mitigate the discriminatory effects 
of their bias.  But the individuals would not, it seems, be racist because they harbored the 
biases or acted upon them, if mere knowledge were sufficient to give rise to them.  
 Thus, it is possible that, given what we currently know and suspect about the nature 
and cause of the implicit biases could be accommodated on traditional models of individual 
moral responsibility.  Or, perhaps, those traditional models will need to be modified in light 
of the evidence from implicit bias.  Additional empirical research will likely shed more light 
on this question and I do not want to rule out the possibility that, in light of further 
developments in the psychological and philosophical literature, including consensus on the 
nature of implicit biases, individual analyses may turn out to be correct.  However, as I have 
argued above, there is one interpretation of the nature and cause of implicit biases for which 
traditional backward-looking (or ‘fault-finding’) models of moral responsibility cannot 
account.  Neither the biases themselves, nor the individuals who harbor them, nor the 
behaviors they cause would properly be called racist.  Thus, my aim for the remainder of this 
paper is to argue that even if this interpretation turns out to be correct, implicit biases are still 
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racist. In other words, even if implicit biases turn out to be nothing more than automatic 
associative tendencies between concepts activated by mere knowledge of cultural stereotypes 
and the agents who harbor them are unaware that they have them and so cannot, prior to 
becoming aware, control them, implicit racial biases are still racist in that they stem from 
racist attitudes.  I argue that, under those conditions, implicit biased behavior would be a 
form of institutional, rather than individual, racism.  This claim admits of several possible 
interpretations, which I will disambiguate in the following section. 
4.  Implicit Bias as Institutional Racism 
To say that institutional analyses of implicit bias have been less pervasive than 
individual ones, is not to say they have been ignored completely in the current literature.  
Institutional theories, because of their close connection to justice (where justice is a feature 
of the arrangement of our basic institutions) are often refer to structures or systems.  
Sometimes it is assumed that simply because implicit biases contribute to racial inequities 
they must therefore be immoral or unjust; But, as I have argued elsewhere, that connection is 
too quick. More promisingly, feminist theorists have argued that racist stereotypes and 
attitudes are part and parcel of a dominant ideology of racial privilege that works to reinforce 
the status of those in power and perpetuate asymmetric power relations.  Sally Haslanger 
(2000) for example, has argued that our race concepts, properly understood, just are 
expressions of power relations.51  One’s race is not just one’s actual social position within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Haslanger (2000) writes that “A group is racialized iffdf its members are socially positioned as subordinate or 
privileged along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and the group is “marked” as a target 
for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a 
certain geographic region (p. 44).”  
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that hierarchy but also includes prescriptive content.52 It is inseparable from stereotypes and 
attitudes about that racial group.53  It determines both how one ought to be treated and the 
meaning of the treatment one receives (Haslanger, forthcoming, ms., 30). 
For example, members of certain racial groups are often, because of their racial group 
membership, deprived of full inclusion in the epistemic community (the community of 
knowers). Their epistemic authority is undermined in a variety of ways because of their racial 
group membership that marks them, among other things, as intellectually inferior.  If justice 
requires (as it plausibly does) that individuals’ access to knowledge not be restricted on the 
basis of their racial group membership, but also (and more importantly) that they not be 
deprived of the capacity for rational self-development (for which inclusion in the epistemic 
community is an essential precondition) then their exclusion is a grave injustice (Haslanger, 
forthcoming, ms., 19).  
Importantly, racial subordination (or the creation of race) is not simply a matter of 
individual attitudes and beliefs.  Centuries of material deprivation make it the case that 
‘equal’ treatment with respect to race will nevertheless perpetuate these hierarchical 
relations.  Moreover, even in cases where there are no biases, explicit or implicit, at work, 
one’s racial group membership can determine the social meaning of an interaction 
(Haslanger, forthcoming, ms., 22-27).  Actions will be interpreted through a dominant 
ideology of race as hierarchy, even if the individual actor does not act from racist attitudes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52Haslanger (forthcoming) writes, “Racial frameworks situate groups delimited by ‘color’ in social hierarchy 
that carries presumptions concerning both moral and epistemic authority and a range of associated entitlements.  
These presumptions are enforced and enacted day to day between the races.” (ms., p. 4) 
53 Haslanger (forthcoming) writes, “The social relations defining both gender and race consist in patterns of 
treatment towards bodies as they are perceived (or imagined) through collective frameworks of salience.  Just as 
pink ‘means’ girl and blue ‘means’ boy in the contemporary US, the bodily markings presumed to be evidence 
of (relatively recent) ancestry in sub-Saharan African ‘means’ (among other things) intellectual inferiority…” 
(ms., p. 30) 
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conscious or unconscious.  And individuals may not always be responsible for the knowing 
or controlling for the social meaning of their actions, even when these actions lead to 
injustice.  So our concepts and background beliefs about races, our entire ideology of 
racialization, express reinforce and perpetuate unjust power relations for which no individual 
may be responsible.   
On this view, implicit biases are racist because they stem from and contribute to the 
dominant ideology of racialization.54  They help to maintain the unjust power structures. But 
they are only a small, and relatively unimportant part of the story.  The larger picture is of 
individuals participating in institutions or structures that, without any racist attitudes or 
beliefs, conscious or unconscious, perpetuate racial injustice. Explanations of this sort are 
institutional or structural (as opposed to agential) because they posit these broad ideological 
forces as a (if not the primary) purveyor of racial injustice.  Racial injustice is contained in 
the very concept of racialization and so built into the structure of our society. 55    
Even if we disagree with Haslanger that our race concepts are necessarily 
hierarchical, we could still agree that negative stereotypes and affective attitudes towards 
historically disadvantaged racial minorities are part of this dominant ideology.  They are built 
into our language, social norms and customs and so, to the extent that they contribute to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 I use “racist” here as a synonym for racial injustice, though Haslanger and others would likely resists that 
move, reserving ‘racist’ to pick out the individual phenomenon. 
55 Haslanger rejects individualistic explanations of social phenomena in her Carus Lectures (2012) in favor of 
structural explanations, which focus on articulating the background ideology or schema (where a schema is a set 
of concepts and background beliefs that “help us interpret and organize information…and are the basis for 
various behavioral dispositions) (Handout from Lecture 2, p. 1). She applies that view to the education system 
arguing, “School…creates kinds of individuals through a process of discipline.  It does not do this in a 
deterministic or mechanical way, of course, for part of the goal of the discipline is to form individuals who 
voluntarily enact the social structures that are to be perpetuated…[T]he process of racialization that occurs in 
schools prepares African-Americans for the subordinate status they can expect to occupy, and it does this very 
effectively.  The ‘success’ of racialization is at odds with the explicit egalitarian ideology that many Americans 
hold dear, but this ideology does not hold the political, cultural or economic reins; and structures have 
pernicious effects without anyone intending or designing them (Haslanger, forthcoming, ms., p. 2).” 
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racial disadvantage, it may be the case that these harms are acted out by agents who, though 
they perpetuate this ideology, have no intention to act or awareness that they are acting in a 
racist way or perpetuating racial injustice, broadly understood. 
This type of institutional analysis of the racism of implicit biases is quite different 
from the one I intend to draw on here.  On the view articulated above, every part of a society 
that employed or expressed or otherwise participated in the creation and perpetuation of race 
categories with their corresponding power relations would be, in some sense, racially unjust. 
The racism is ‘institutional’ in the sense that it is not ‘agential.’  It is a property of a large, 
loosely-organized, societal-wide structure or system without aim or purpose beyond, one 
might hypothesize, its own perpetuation.  However, even to say that is to take a step towards 
assigning agency to this structure that it importantly lacks.   
Though I have argued against structural analyses like Haslanger’s as accounts of 
racism elsewhere, nothing I say here hangs on that argument (Mitchell).  I submit that even if 
the concept of race is inseparable from racial attitudes and stereotypes and our culture is, as a 
result, shot through with racism through the perpetuation of a racial hierarchy that is the 
product of no one’s intentional action, there is still space to mark out agential racism (the bad 
attitudes and beliefs of individuals) as a particular sort of harm. Assuming that racism can 
also be expressed in the morally objectionable attitudes and beliefs of agents, the structuralist 
should be able to accept the analysis I offer here while still believing that there is work to be 
done by a broader, structural explanation of the phenomenon.   
Thus, I want to focus on a different sort of institutional racism, where what I mean by 
‘institution’ does not exclude, but instead relies upon, the concept of agency.  By 
‘institution,’ I intend to mark out discreet organizations that, I will assume for the purposes 
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of this paper, can be understood as possessing some sort of group or collective agency 
sufficient to ground moral responsibility.56   This claim is obviously controversial, but I will 
not argue for it here.57  Rather, I will assume that the sorts of group agents I will single out 
here, corporations and companies with organized structures and codified policies and 
procedures will count, if anything does, as group agents.  That agency entails not only that 
they be capable of collective or group intentions (and thus, be able to perform actions that are 
properly thought of as theirs) but also that those intentions are appropriately subject to moral 
praise and blame.  Institutions not only can act, but they can act immorally.58   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 In other words, I will reject the methodological individualism embraced by Max Weber (1968), among others.  
But I will also steer clear of views on which mere aggregates of individuals or institutions can be said to act 
with intention.  I take it that some organizational structure or other (I review several in the footnote 37) 
sufficient to, at the very least, transfer the intentions/attitudes of one individual so that it determines the 
behavior of another is necessary to give rise to group action (though not every case of intention transfer is an 
instance of group action).   
57 Like Cooper (1968), I take it as one piece of evidence in favor of group or collective action and moral 
responsibility that we often do talk as if groups can act, and be held responsible for those actions and that is 
difficult to see how the intentions, actions, and responsibility we assign to these collective agents could be 
broken down and analyzed in terms of individual action, intention and responsibility.  This is not, of course, a 
definitive argument in favor of collective agency.  We could simply be mistaken and/or employing incoherent 
concepts.  Alternatively, groups may act as agents in a purely representation sense—a sort of Hobbesian 
Leviathan.  There is some individual actor or corporate head to whom the actions are appropriately ascribed, 
and who bears moral responsibility for those choices, but he can be said to act for the rest of the group on 
account of their having transferred their wills to him.  Group actions might, in some sense, supervene on the 
actions of the respective members of the collective, as does responsibility for those actions (Tuomela, 1989, 
2005, 2006).  Recent work by Pettit and List (2011) has made some headway in articulating yet another 
possibility for group agency, where groups can be organized in such a way that they are properly understood as 
having intentions that cannot be ascribed to any particular member of that group.  They are irreducible group 
agents.  For my purposes, any of these accounts of group agency is acceptable and I will not attempt to 
adjudicate between them here. 
58 Here, I think it is not inconsistent with my conclusion to think that, though organizations or institutions can 
act collectively, they do not possess moral agency in anything but a metaphorical sense.  Thus, when we accuse 
a corporation of racism, it is possible that we are saying that its actions are of the sort that, were they performed 
by individuals, they would be morally condemnable as racist.  If we are content to let this metaphorical sense of 
moral agency stand as a coherent and generally accepted use and employ it to praise and blame corporations and 
their actions, then I would be happy to accept that is all we mean when we say that a corporation is “racist.” 
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4.1  The Agential Account of Implicit Bias as Institutional Racism 
In this section, I argue that implicit biased microbehaviors (or IBMBs) are the actions 
of the set of major media organizations that constitute the modern American media 
landscape.  By this I mean the entertainment and news media including, but not limited to, 
the companies who own and operate radio stations, television and film studios, magazines, 
newspapers and other forms of print media, as well as music production companies and 
record labels.  While the particulars of the medium and content may differ drastically from 
one such organization to another, the basic aim of each is the same: produce media for 
consumption by the public.  (I will hereafter refer to the aggregate of organizations that 
pursue this aim as ‘the American media industry.’)59  
I argue that by using them in the content it produces the American media industry 
perpetuates awareness of common cultural stereotypes and vicious attitudes towards blacks. 
Having stipulated in the previous section that such an awareness is sufficient to give rise to 
implicit biases as associative tendencies in individuals, the media industry causes these 
biases to form in their consumers.  The biases, in turn, cause those consumers to act out in 
the discriminatory ways described in the first section of the paper.  I argue that the 
stereotypes and attitudes expressed by the media industry are racist and that consumers 
IBMBs, as a direct result of those racist attitudes and beliefs, are racist.  However, I remain 
agnostic as to whether or not the corporations are at fault for the behaviors, and thereby 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The aggregate is not itself a group agent.  They express similar attitudes and engage in similar behaviors 
making it appropriate to speak of them in a general way.  But they do not possess the sort of relationships that I 
take to be necessary for group intentionality or moral responsibility.  They act largely independently from one 
another.  I will argue that implicit bias is a product of the racism of each, for which they are independently at 
fault.  It may be that they also bear some collective moral responsibility as an aggregate, the way that Held 
(1970) argues that a mob might be collectively responsible for the harms they cause but this is not a line of 
argument I will pursue here.  Consequently, when I speak of the American media industry I wish to indicate an 
aggregate of institutional agents each of whom is responsible, in some part, for the actions of implicit bias.   
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racist, or whether certain excusing conditions might apply that would mitigate their 
responsibility and thus, their racism.  
The public that occupies the role of consumers within the organizational structure of a 
media production company is, in some sense, a merely hypothetical member of the 
organizational structure.  Unlike other members, consumers are subject to no 
organizationally imposed sanctions if they fail to fulfill their role and consume the media 
produced.  However, in another sense, their inclusion within that structure is very real insofar 
as the company directs its efforts towards influencing their choices and includes their 
preferences in its decision-making.  They are unofficial but influential stakeholders in the 
corporate structure.60   
In a more direct and obvious way, those media organizations also employ individuals 
in the roles of writers, directors, producers and other creatives.  The individuals occupying 
those roles aim to produce content for consumption because that is the function of the role.  
So, a particular writer qua artist can intend to inspire through his art, but qua writer for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 I acknowledge that my inclusion of ‘consumers’ within the institutional structure of media companies is 
controversial.  Indeed, I think whether or not they count as a proper part of the institution will depend on the 
aims of a given company with respect to soliciting customer opinions and responding to information about what 
its customers want.  If the actions of a media company are collective in the sense that they are the will of a 
single individual whom the rest have consented to follow or obey then tacit consent to the expression of the 
stereotypes by that actor must be read off the public’s consumption of that media.  If the actions are collective 
because they are the product of voting procedures that arrive at a group intention then the ‘vote’ of consumers is 
likely hypothetical, as the opinions of the public who consume the media are not consulted as an official 
member of the production team.  However, the opinions of consumers are often solicited through polls and 
screen testing, and in both entertainment and news media attempts are made to shape content and presentation 
to consumers desires.  My tentative suggestion is that to the extent that this process is part of the policies and 
procedures of a company, the consumer is appropriately thought of as a role-holder in the organization’s 
structure.  This makes it the case that some number of media companies who do not produce content with an 
aim of attracting consumers or who hope to attract viewers but have no procedures in place for monitoring and 
taking into account the desires of potential or actual consumers, might cause implicit bias by expressing 
stereotypes and negative attitudes towards a particular racial group but the IBMBs that result will not be 
properly thought of as institutional actions.  Some IBMBs are caused by institutional expressions that are not 
behaviors of that institution and so are not institutional racism.   
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television company his aim, whether he acknowledges it or not, is to produce content for 
public consumption.   
It is well established in the communications field that, in producing content for public 
consumption, writers or producers often exhibit stereotypes about and negative attitudes 
towards historically disadvantaged racial minorities, including blacks.  At times, these 
producers merely mention such stereotypes and attitudes as when, in the course of covering 
the shooting of teenager Treyvon Martin, various news agencies reported that George 
Zimmerman could have held anti-black racist attitudes or stereotypes. 61 Frequently, 
however, they use these stereotypes, depicting blacks (and particularly black males) as 
criminal, lazy, unintelligent or aggressive in both entertainment and news media.62 
When media outlets express anti-black stereotypes and attitudes (‘using,’ rather than 
‘mentioning’ them) in their products, it is plausible to assume that they often (though perhaps 
not always) stem from the conscious or unconscious racist beliefs and attitudes of those 
creating the content.63  The decision to focus on, for example, black men engaged in criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 My contention that using racial stereotypes is racist is importantly different from an argument that any 
mention of such stereotypes is racist.  Mentioning stereotypes is, I think, allowable (after all, I have done so 
many times throughout this paper).  And yet, mentioning stereotypes might also lead to implicit bias if 
awareness of common cultural stereotypes is sufficient to give rise to these biases.  It seems to me that the 
dangers of creating a population with implicit bias ought to be weighed against the necessity of reporting on 
racism, including creative or historical pieces that employ these stereotypes to make salient the viciousness of 
racial prejudice, past and present.  If mentions of racial prejudice are pervasive enough, it could be the case that 
the public continues to exhibit implicit bias as a result of their exposure to American media.  But their behaviors 
would not be racist.  They would not stem from the racist attitudes and beliefs of a discreet institution of which 
they are a part.  So while individuals qua consumers would have the same associations and perform the same 
racially discriminatory IBMB, those behaviors would no longer be racist.  I do not think this is as strange as 
result as it might appear.  There are many behaviors that, though on the surface indistinguishable from each 
other, carry a very different moral weight when we discover that they are born of an vicious attitude or one of 
disregard vs. a conscious deliberative process.  
62 Just on the media portrayal of blacks as criminal see Dixon & Linz (2000); Dorfman and Schiraldi (2001); 
Sommers et al., (2006); Rome (2004); Covington, J. (2010). 
63 The frequency with which such stereotypes continue to be portrayed by the American media industry despite 
the widespread knowledge (and certainly industry common knowledge) that the engage in such behavior is one 
reason to suspect that those who are producing this content actually endorse such stereotypes.  Another is the 
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activity is not an IBMB (IBMBs are microbehaviors or automatic responses) nor, I think, 
should it qualify as a case of non-culpable ignorance.  Reasonably educated Americans, 
including news, television, film and radio writers and producers, have access to the data 
necessary to establish that blacks do not engage in more criminal activity than whites and 
that most crimes are intraracial, not interracial (Rennison, 2001).  The pervasive portrayal of 
blacks as criminals, just one of many racial stereotypes and negative attitudes towards blacks 
by the media industry (and expressing the racist attitudes and beliefs of the producers) 
disseminates knowledge of the stereotype to the American public in their role as consumers.  
If, as stipulated, mere knowledge of cultural stereotypes is sufficient to give rise to implicit 
bias in the form of associative mental states, then the use of these stereotypes creates implicit 
biases.   
By consuming media laced with stereotypes and negative attitudes towards blacks, 
more Americans (including children) form associations on which they unwittingly act. 
Irrespective of whether or not the implicit biases are racist, the causal chain linking the 
expression of racism by the corporation to the actions of the implicitly biased individual 
renders the discriminatory microbehaviors racist.  While the biases themselves may be too 
minimal, as mental states, to be subject to moral evaluation, an institutional approach affords 
us the perspective that the IBMBs are importantly connected to racist cognitive or non-
cognitive attitudes.  These are not the attitudes of the individuals who harbor the biases, but 
those the content-producers who use racist stereotypes and attitudes and disseminate them to 
the general public.  Because of this connection, the effects of implicit bias are racist even if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
widespread explicit racism of many Americans.  For example, an AP poll (2012) found that 51% of Americans 
expressed explicit anti-black racist attitudes. 
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the biases themselves are not. The harms they cause are not simply racial discrimination, but 
racist discrimination.   
The institutional character of implicit bias is perhaps best captured by an analogy:  
Imagine a Senator who, acting on her antipathy for blacks, introduces a bill that would cause 
harm to that group and manages to get his bill passed as a law.  An unwitting police officer is 
given the task of enforcing that law.  Even if the officer is completely unaware that the law is 
an expression of the Senator’s racism, or that it causes harm to a particular racial group, her 
enforcement of the law is, nevertheless, racist.  She is acting out the racism of the Senator by 
enforcing his racist law.   
The stereotypes and negative attitudes used by the American media industry are like a 
discriminatory bill written by a racist Senator.  They express the racism of their creators 
while imbuing the consumers with implicit biases.  Learning those racist stereotypes and 
attitudes gives rise to associative tendencies and so IBMSs.  Like the police officer charged 
with enforcing the racist Senator’s law, we all, qua consumers, carry out the racism of the 
American media industry when we perform IBMB.  As individuals we are not racist (at least, 
not for carrying and acting on these implicit biases) just as a police officer need not be racist 
to commit a racist act when she enforces a racist law. She is carrying out the actions of a 
racist institution. 
Naturally, there are some significant differences between the two cases: First, if 
implicit biases are caused by racist expressions in the media, the ‘laws’ that we follow are 
unconscious.  Though consumers with implicit bias have knowledge of certain stereotype or 
attitudes, they are unconscious that those stereotypes hold force for them; they do not realize 
that they have, in some sense, internalized the association and will act upon it.  This would be 
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like a police officer who is aware of a certain law but does not take herself to be in the 
business of enforcing that law.  In fact, she might have explicitly decided not to enforce it.  
And yet, without realizing it, she continually does enforce it.  But, that this would certainly 
be unusual behavior for any rational person to engage in on the macro-level does not mean 
we should reject this analysis of IBMBs. Instead, if anything, it should make us more wary of 
the potential effects that our media consumption can have on our actions.   
Second, in the case of the police officer, every instance of her enforcement of a law is 
racist because her behavior expresses the Senator’s racist attitude.  The link between the 
attitude and the behavior is clear.  If implicit biases are the mere consequence of knowing 
cultural stereotypes then any number of institutions and individuals could be responsible for 
any particular agent’s implicit bias.  So why think IBMB are the behaviors of the media 
industry rather than some other institution or individual?  Why think that they are 
institutional at all if one could learn a cultural stereotype from a friend, a grandparent, or 
some random stranger on the street? 
Unfortunately, given the myriad of ways on which the public is exposed to these 
stereotypes, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove the sort of direct connection 
between the media’s use of stereotypes and the harms caused by these stereotypes that would 
definitively establish causal responsibility.  There is no necessary connection between the 
development of implicit racial biases and the American media industry. But, imagine that we 
could establish that, as a matter of fact, the American media are major purveyors of anti-
black racist stereotypes and attitudes and so, have had a large impact on the population’s 
general awareness of negative racial stereotypes and attitudes.  Certainly, given the ubiquity 
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of such stereotypes and attitudes in the media, and Americans’ exposure to media outlets, it 
is a plausible that they cause or perpetuate these biases.   
In the end, the argument that media outlets are causally responsible for implicit biases 
might depend on what we mean when we say that implicit biases result from awareness of 
common racist stereotypes or attitude.  Is it enough that someone hears a stereotype once to 
develop an implicit bias?  I recall a college friend once told me that his uncle firmly endorsed 
the claim, “All Yankee girls have fat ankles” (a claim I am assuming is a false generalization, 
though I have no empirical evidence one way of another) but, I would be surprised to learn 
that on the basis of just becoming aware of that stereotype I now more strongly associate  
‘Yankee girls’ with ‘fat ankles’ than any other group.   
So, instead, we might argue that the media are causally responsible for implicit biased 
behaviors along the same lines that some claim they are responsible for making extreme 
thinness part of our common cultural standard of beauty or normalizing violence among 
American youth. There is a causal connection between those phenomena and the media 
industry’s almost exclusive portrayal of extremely thin females and its casual approach to 
violence.  Though the media are not solely responsible (they may not even be the originator 
of the stereotype or attitude) our continuing familiarity with these stereotypes and attitudes 
(especially at a young age) is due (in some significant part) to the ubiquity of their expression 
in the media.64  
Of course, for the IBMBs to be racist, the attitudes that these institutions express must 
actually be racist and not just unfortunate.  What if a content-producer’s decision to include 
stereotypical depictions is not born of racism but is just a decision to show people what they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 These comparisons are not meant to convince the skeptic but to sketch a model for how one might go about 
arguing that IBMBs are the racist behavior of a modern media industry.   
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want to see?  One can certainly imagine a studio executive arguing that while he is aware that 
blacks are no more criminals than whites and bears no ill will towards black people, his duty 
is to his bottom line.  Consumers, consciously or unconsciously, want to see these racist 
stereotypes and attitudes expressed and they are more likely to consume media that presents 
them.  The racism, he argues, is theirs not his.   
To show the racist attitudes properly belong to the media industry, it must be the case 
that using these attitudes is racist regardless of whether or not the attitudes themselves are 
actually endorsed by the producers of the content.  This argument is, I think, fairly intuitive 
and does not depend on showing that these stereotypes and vicious attitudes have harmful 
consequences (though they do): Imagine a scenario in which a group of colleagues are telling 
racist jokes.  None of them endorse the attitudes or stereotypes the jokes’ express, but they 
are neither telling them with either a sense of irony (which some might argue makes such 
jokes excusable) nor just reporting the joke.  They are intending to elicit a laugh from the 
joke, not at the outrageousness of the stereotype it expresses, but at the racial group who is its 
subject.  Now, further imagine that no member of the racial group will ever hear the joke and 
telling the joke will not cause any of the worrisome psychological effects that are the subject 
of this paper.  I find it plausible that those telling, listening to, and laughing at the joke are all 
displaying an attitude of racist disregard to members of the racial group that is its subject.  
Even if one does not endorse the stereotype, using inferiorizing beliefs about or vicious 
attitudes towards a particular racial group, whether it is to get a laugh or sell one’s product, is 
racist.  
Nor does the caveat that one would use any racial or social group to get a laugh or sell 
products make it the case that one is not a racist.  First, an attitude of disregard toward all 
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groups does not make it the case that one is not displaying disregard toward one.  Second, 
given the long history of racial injustice towards blacks in this country, equally bad treatment 
does not express equal levels of disregard.  One must be more careful with one’s words and 
actions, not simply because of the consequences of those words and actions are different for 
different racial groups (though these consequences are also important) but because, given our 
racist history, the same words and actions express different attitudes depending on the racial 
group that this their object (provided that one is aware of that history).  A colleague’s 
insensitive habit of remarking on others’ weight expresses a far more callous and coldhearted 
attitude when he does it to a person he knows struggles with an eating disorder than when he 
does it to someone who does not.  Thus, it is not enough that a studio executive could claim 
that he would use any racist stereotype or attitude to sell his product.  The ones he does use 
are still racist. 
To say that IMBMs stem from the racist attitudes and beliefs of the content creators is 
not yet enough to show that the media industry is responsible for them.  While the behaviors 
may be racist, perhaps the industry itself is not. The corporations that make up the media 
industry might express racist attitudes but not be at fault.  As with individuals, the moral 
responsibility of institutions for IBMB would likely hang on questions of their awareness, 
control, and what we might call “centrality” (an analog to the individual case of “deep 
character”) of the racist attitudes they express. Regardless, they are not excused simply 
because they may not be aware that their racist expressions cause implicit bias.  As an 
individual, I am likely morally responsible for the consequences of expressing racist beliefs 
and attitudes even if I did not mean to cause those consequences, so long as I am responsible 
for the expression itself.  And, unlike individuals with implicit bias, the industry can control 
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whether or not they express those attitudes and thus, influence whether or not IBMB occur as 
a consequence of their use of racist stereotypes and attitudes.   
Even if the industry is racist, perhaps they have no moral duty to curb their racist 
behavior.  For example, while their duty to their bottom line does not render the stereotypes 
and attitudes they express non-racist, it might still trump a moral duty not to show them.  
They are like a mortgage company that requires all home loan applicants to have a credit 
score above a certain threshold in order to be approved.  Blacks, who for reasons of past 
racial injustice are less likely than whites to meet that threshold, are therefore less likely to 
receive home loans.  However, the mortgage company would do worse and perhaps even fail, 
if they offered home loans to applicants with lower credit scores.  They cannot, it would 
seem, be forced to shoulder the burden of past racial injustice if doing so would contribute 
directly to their failure as a company.  Similarly, a media company who exhibited a greater 
diversity of female figures or refused to air gratuitous violence might be acting well, but, one 
might argue that their doing so can hardly be morally required if it interferes (to some extent 
of another) with the aim of making money. 
I think, however, there may be an important disanalogy between the two cases. With 
respect to the mortgage industry, it is at least plausible that there is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with using credit scores as a means of differentiating between acceptable and 
unacceptable loan applications.65  Were it not that past racial injustice renders the process 
unfair for black applicants, we would have no objection to the mortgage company (or the 
industry as a whole) engaging in this practice.  But perhaps there is something intrinsically 
wrong with a media industry portraying only extremely thin women or showing gratuitous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 I say “plausible” so as to leave open the possibility that a thoroughgoing critique of capitalism could show 
this practice to be intrinsically morally reprehensible. 
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violence.  And, I think it quite likely that there is something intrinsically wrong in using anti-
black racism to sell a product.  It is, as I argued above, at least indicative of an attitude of 
disregard. 
So, it may be that the industry is morally culpable for the racism it expresses. 
Regardless, I did not set out to prove that claim.  My aim was only to show that the behaviors 
of implicit bias are racist even if implicit biases are mere associations caused by knowledge 
of common cultural stereotypes.  Though, on an institutional approach, the implicit biases 
themselves are not racist (they are too minimal as mental states), the behaviors the directly 
cause (IBMBs) are.  They are the racist behaviors of an institution.  Vetted, approved and 
eventually produced the attitudes these behaviors stem from are the expressions of American 
media companies.  Individuals qua consumers act out the racism of institutions of which they 
are a part. 
5.  Conclusion 
So, given what I have said here, the next obvious question is what, if anything, ought 
to be done about implicit bias?  To some extent, this will depend on whether or not implicit 
biases actually are mere associative tendencies caused by awareness of common cultural 
stereotypes and racist attitudes or if individuals are at fault for their own biases.  If implicit 
bias is a form of institutional rather than individual racism, then new avenues open up for 
thinking about and dealing with its discriminatory effects.  For example, one might argue that 
racist stereotypes and attitudes ought to be excised from our media entirely, given their 
potentially harmful effects.  Or maybe they ought to be regulated, with warning labels placed 
on media that contains racist stereotypes and attitudes, just as some have argued we should 
regulate violent video games or stick-thin models.  However, in the case of racism, many of 
	   77 
the products infected with racist stereotypes and attitudes are classic works of literature, 
music and film.  How should we handle those cases?  Equally important are considerations of 
corporate responsibility. Going forward, are media outlets responsible for fixing the racism 
they have perpetuated or as individuals are we responsible for our own consumption?  To say 
that the implicit racial bias is a form of institutional racism is not, after all, to abdicate all 
individual responsibility.  The police officer who realizes she has been enacting a racist law 
can refuse to enforce it.  She can resign.  As consumers, perhaps we have a similar 
responsibility to resign from participation in mass media in order to stop acting on implicit 
racial bias.  These are, no doubt, tricky questions and ones that ought to be thought through 
carefully. But knowing that implicit biases are racist, regardless of what they are and where 
they come from, will aid in that process.  When we are tempted to throw up our hands in 
frustration at the pervasiveness of the problem and its seeming insurmountable, it is helpful, I 
think, to know that our struggle is not just against some trick of human psychology or 
insoluble structural injustice, but it is a fight against racism.   
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3.  The Search for Formal Equality of Opportunity: A Case for the 
Preferential Treatment of Black Americans 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Andre and Wesley, current U.S. high school seniors, are applying for federally funded 
college scholarships. They were admitted to the same school with the same SAT scores and 
extracurricular activities. But Andre has a slightly lower GPA than Wesley.  On one form, 
they are asked to identify their respective racial backgrounds.  Andre, who is black, checks 
one box, while Wesley, who is white, checks another.  Despite his lower GPA, is Andre is 
more likely to get the loan because he is black? And if so, should he? 
Arguments that seek to answer this question in the affirmative, presenting an 
argument in favor of preferential treatment for black Americans, fall into one of two basic 
categories: the backward and the forward looking. Backward-looking arguments are 
generally compensatory; They are intended to repay (or partially repay) blacks for racist 
harms they have suffered. Forward-looking arguments are, as the name suggests, aimed at 
securing future goods. They aim to bring about a better, more just society through 
preferential treatment. Both present substantial difficulties.  The backward-looking approach 
has theoretical and practical problems that make it difficult to clearly articulate and 
implement.  Meanwhile, forward-looking arguments tend to focus on attaining controversial 
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social goals and in doing so, lose the support of many who, though liberal, disagree about 
both the nature and relative importance of freedom and equality. Moreover, forward-looking 
approaches tend to send the wrong message about preferential treatment to whites and blacks 
alike because they focus on ends that are only tangentially related to preventing anti-black 
discrimination. 
In what follows, I will present a forward-looking argument that avoids these two 
complaints.  I will assume merely formal equality of opportunity (rather than any more 
substantive form of equality), a minimum principle to which most (though not all) liberals 
would assent.66  This principle is often taken to ground anti-discrimination laws and policies 
but not preferential treatment.  I will show how it can be extended such that it necessitates the 
latter as well.  By minimizing these substantive commitments, my hope is to bypass some of 
the theoretical problems often associated with forward-looking arguments including disputes 
over the content and demands of freedom and the role of equality within a theory of justice.  
My sense is that convincing as many people as possible that, in light of their own ideological 
commitments, they ought to support affirmative actions is likely an effective strategy for 
inducing social change.  And, if this minimal requirement is all that is needed, then to deny 
blacks a presumption in favor of preferential treatment, one would have to deny the principle 
of formal equality of opportunity.  Furthermore, because the forward-looking argument I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The argument I make in these pages is heavily indebted to recent work on the value of equality in liberal 
societies and the need for racial integration in order to achieve that ideal, particularly Anderson (1999, 2002, 
2010).  I think sketches of the argument I offer here can be found in several places in her 2010 work The 
Imperative of Integration. If the argument is indeed prefigured or even explicitly made in Anderson, my modest 
aim is to draw it out and make it more explicit in hopes of showing exactly how significant of a contribution it 
is to the literature on affirmative action.  By connecting it with Hill’s work on affirmative  
action’s message, I also aim to draw out how it importantly differs, in spirit and message, from other 
justifications Anderson offers for affirmative action, especially those in which she regards it as a tool for 
promoting a (generally) more democratic civil society. 
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offer concentrates on securing protection for blacks against racist discrimination, it is not 
vulnerable to the critique that it expresses a disregard for concerns that are of central 
important to the black community. Finally, I show how this argument can be extended. It is 
not only a critique of colorblindness but also an argument against certain forms of (seemingly 
non-objectionable) statistical discrimination. 
1.1.  The Backward-Looking Approach 
If the two had exactly equal qualifications, we might think preferential treatment for 
Andre falls straightforwardly out of principles of redress and the reality of past anti-black 
discrimination.   When we consider that there were times in the not-too-distant past when any 
indication of Andre’s racial background would have disqualified him from a great number of 
opportunities (including college admission and scholarships) it seems only fair that Andre 
should be first in line to get the money.  Despite the fact that Andre is, on some metric, a 
slightly less qualified of a candidate, it still seems he is owed something because of the 
harms that were perpetuated against black people, including his ancestors. Moreover, we 
might reasonably assume that, had Andre’s ancestors been afforded all the same advantages 
as Wesley’s ancestors, Andre might have had the same GPA as Wesley.  Therefore, we might 
conclude that he is just as deserving of the money on grounds of merit and entitled to it in 
order to compensate for past injustice. 
Unfortunately, in studying the case a little longer, two complications arise that might 
mitigate the force of our initial intuition.67  First, let’s assume that these scholarships are a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 I will set aside some other complications including who donated the money for the scholarships, whether the 
university is public or private (and whether or not that matters) and if the effects of a more diverse student 
population would be positive or negative. These issues are not unimportant and they are further indicators of 
exactly how theoretically and practically exhausting backward-looking arguments can be.  My hope is that the 
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finite resource such that, if Andre receives the money, then Wesley does not.  Though it is 
perhaps true that some of Wesley’s success (including, we might think, his GPA) is 
attributable to the many advantages of white privilege that he and his family enjoyed which 
Andre’s family did not, Wesley himself had nothing to do with the racism Andre’s family 
endured. Why should Wesley lose out on an opportunity in order to make up for harms that 
he did not cause?   
By way of analogy, imagine that instead of competing for a scholarship, Wesley and 
Andre are running a race.  If a spectator jumped out and tripped Andre, causing him to lose 
the race, it would be difficult to deny that Andre was harmed. But if to make up for the harm 
done to Andre we were simply to award him 1st place in the race, then it seems Wesley might 
also have the standing to argue that he has been harmed by us.  After all, he did not trip 
Andre.  Consequently, if it is true that Andre is owed redress for harms perpetrated against 
his ancestors then giving him the scholarship might be a way of trying to make up for those 
harms.  But we might still be left feeling that Wesley has been treated unfairly. We might 
even worry that his right to equal opportunity has been violated.  It is he that has been judged 
for the color of his skin, rather than the content of his application.68   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
two complications I present introduce sufficient worries for the backward-looking approach without having to 
explore additional complexities. 
68 There are a number of disanalogies between the two cases that might undermine the intuitive strength of this 
objection.  For example, college scholarships, unlike most races, can consider any number of factors in 
determining who the winner should be. The rules governing scholarships are generally more complicated and 
less universal than those governing races.  So, we are not actually taking from Wesley when we give the 
scholarship to Andre.  Wesley was never entitled to the scholarship.  Those who fight this claim usually argue 
that scholarship competitions (or hiring and admissions decisions) ought to be decided purely on the basis of 
(what they call) “merit.” Like races, the rules ought to be such that those who meet some general criteria will 
win, regardless of their race.  They forget that affirmative action is actually a way of doing just that; Affirmative 
action is one tool for equalizing the centuries of privilege that white people have enjoyed, often at the expense 
of blacks.  Like a “head start” in a running race, preferential treatment can be a way of making the fight fair and 
giving each opponent an equal change at winning. 
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Second, even if we were to decide that the effects of past racial injustice, irrespective 
of Wesley’s participation in it (and thus, Andre and Wesley’s racial group membership) are a 
relevant consideration in who should get the scholarship, what should we make of the claim 
that Andre might have done better if he and his family had not been victims of racist laws?  
Even if we can find some actually culpable person or institution to offer up compensation for 
past harms (a tricky business in itself), how can we know for sure that Andre, in particular, 
was harmed by past racial discrimination in such a way that he is owed this scholarship?  His 
lower GPA might not be the result of racial discrimination but some other, non-redressable 
harm (or perhaps, no harm at all).  Maybe Andre would not have been better off had his 
family received all the same benefits as Wesley’s family.  Andre’s ancestors might have 
squandered the money.  After all, there are plenty of white families who did have all of the 
same advantages and did worse than Wesley’s family.   Proving the connection between a 
particular black American’s current socio-economic status (or, GPA) and past racial injustice 
is especially difficult in cases where a great deal of time has passed between the injury and 
the attempt to offer reparations.  The counterfactuals (‘had person A not been a member of 
oppressed group Y then she would not have suffered harms r, s and t…’) are likely to be 
difficult to evaluate.  If we were to wholeheartedly endorse compensatory preferential 
treatment for black Americans we might end up rewarding those who do not deserve it in 
addition to taking from those who did nothing wrong.69 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 In a somewhat related worry, philosophers with such divergent views as Goldman (1976) and Nagel (1973) 
argue that compensatory arguments for race-based preferential treatment programs like affirmative action are 
unjustified because they reward the most qualified and so primarily help those who were least harmed by past 
racial injustice.  However, as Boxill (1992) points out, the least harmed members of an oppressed racial group 
could still be badly harmed by past racial injustice.  Though Goldman and Nagel’s critiques might justify 
expanding compensatory preferential treatment, they do not give us reason to abandon it. 
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1.2  The Forward-Looking Approach 
So, even if the compensatory argument is theoretically straightforward, it is beset by a 
number of practical complications that are unlikely to be resolved.70  Recognizing this, we 
could consider a different strategy.  Perhaps, Andre deserves preferential treatment not 
because he was harmed, but instead because such preferential treatment is the best way to 
achieve a just society now.  As liberals, we share a general commitment to the value of 
individual freedom. It could be that, in order to be truly unconstrained, members of a society 
must be given an equal opportunity to develop their capabilities and preferential treatment for 
Andre is a means to achieving that aim. 
This sort of forward-looking argument could assert that since black Americans were 
excluded from many opportunities in the past, society is currently less free than it otherwise 
might be.  The best way of achieving a more free society now is to engage in affirmative 
action and offer the scholarship to Andre. This view is forward-looking because, though it 
recognizes that racial harms occurred that lead to current inequality, those harms do not 
ground the preferential treatment.  Rather, preferential treatment for blacks is justified solely 
because it is expected to produce good outcomes, namely increases in individual freedom.  If 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 By which I do not mean to say that they are irresolvable.  I am generally sympathetic to backward-looking 
arguments for affirmative action and unconvinced by the worry that some blacks who were not directly harmed 
by slavery or segregation might end up unfairly benefiting from a reparations schema and whites who were not 
at fault might end up losing advantages they earned.  But I suspect that lack of concern probably stems from a 
general commitment to principles of distributive justice and not from a fully worked out response to this 
position that does not depend on any substantive views about the nature of justice that those who endorse it 
could not accept.  And, as my goal is here is to convince those with radically different views about the nature of 
justice that by their own lights they ought to endorse affirmative action, relying on my own commitments to 
dismiss this worry would run counter to my aims.  However, that is not to say that an argument that does defeat 
these objections on the objector’s own terms is not possible.  In fact, I believe that Boxill (1992) offered one, as 
does Ta-Nehisi Coates (2014) in his recent article.  My larger point is that haggling over compensatory 
schemas, as this sort of objection invites us to do, might be philosophically exhausting and pragmatically 
pointless. 
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it turned out that offering the scholarship to Wesley and other white males would lead to 
better outcomes then preferential treatment would be given to them instead.71 
But this strategy, too, is beset by a number of complications.  Is it true that individual 
freedom requires this sort of substantive equality?  And if so, how much and what kind of 
equality is required to achieve individual freedom?  And what is freedom anyway?  Even 
among those who agree about the priority of freedom, there is substantial divergence with 
respect to what that agreement entails.  And though nearly everyone will assent to the claim 
that the just state treats its citizens equally or with equal respect, it is far from clear what 
equality requires.  
Elizabeth Anderson (2010), for example, has recently argued in favor of affirmative 
action for blacks as a tool to promoting integration.  Against luck egalitarians, she claims that 
in the equal distribution of resources, the state should not make exceptions for bad 
circumstances that are an individual’s fault (see note 12).  Justice in a democratic society 
requires social equality, meaning that citizens must be able to stand and relate to one another 
as equals.  To do this, individuals must be guaranteed a minimum standard of living (you 
cannot, for example, stand before others as an equal if you cannot afford clothing or food) 
and equality of opportunity to secure positions beyond that minimum.72  Without these 
equalities in place, racial segregation will continue, racial stigmatization and discrimination 
will necessarily ensue, and a great number of injustices, racial and otherwise, will result from 
both segregation alone and discrimination as its consequence.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 This point is made especially clear by Hill (1995). 
72 As Anderson (2010) writes, “The distinctive normative feature of democratic societies is social equality.  All 
of the members of a democratic society have a just claim to stand in relations of equality with their fellow 
citizens” (p. 17). 
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But is Anderson right?  Is a minimum standard of living actually required to 
guarantee that citizens enjoy democratic equality?  And should we even be aiming for 
democratic equality? The range of possible positions on the value, nature, and extension of 
equality and the myriad of disputes between those who agree on many of the major points, 
including the fact that blacks are entitled to some sort of preferential treatment in order to 
achieve a given social aim, is both distracting and potentially debilitating.  Once entrenched 
in this debate, we find we are only nominally discussing whether Andre is entitled to 
preferential treatment.  Instead, we are caught up in a deep (and seemingly intractable) 
dispute about the nature of justice, which is unlikely to be resolved in favor of one side over 
the other anytime soon.  
We might be tempted to dig in here and spend our remaining philosophical strength 
spelling out and defending a particular conception of freedom or equality that would entail 
preferential treatment.  But in so doing, we risk losing sight of the fact that debates over 
preferential treatment for black Americans are not merely (or even primarily) a matter of 
abstract political principles but calls for policy changes that have the potential to drastically 
affect the life chances of actual individuals. Moreover, even if we could agree on a particular 
social ideal that we hope to achieve (a seemingly impossible task in itself) we might also 
worry about the message that a purely forward-looking approach sends to blacks and whites 
alike.  As Thomas Hill (1995) points out, concentrating only on the overall social benefits of 
preferential treatment might express a lack of concern for the suffering of black Americans 
like Andre and little confidence in his abilities as an individual. It says to him: you are 
receiving this award not because you deserve it but because giving it to you is likely to bring 
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about some good for all of us. To Wesley it says that, though he has not been found 
undeserving of a scholarship, his desires must be sacrificed for the good of all. 
Given the problems with both approaches, it would be nice if we could find an 
alternative; Either a backward-looking approach that doesn’t rely on establishing the truth of 
a complicated set of counterfactual claims or a forward-looking justification that does not 
send the message to blacks or whites that they are being used as a means to some greater 
societal end, which they may or may not think is an appropriate end.  Instead, while our 
forward-looking argument aims to achieve a good for all, it should do so in such a way that 
the clear message sent to black Americans is a concern for their liberty, in particular, not just 
democratic ideals generally.73  Furthermore, the aim should be one to which a large swath of 
liberals can agree.  Without ruling out the possibility of the former, I will concentrate my 
energies on developing the latter—a forward-looking approach that takes racial justice to be 
of chief concern and appeals to liberals across the political spectrum by requiring little in the 
way of controversial ideological commitments. 
2.  Preferential Treatment for the Vulnerable 
To arrive at the sort of forward-looking argument we desire—one that takes racial 
justice for blacks as the primary social good secured by preferential treatment—we must first 
show that preferential treatment is required to treat a certain kind of racial injustice against 
blacks. In this section, I will identify the conditions that make individuals initial candidates 
for preferential treatment (they are vulnerable) and then identify one type of vulnerability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Hill (1995) has suggested that we look at the message of our affirmative action policies as an alternative to 
forward and backward looking proposals—What do we want them to say?  I wholeheartedly endorse this 
approach and nothing I say here is meant to contradict it.  My aim is to throw into the ring another alternative 
with broad political appeal and my hope is that expresses a more respectful message then more traditional 
forward-looking approaches and one that is more likely to be well-received by both blacks and whites.   
	   87 
that justifies that treatment.  In the section that follows, I will argue that blacks are members 
of this type of vulnerable group. 
On its face, the justification for preferential treatment can appear fairly simple.  
Plainly, not everyone enjoys an equally level playing field with respect to attaining her 
conception of the good.  Some of us are more constrained than others.  Indeed, all of us enter 
the world less well off than the adults around us who generally have use of their rational 
capacities and the ability to communicate their needs to others.  As infants we are vulnerable 
insofar as we suffer from conditions that render us helpless in scenarios in which adults 
likely are not.  The same is often true of the elderly or physically infirm.  For example, 
assuming most of us share the goal of not suffering a stroke, it is the elderly who are more 
likely to succumb to one during an unexpected heat wave.  Because they are, by and large, 
less physically robust than younger people, the elderly are more vulnerable to certain sorts of 
harms.  Consequently, a fire department might extend preferential treatment by keeping a list 
of elderly people in the neighborhood and checking on them first during a heat wave.  If 
justice requires that, as much as possible, all persons have an equal chance at attaining a 
reasonable conception of the good then preferential treatment is justified for those who suffer 
from some deficiency that lowers the likelihood that they will succeed. 
These individuals, who are more susceptible to future harms (or, if you prefer, less 
likely to be able to attain their conception of the good) because they experience some 
condition that most human beings do not, are the vulnerable.74  That condition need not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 ‘Vulnerability,’ then, is a statistical relation.  It makes a claim about the goods or abilities a particular person 
or group enjoys relative to the rest of the population and takes for granted (at least for our purposes) a certain 
set of reasonable conceptions of the good.  So, in general, American children are less vulnerable relative to 
African children, though all children are vulnerable, in some sense, relative to adults. Michael Kottow (2003) 
distinguishes this population from the vulnerable, referring to them as ‘susceptible.’  He argues that all human 
beings are essentially vulnerable and that vulnerability is the basis of the state’s protection of human rights: “In 
a nutshell, the vulnerable are intact but at risk, in the same way a fine piece of porcelain is unblemished but 
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actually interfere with their ability to contribute to society or pursue their conception of the 
good.  Rather, their vulnerability is a matter of the likelihood that they will be frustrated in 
their goals.  By way of analogy, we might imagine a community whose houses are all built 
into the side of a mountain; the vulnerable are those whose houses stand nearest to the edge.  
It is they who are most likely to slide into the abyss if special care is not taken to protect 
them.75   
When preferential treatment is justified, it is generally in response to such 
vulnerability.  Preferential treatment is a way of protecting a group against the harms they are 
more likely to suffer because of an injury or impairment.  In a sense, then, the name is 
somewhat misleading—“preferential treatment” for vulnerable groups is meant to raise them 
closer to, not above, the level of the non-vulnerable.  However, the use of “preferential” does 
capture an important distinction between this and anti-discrimination laws and practices.  
Preferential treatment is not the mere extension of a particular treatment to a new group but 
the recognition that some greater level of care is required in order to achieve an equal 
outcome—to ensure that the vulnerable group is equally unconstrained.  It is a way of 
moving their houses back from the edge, or helping to reinforce them against calamity. 
Vulnerability can pertain to individuals, but also to socially salient groups.  In many 
cases, when we identify a vulnerable group, the individuals in that group will merely exhibit 
a tendency towards experiencing some condition.  The elderly, for example, have a tendency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
highly vulnerable to being damaged. The susceptible are already injured, they already suffer from some 
deficiency that handicaps them, renders them defenceless and predisposed to further injury; their wounds lower 
the threshold to additional suffering” (p. 464). While I do not wish to deny that the human condition is a 
vulnerable one, I want to preserve the term here to refer to those in a special position of susceptibility vís a vís 
the majority.   
75 This ‘cliff analogy’ is adopted from one used by Jones, et al. (2009) in discussing the social determinants of 
children’s health, including racism.   
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towards comparative physical weakness while the young have a tendency towards an 
underdevelopment of rational capacities.   There are exceptions in most vulnerable groups.  
However, we pick out these individuals and identify them as vulnerable by their group 
membership because there is a greater likelihood that a member of the group will experience 
the relevant condition.76  Perhaps, given constraints of time or resources, we cannot 
realistically differentiate between those group members who actually have the condition and 
those who do not, so we rely on the fact of their group membership.  Or, perhaps the mere 
fact that there is that tendency towards a particular condition is enough to make them 
susceptible to future harms.  So, for example, although a particular elderly person may be in 
fine physical health the general tendency of elderly people to poor health justifies identifying 
the elderly as a vulnerable population.  Even the most robust elderly person might be more 
likely to suffer a mugging because the general tendency of the elderly towards physical 
infirmity marks her out as a target for muggers.  But demonstrating that a population is 
vulnerable is not, on most theories of liberal justice, tantamount to demonstrating that they 
are entitled to preferential treatment. Intuitively, the vulnerability must be of the right kind.  
It must make them likely to be prevented from receiving something to which we agree that 
they are entitled, such as a basic liberty. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 In many instances, the vulnerable group’s tendency towards a particular injury or impairment is causally 
related to its group membership, but that need not be the case.  The elderly are more likely to be physically 
weak because of problems related to aging but Iowans might be more likely to develop cancer without their 
living in Iowa bearing any causal relation to that tendency. In such cases, it would not make sense to identify 
Iowans as the vulnerable group.  There is nothing about Iowa that contributes to their tendency to develop 
cancer.  However, as I will argue later in the paper, even in cases where there is no causal connection, groups 
can sometimes have a social salience that makes it the case that the larger group, and not simply the population 
that is actually injured, is properly identified as vulnerable. In these situations, it is the existence of the tendency 
itself combined with the salience of the social group that creates a causal connection between an individual’s 
group membership and the likelihood that she will suffer future harms. 
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2.1  Formal Equality of Opportunity and the Problem of Distinguishing Vulnerability 
As we have seen, part of the argument for justifying preferential treatment rests on 
identifying an individual as a member of a vulnerable group.  She must be part of a group 
that exhibits a tendency to some condition that makes her susceptible to future harms.  But 
vulnerability alone is not enough; the vulnerability must be of the right sort. Intuitively, not 
every inequality deserves to be rectified or regulated against and there is substantial 
disagreement between liberals with respect to this issue.  In general, everyone agrees that 
when a current vulnerability is the result of a definite past injustices, the individuals who 
suffer ought to be compensated so that the vulnerability does not interfere with their ability to 
achieve their aims. But given the practical problems involved in securing preferential 
treatment for black Americans on those grounds, we have stipulated that our account will be 
forward-looking.  So what sort of vulnerability, experienced by black Americans, could 
inspire a wide swath of liberals to agree that preferential treatment is justified?  What basic 
liberty are black Americans are unfairly denied? 
One way to draw a distinction between those inequalities that would be acceptable for 
most liberals to regulate against and those that would not is by asking what caused a group’s 
vulnerability.  Imagine two groups, one whose members choose to build their houses close to 
the edge of the precipice because they enjoy the view and another whose members build 
there because they have no alternative.  The first group, we might think, is not entitled to our 
help.  They have chosen to make themselves vulnerable and so any consequences they 
experience are not our concern.77 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The intuitive idea behind this distinction is that, taking liberty as the primary good to be secured for each, 
intervention by the state (including preferential treatment) is justified only to the extent that it increases liberty.  
However, what counts as an interference to one’s liberty is a subject of much debate.  Most, though certainly 
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But many of us have the intuition that, at least in some circumstances, members of the 
second group would be entitled to our help.78  For example, imagine that those who live on 
the edge are forced to do so because they are members of a despised social group, scorned for 
no morally defensible reason. Certainly, some intervention is justified to protect those 
individuals from the threat of harms caused by others.  They are vulnerable for reasons that 
have nothing to do with their individual merit.  The constraints they experience as a result of 
their condition are not imposed by nature, but by other agents.79  So, to protect them from the 
condition they suffer (membership in a despised social group) we introduce formal equality 
of opportunity.  We hold that, as John Rawls (1999) puts it, “all have at least the same legal 
rights to all advantaged social positions” (p. 62). Of course, this does not yet introduce any 
sort of preferential treatment.  It is merely a guarantee of equality under the law. 
There are, however, problems with adopting this position.  The most important for 
our purposes is that if we accept that markets ought to be regulated to rule out disadvantages 
or constraints imposed by other agents (to make it the case that careers are actually open to 
natural talents) then we might not be able to stop at guaranteeing mere formal equality of 
opportunity.  As Rawls (1999) famously argues, the same principles that lead us to endorse 
formal equality of opportunity ground a more substantive alternative, which he calls 
“equality of fair opportunity” (sect. 12). Recognizing that the extent to which individuals are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not all, liberals want to rule out state interference to correct for inequalities resulting from voluntary choices.  
Proponents of this view include “luck egalitarians” like Roemer (1994) Nagel (1991), Dworkin (1981), Cohen 
(1989) and Arneson (1997) as well as negative liberty theorists like Kramer (2003) and Carter (1999).  
Anderson (1999) who defends “democratic equality,” is a notable exception to this view.  She argues that 
labeling some individuals as “at fault” for their misfortune and denying them aid on that basis is disrespectful.  
78 Liberal theorists would diverge with respect to whether individuals ought to be protected against or 
compensated for the effects of bad luck, generally, or only harms that are product of another’s intentional 
action. 
79 Kramer (2003) flags the intuitive force of this distinction though he admits there may be no non-question-
begging way to establish it. 
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able to cultivate their natural talents is largely determined by accidents of their birth (the 
economic and social position of their parents, for instance) and that those “accidents” (really, 
the intentional and unintentional actions of other agents) place significant restraints on the 
freedom of individuals, merely eliminating formal sources of discrimination will not actually 
achieve the goal of awarding opportunities on the basis of natural talent. Instead, it appears 
that actually ensuring formal equality of opportunity would require much more drastic 
measures than intervention into the private choices of individuals and a large-scale 
redistribution of wealth.  If individuals would endorse a policy of formal equality of 
opportunity because, given the constraints of the original position, they decide that allocating 
desired positions on the basis of individual merit (and not by the arbitrary, and perhaps 
immoral, preferences of others) is the most effective means of maximizing their primary 
goods, then they ought to endorse an equality of fair opportunity that aims to correct the 
many inequalities that interfere with the development and exercise of individual talent.80  
Those liberals who accept Rawls’ line of argument from formal to substantive 
equality of opportunity, but balk at his conclusion, might be tempted to reevaluate the force 
of the initial intuition that some forms of discrimination ought to be regulated.  If we cannot 
draw a clear distinction between discrimination on the basis of characteristics such as race or 
gender, which seem clearly imposed by an coercive agent and the many other constraints 
which we normally attribute to luck (but are also, in reality, the result of the choices of other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This argument can be taken farther, as Rawls does, to criticize not only the role of the social lottery in our 
prospects but the “natural lottery” as well.  The talents that one is born with are as much a result of luck as the 
social position into which one is born, even if the latter is determined by the actions of other agents while the 
former is not.  This further complexity, however, is unnecessary for the conclusion that merely formal equality 
of opportunity is unstable as an ideal and so I leave it aside.   
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agents) then perhaps we ought to reject both equality of fair opportunity and formal equality 
of opportunity.81   
After all, there is a different way of framing the distinction between the vulnerable 
and non-vulnerable groups. To return to the earlier example of a mountain-side community, 
rather than asking what caused the disadvantages suffered by a vulnerable group, we might 
instead wonder whether or not those that live farther away from the edge have unjustly 
gained the advantages they enjoy.  We cannot protect those at the edge without taking 
resources from those who are farther in, and that appropriation is only justified, some would 
argue, if they do not have a right to those advantages they possess.  A Nozickian libertarian 
would claim that so long as those advantages are the result of free transfers, then they are the 
legitimate property of those who possess them.82 Taking these resources would violate the 
rights of the owners, so discrimination in the public sphere on the basis of personal 
preferences, even morally objectionable preferences, must be permissible.83  On this view, all 
attempts to level out the playing field, even anti-discrimination laws, would amount to 
preferential treatment. 
The two sides may be right to insist that there is no tenable position between them; I 
do not have space to argue that point here.  Rather, I want to simply flag my suspicion that 
many people do, in fact, endorse a middle position.  They have different reactions to a sign 
outside a grocery store that says “No blacks, no Jews” than one reading, “No people who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 For one example see Cavanaugh (2002). 
82 See Nozick (1974), p. 149-182 for the complete argument. 
83 Some proponents of this view argue also that, as a matter of fact, the market will not support racial or gender 
discrimination and so no state regulation is necessary.  This claim is highly contested, but for my purposes, 
nothing rides on its truth or falsity.  If it is the case that no state intervention is necessary to guarantee non-
discriminatory practices, then the state will not intervene, but if state regulation is required, then formal equality 
supports a state obligation to intervene.  
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cannot afford to pay.” They tend to find the first sign morally offensive and the sort of thing 
that ought to be regulated against.   Perhaps this is a simple failure on their part to appreciate 
the extent to which the economic and social positions that individuals occupy are largely 
determined by circumstances beyond their control.  Or, alternatively, they may not be 
adequately attuned to the libertarian argument that, like the benefits that come from the 
possession of natural talents, individuals are entitled to the benefits that come with having 
been born a favored race in a racist society.  
Though it is possible that a justification exists for extending formal equality of 
opportunity, the rest of my argument does not depend on one.  Rather than trying to convince 
the advocate of formal equality of opportunity that she ought to modify her position in one of 
the two directions outlined above, I aim to meet her where she stands.  I argue that given a 
commitment to formal equality of opportunity on which individuals’ legal right to achieve 
advantaged social positions ought not be limited by the prejudice of others, she ought to 
endorse not just anti-discrimination legislation, but also preferential treatment for black 
Americans. 
3.  Blacks as a Vulnerable Population? 
If the preceding discussion of vulnerability and the types of constraints that can 
appropriately be regulated against (those that violate formal equality of opportunity) is 
correct, the next step is to demonstrate that blacks are a vulnerable population.  This is not 
yet to argue they ought to be treated preferentially, only that they are vulnerable in some way 
that offends against formal equality of opportunity. In an obvious sense, many American 
blacks suffer from conditions that many whites do not: blacks are more likely to be poor, 
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under-educated and unemployed.84  Each one of these conditions makes it less likely that an 
individual will be able to achieve a desired position in society or pursue her own conception 
of the good, and thus, renders her vulnerable.85   
However, this unfortunate reality is not enough to establish that blacks as a whole are 
a vulnerable class, let alone that they are entitled to protection as such.  That blacks are more 
likely to be poor or under-educated, and that those conditions make those who suffer from 
them susceptible to future harms, is only sufficient to establish that the poor and uneducated 
are vulnerable because they are poor and uneducated.  Why think that blacks who are rich, 
highly educated and gainfully employed are also part of a vulnerable group because they are 
black?  After all, large numbers of black Americans are perfectly capable of attaining their 
goals (as evidenced by the fact that they do so).  So what evidence do we have that blacks as 
a whole reside nearer to the precipice than whites because they are black?  
Recall that in the previous section, I showed that an individual does not need actually 
to experience consequences as the result of her condition to count as vulnerable.  She can 
stand at the edge of a precipice but still be located on fully solid ground, just as someone can 
have a symptomless illness that nevertheless puts her at risk for catching some further 
disease.  The important feature of her situation is that whatever condition she suffers, 
regardless of whether or not it now affects her, makes her more susceptible to a future harm.  
It increases the likelihood that she will be harmed in some way.  And as a member of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 According to a recent study, in 2009, 46% of traditionally college-aged white Americans enrolled in 
university, compared to only 35% of blacks (Young, 2011, p. 2).  A different study revealed that 40% of black 
children, as opposed to 13% of white children, were living in poverty and the unemployment rate for black men 
in 2011 was more than double that for white men (Acs, 2013, p. 6 and 18)  
85 There are, of course, exceptions.  If one wishes to be an ascetic monk then being born into poverty may be no 
bar to one’s future goals, but in the usual case, these are the sorts of conditions that make it more difficult to 
fulfill one’s aims.   
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socially salient group she need not actually possess the condition.  It is sufficient that the 
group as a whole exhibits some tendency towards a condition that makes each of the 
members (whether or not she possesses the condition) vulnerable to some future harm. 
This, however, might seem like a non-starter.  Blacks do not, in virtue of some shared 
characteristic, exhibit a group tendency to poverty, under-education, or unemployment.  The 
tendency of the elderly to physical infirmity (which makes them more susceptible to 
muggings because muggers are more likely to target them) is caused by their age.  Blacks are 
not susceptible to the consequences of poverty or under-education because they are black.  
As we recognized above, it is not even the case that all blacks are poor or under-educated.  It 
seems that there is no property that all blacks share that makes them vulnerable, as a group, 
to future harms. 
Here, one might be tempted to protest.  It seems obvious that blacks do, in fact, share 
a common feature that makes them vulnerable (as blacks) and it is not a tendency towards 
poverty or under-education.  Rather, as a result of their blackness, all blacks are vulnerable to 
anti-black racism (to some degree or another).  Thus, regardless of whether or not they are 
poor or under-educated, being black in a society with anti-black racism makes blacks as a 
whole susceptible to future harm, in the form of racial discrimination. 
The problem with pursuing this line of argumentation, in which black vulnerability 
follows from racial group membership and the existence of anti-black racism, is that those 
who admit that anti-black racism is a source of black vulnerability could claim that blacks 
already have protection against future harms sufficient to level the playing field and are not 
due any preferential treatment. They already enjoy formal equality of opportunity in this 
regard.  They could cite the existence of anti-discrimination laws and practices that impose 
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legal sanctions on individuals whose public transactions are racially biased.  Even evidence 
that current anti-discrimination laws are ineffective would not be enough to justify 
preferential treatment, rather than an increase in anti-discrimination laws or litigation.  
Justifying preferential treatment, as I intend to do, requires more than the assertion that 
blacks are currently subject to anti-black racism and must be protected.  Instead, it must be 
shown that protecting blacks from discrimination requires treating blacks differently from 
(and in preference to) whites.  The harm they suffer must offend against formal equality of 
opportunity in a different way, such that the means to securing it is preferential treatment, 
rather than mere anti-discrimination legislation. The following section gives a theory of black 
vulnerability that will be used to ground that claim. 
3.1  A New Theory of Black Vulnerability 
Black vulnerability is importantly linked to the development of negative racial 
stereotypes.  Though the particulars of stereotype development are complex, they appear to 
rely at least somewhat on the process of sorting individuals into social categories based on 
what appear to be salient differences (much in the same way we use classification systems to 
make sense of the natural world).  Many of the social categories with which we interact are 
passed along to us by the culture in which we live.  For example, ‘black’ and ‘white’ are 
significant social categories in the United States and ‘man’ and ‘women’ appear to be 
important groupings worldwide.  Once such categories are established, intragroup differences 
tend to be experienced as less than they actually are and intergroup differences as greater, 
giving rise to stereotypes about the members of those groups (Bobo & Massagli, 2001, p. 
102). 
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While some “in-grouping” and “out- grouping” along socially salient lines may be 
inevitable, the particular stereotypes associated with a social category are still responsive to 
social conditions. It need not be the case that the category ‘black’ is associated largely with 
negative stereotypes and ‘white’ with positive ones.  Black African civilizations might have 
coherently held negative stereotypes about whites.  Instead, the role or position that a group 
occupies in society will likely determine the stereotypes associated with that group (Bobo & 
Massagli, 2001, p. 102). Recent research shows that socio-economic status is a major factor 
influencing the development and content of stereotypes about the character of particular 
social groups (Bobo & Massagli, 2001, p. 102). So, existing economic or social inequalities 
can lead individuals to develop and maintain negative stereotypes about that group.  As 
sociologists Bobo and Massagli (2001) observe, “…all else equal, the more economically 
successful the members of a group are perceived to be (rich versus poor), the more favorable 
the other trait beliefs will be (intelligent, self-sufficient, easy to get along with, and speaking 
English well)” (p.102). In other words, in addition to the already difficult position faced by 
those who are poor, under-educated or unemployed, the mere fact of their poverty can lead 
others to develop negative trait beliefs (which are often affectively-laden) towards them.86  
However, it is not just those who are actually poor who are subject to these 
stereotypes.  In the U.S., ‘black’ is a salient social category that, as noted above, tends to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Anderson (2010) recognizes this phenomenon as well.  She writes, “Given that practices of social closure 
make race highly salient as a social category and identity marker, people will try to make sense of the observed 
effects of segregation by constructing stereotypes about racial groups.  The group inequalities generated by 
segregation provide much of the content of these stereotypes.  Thus, people will tend to perceive blacks as 
(relatively) poor, on welfare, uneducated, idle, prone to form single-parent families at a young age, unlikely to 
keep up their property, and liable to engage in criminal activity.  Such group stereotypes are then used to make 
inferences about the likely characteristics of individual blacks” (p. 44).  On their own these are merely cognitive 
inferences and not yet racial stigmatization (a term which Anderson prefers to “racism,” which she claims 
invokes too vicious an attitude and tends to shut down conversation).  But, the individuals who hold these 
stereotypes tend to attribute confirming behavior to dispositions in the stereotyped group, which, in turn, 
rationalizes negative attitudes towards members of that group.  Anderson writes, “The tendency to attribute 
negative stereotypes dispositionally yields stigmatization of disadvantaged groups” (p. 46).   
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correlate with lower economic and educational achievement.  If one is black, one will tend to 
occupy a lower socio-economic status than if one is white.  Because of this tendency, an 
association between blackness and poverty develops and negative stereotypes about blacks 
emerge or already existing stereotypes are confirmed. (This is in keeping with a general 
correlation between racial group stereotypes and the respective socio-economic position 
occupied by those groups.)  Consequently, the continued existence of large racial disparities 
between whites and blacks, (most notably economic gaps, but also their attending causes and 
consequences, including lack of education and employment) contributes to the development 
and perpetuation of anti-black stereotypes in the United States.87  In other words, not only 
because they are black (and some people possess racist attitudes and beliefs) but because 
blacks tend to be poor, under-educated and unemployed, they are susceptible to the anti-
black racism.   
But what if (as is clearly not the case in the actual world) black poverty were entirely 
the fault of those who experience it?  If that were true, wouldn’t blacks be vulnerable in the 
same way as those who choose to build their houses close to the edge of the cliff so that they 
can enjoy the view? They would not deserve protection against the harms of these 
stereotypes.   
My response is twofold.  First, even if racial inequalities between blacks and whites 
were not at all the result of past prejudice, but entirely the fault of those who experience 
them, we still must admit that not all black people are responsible for black poverty.  Some 
blacks are rich, educated, and employed.  Thus, there are at least some blacks who are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 This assumes that the only or major contributing factor to the creation of particular negative stereotypes is 
economic achievement.  Likely there are other ways in which the social status of certain minority groups 
influences which stereotypes develop.  
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completely blameless for current racial inequalities and yet, because of their blackness and 
the effects of racial disparities, they would be susceptible to the harms caused by increased 
anti-black racism in their society.   
Second, we might be tempted to think that these economically privileged blacks are 
the only innocent victims of increased anti-black racism and so, harms against the vulnerable 
which deserve our protection are relatively small.  But the rest of the black population is also 
vulnerable and the nature of their vulnerability is the sort to which all those who endorse 
formal equality of opportunity would object.   
If they are poor, under-educated and unemployed for reasons that are entirely their 
fault, blacks may deserve many of the consequences that follow from their situation.  A law 
that is applied equally to all but disproportionately disadvantages the poor because they are 
poor may be perfectly acceptable under formal equality of opportunity, so long as the poor 
deserve to be poor.  We might even condone holding negative attitudes towards the poor, 
because they have been irresponsible or lazy.  These could be character defects that warrant 
our general disapproval.  However, as we have seen, racial inequalities do not breed negative 
attitudes only towards the poor, but give rise to negative racial stereotypes.  Such negative 
stereotypes about blacks are generally considered central to our ordinary conception of anti-
black racism and racism cannot be deserved. We might discriminate against the poor because 
they are lazy but we ought not to discriminate against them because they are black.  To 
discriminate on the basis of their blackness would be exactly the sort of prejudice that formal 
equality of opportunity purports to guard against.  Thus, a tendency for blacks to be poor, 
uneducated and unemployed is injurious to all blacks as black because the continued 
existence of those disparities has a direct causal impact on the development and maintenance 
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of anti-black racism.  It is on the basis of this shared vulnerability to anti-black racism caused 
by racial disparities (and not anti-black racism, full stop) that blacks ought to be treated as a 
single, vulnerable group. 
4.  Protecting the Vulnerable from Harm Through Preferential Treatment 
Having shown that blacks are vulnerable because they are subject to anti-black racism 
is insufficient to prove that they are entitled to preferential treatment.  Even if that anti-black 
racism stems from pervasive social and economic inequalities, one might still argue that the 
effects of this racism (namely, violations of blacks’ rights to formal equality of opportunity) 
could be treated through anti-discrimination laws. To show that guaranteeing formal equality 
of opportunity is sufficient to justify preferential treatment, it must be the case that mere 
equality of treatment (anti-discrimination laws) would not suffice to protect blacks from the 
effects of anti-black racism.  In this final section, I argue that this is, in fact, the case. 
Notice, first, that state policies play a role in maintaining social and economic 
disparities between blacks and whites.  When enacting some resource distribution schema, be 
it for public education, tax incentives, Medicaid vouchers or unemployment benefits, the 
state can decide to take race into account or not.  And those policies that do not take race into 
account (those that are ‘colorblind’) sometimes perpetuate racial disparities. (When they do 
not, it is likely because they are taking some other factor into account that strongly correlates 
with race).  So, for example, if federal aid for education is done in a race neutral way (say, 
for simplicity’s sake every public school gets $10,000) then schools that were already 
underfunded (because they were paid for by the low property taxes in impoverished black 
neighborhoods) will still have substantially less than those (white) schools which were 
already well funded.  The under-education of black Americans will continue, as will blacks’ 
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poverty and under-employment.  By default, colorblind policies that perpetuate these 
disparities also maintain or further develop anti-black racist attitudes in the form of negative 
stereotypes.88  Thus, the state is complicit, if not actively engaged, in the creation of a more 
racist population.   
Conversely, enacting policies that provide preferential treatment for blacks and 
thereby reduce economic and social disparities is a way for the state to counteract these racist 
attitudes.  Of course, some may object that this sort of attempt at creating a more virtuous 
citizenry is an illegitimate state action.  But, there is an important distinction to be drawn 
between the cultivation of virtue and state production of vice. A state that attempts to make 
its citizens more virtuous could call to mind the sort of worries Karl Popper (1945) famously 
leveled against Plato’s republic. To do so effectively might require far-reaching limitations 
on freedom of thought and expression, and any number of other interferences in the personal 
lives of its citizens.  In Plato’s case, it meant placing restrictions on the ideas to which 
citizens were exposed.  But avoiding actively producing vice is a quite different affair.  If the 
state is charged with creating just and fair institutions that protect its citizenry, then it might 
want to avoid actively cultivating those attitudes which, if acted upon, are likely to cause 
some portion of its citizens harm.  Imagine, for example, that the state is the only entity 
empowered to print books, for technical rather than legal reasons. In such a situation, 
refusing to print books that express certain beliefs that contradict principles endorsed by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 There is, of course, an argument (often advanced by opponents of affirmative action policies) that preferential 
treatment for blacks actually breeds resentment and anger amongst whites and contributes to a net increase in 
anti-black racism.  Thus, they would deny my claim that by perpetuating economic disparities the state 
contributing to the development of anti-black racism.  The question of who’s right is an empirical one and so I 
will not attempt to adjudicate it here.  However, I do wish to flag my suspicion that piecemeal preferential 
treatment policies which do not so much reduce racial disparities as create a small, elite class of well-off blacks 
while leaving a much larger group at the low end of the socio-economic ladder relatively untouched may well 
increase racial animosity but such evidence does not tell against the theory that a substantial reduction in 
economic disparities overall might result in a decrease in anti-black racism. 
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state, such as the value or patriotism or civil service, could be seen an unjustified interference 
on the part of the state in the name of creating a more virtuous citizenry.  But, given the 
opportunity to submit some number of books for publication each year, the state could 
choose not to write books that it thought likely to produce a more vicious citizenry. 
So, limiting our discussion to the class of cases in which some state intervention is 
legitimate (a class which will vary depending upon where we fall along the liberal spectrum), 
in each instance there is an option for the relevant law to dictate equal or preferential 
treatment to blacks.  The state’s justification for intervention might stem from concerns 
completely unrelated to guaranteeing formal equality of opportunity to blacks.89  For 
example, with respect to voter ID laws, there is a question about whether or not the state can 
legitimately pass any legislation requiring that voters show ID, which is not necessarily 
grounded in worries about discrimination (though of course, in the US case the legitimacy of 
such laws is often undermined by their disproportionate impact on black Americans).  Then, 
there is a further question about whether or not such a law ought to be colorblind or dictate 
preferential treatment for blacks.  If a voter ID law is legitimate, should it apply equally for 
blacks and whites?  Perhaps, if blacks and whites are both subject to voter ID laws, racial 
disparities in voter turnout rates will continue and white interests will be disproportionately 
represented leading to continued disparities in wealth between whites and blacks.  But, if 
only whites are IDed, then these disparities will be reduced.  If colorblind treatment in this 
case causes the perpetuation of economic and social disparities between whites and blacks, 
leading to the maintenance or development of anti-black racism, then maybe the state instead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 There is a further argument about the circumstances in which the state would be justified in expanding either 
colorblind or preferential treatment to new areas that we will not explore here.  
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ought to adopt a policy of preferential treatment for blacks and not require that they produce 
IDs to vote.    
Naturally, some will object that I am running together an increase in actual 
discrimination with the development of anti-black racist attitudes.  The two are not 
necessarily the same.  Why ought the state care about the racism of its population? While the 
state can properly regulate discriminatory behavior, it does not have the right to police the 
attitudes of its citizens.90  The state is charged with guaranteeing that individual liberty is 
respected, not with restricting the beliefs and attitudes of its citizens.  A person may hold 
racist beliefs and attitudes without engaging in any discriminatory behavior.  Thus, there is 
no justification for policies designed to reduce racial disparities and thus, the continuation 
and/or cultivation of anti-black racism, only the maintenance or development of effective 
anti-discrimination laws to prevent private attitudes from spilling over into public actions. 
Such an argument fails to properly understand the potential dangers blacks face due 
to continued or increased anti-black racism.  Among concerns for equality and liberty, the 
liberal state is also committed to stability, a mandate that includes the ability to effectively 
enforce the laws and policies it creates.91  There are real worries about the current ability of 
anti-discrimination laws to operate effectively (as evidenced by well known racial disparities 
in arrest and conviction rates, sentencing, and hiring, to name a few) and if racial disparities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Anderson (2010) declines to refer to these cognitive or affective racial biases as “racism,” preferring to 
reserve the term for more serious expressions of vice.  However, she does argue that racial ‘stigmatization’ can 
cause a myriad of serious harms to the black population including (1) damaging the reputation of blacks, and 
thus, their public standing; (2) creating a self-fulfilling prophecy for blacks; (3) encouraging confirmation bias, 
wherein parties do not accurately assess the evidence but pay more attention to evidence that confirms the 
stereotype than that which denies it (p. 53-57). 
91 Rawls (1999) is perhaps most explicit about this demand writing, “An important feature of a conception of 
justice is that it should generate its own support.  Its principles should be such that when they are embodied in 
the basic structure of society men tend to acquire the corresponding sense of justice and develop a desire to act 
in accordance with its principles” (p. 119).  The argument I offer here is an attempt to spell out what features 
are necessary for a principle of formal equality of opportunity to generate its own support.   
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continue or widen over time, along with anti-black racist attitudes, those laws might become 
even less effective.  In order to guarantee that anti-discrimination laws are enforceable, some 
(not insignificant) portion of the population must be committed to ensuring those laws are 
carried out.  And for that to be the case, it must either be in the self-interest of the individuals 
who make and enforce the laws to ensure that they do not discriminate or those individuals 
must be committed to the principle of justice anti-discrimination laws uphold.  If these 
conditions are not met, then there is little reason to believe the law will be enforceable. 
The recent controversy over the Voting Rights Act of 1965 touches on exactly this 
issue.  During the Supreme Court hearing, critics of the law argued that a decrease in racist 
attitudes in the affected regions made it so that federal oversight was no longer necessary.  
This argument speaks to the historical reality that at the time the VRA was passed, despite 
the implementation of anti-discrimination laws in those counties, elected officials and poll 
workers could not be trusted to regulate their own voting practices. Racist attitudes were too 
pervasive.  If racist attitudes, though perhaps less explicitly expressed, are just as pervasive 
today in places with large racial disparities as they were in the past, we ought to be concerned 
that there are no parties capable of performing the regulatory role necessary to ensure that 
institutional behavior is non-racist.  And even if racist attitudes are less virulent than they 
once were, we might well wonder whether or not they have sunk below the level necessary to 
ensure that anti-discrimination legislation is stable.  Furthermore, if racial disparities persist 
without a concerted effort to stem the attitudes to which they give rise, the population is 
likely to become more racist, less committed to the principle of non-discrimination against 
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blacks and consequently, less able to regulate institutional policies that call for them to act in 
a non-discriminatory fashion.92 
This argument does depend on the assumption that blacks are, in the absence of 
preferential treatment, likely to remain poorer, under-educated and under-employed.  If 
blacks were moving away from these conditions, then there would be no reason to offer 
preferential treatment.  Racist attitudes would decrease and anti-discrimination laws would 
stabilize without government intervention.  Other socially salient groups, one might argue, 
have also been at the receiving end of the negative attitudes and stereotypes associated with 
poverty, unemployment and lack of education.  But no preferential policies were necessary 
because, within a few generations, those groups managed to achieve equal status to whites 
and those stereotypes largely disappeared.   Anti-discrimination laws, then, ought to be 
sufficient to achieve our ends.   
Given historical trends, I find the assumption that racial disparities between blacks 
and whites will continue quite plausible.  Black unemployment has remained twice as high as 
that of whites for over 50 years (Fletcher, 2013, para. 15). The black poverty rate is still three 
times as high as that of whites and it has ceased declining (Fletcher, 2013, para. 16). And 
unlike backward-looking arguments that must show that these disparities are caused or 
maintained by racial injustice, my theory makes no such demands.  Regardless of why these 
disparities persist, if the state wishes not to contribute to creating a more racist citizenry or 
wants to ensure it has enforceable anti-discrimination laws, then blacks are entitled to 
preferential treatment so as to reduce those disparities.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 A recent AP poll (2012) shows a slight uptick in the percentage of the U.S. population that holds explicitly 
anti-black racist attitudes (from 48% in 2008 to 51% in 2012).  
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There is a possible alternative to preferential treatment.  Perhaps, rather than ensuring 
that a state’s citizenry is adequately committed to the principles of justice that ground anti-
discrimination laws, stability can be maintained entirely through self-interest.  James 
Madison (1787), for example, thought that factions could be managed so long as the country 
remained large enough and representatives were chosen from a varied enough body of voters 
to guarantee that the interests of one party could be pitted against the interests of another. 
Such a scheme would tend to result, Madison claimed, in the election of worthy candidates 
committed to upholding justice.  But, in cases where corrupt candidates gained office, the 
size of the republic and the many groups contained therein would prevent that corruption 
from spreading too far.   
Unfortunately, Madison’s proposed solution is ineffective against a majority who are 
all committed to circumventing a particular law or policy (or who are not sufficiently 
committed to ensuring that it is upheld).  If the empirical research is correct, then when racial 
disparities are pervasive throughout the United States and/or there is general awareness of 
such disparities, negative stereotypes are also likely to be widespread.  Those attitudes will 
tend to manifest in discriminatory behavior by those who hold them because the principles 
that ground a commitment to formal equality of opportunity (that race is not a morally salient 
feature and does not affect individual’s merit) will not be endorsed by a majority of citizens.  
Though it will always be in the interest of blacks that race-based anti-discrimination laws be 
enforced, if a black minority (stymied by discrimination in voting practices) is unable to 
make its interests heard through the election of anti-discrimination candidates to key 
positions, then such interests are likely to be overrun by a racist majority.  Moreover, 
discrimination is notoriously difficult to prove, making it more difficult for the blacks to 
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avail themselves of the general check on corrupt laws and practices offered by the judicial 
system.93  An interest in the stability of anti-discrimination laws, then, would seem to 
demand that the state guard against widespread racist attitudes in the citizenry. 
 In offering this argument, I do not presume that in all cases a state must or should 
offer preferential treatment to its vulnerable black citizens.  There may well be instances in 
which colorblind treatment is justified for moral or pragmatic reasons.  Rather, the potential 
harm caused to blacks as a vulnerable population should be included in calculations 
determining whether or not to extend colorblind or preferential treatment.  Moreover, it is not 
just when considering enacting colorblind policies that the state ought to guard against this 
harm.  The same problem can arise in cases of seemingly legitimate discrimination. As I will 
argue in the next section, statistical discrimination can also threaten black citizens’ right to 
formal equality of opportunity. 
5.  What’s Wrong with Rational Racial Profiling? 
There is nothing more painful for me at this stage in my life than to walk down the street and 
hear footsteps and start to think about robbery and then look around and see it’s somebody 
white and feel relieved.  
             -- The Reverend Jesse Jackson 
In the previous sections, I argued that colorblind policies that perpetuate economic 
and social inequalities between whites and black threaten blacks’ formal equality of 
opportunity.  They cultivate racist attitudes in the population and destabilize anti-
discrimination laws.  Equally troubling are non-colorblind public policies that take race into 
account when they ought not.  Of these, many are wrong for obvious reasons.  By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93See, for example, Semli (2001). Bartlett (2009) argues that excessive legal control and pressure is likely to be 
less effective at preventing workplace discrimination than promoting commitment to nondiscriminatory norms 
and doing the latter involves fostering good intentions.  
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discriminating on the morally arbitrary feature of race, they threaten blacks’ equal right to 
formal equality of opportunity.  But within the set of policies that discriminate on the basis of 
race is a troubling subset that appear to be free of the obvious flaws; these are instances of 
what is often called ‘statistical discrimination’ (SD).  
In its most general form, SD occurs when some easy-to-see property of individuals 
correlates (imperfectly) with some other property that, for some reason or other, is harder to 
detect.  Rather than search for the more subtle property, we discriminate between individuals 
using the more visible one (Maitzen, 1991, p. 23). 94  By itself, SD is a fairly normal and 
relatively uncontroversial phenomenon.  Likely, we all engage in some form of SD on a daily 
basis. But seemingly more problematic cases of SD arise when an individual is discriminated 
against on the basis of statistical information about a socially salient group, like a racial 
group, of which she is a member. The use of racial group membership as the basis for 
discrimination I will refer to as ‘rational racial profiling’ (RRP). 95  Even more worrisome, if 
only because their effects are likely greater, are state level policies that engage in rational 
racial profiling. 
A host of previous analyses have attempted to articulate what, exactly, is wrong with 
RRP.  Some have argued that it is intrinsically, rather than contingently morally wrong 
because it violates certain rights or fails to treat its subjects as individuals.  I am 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 For example, a middle school basketball coach who wants to create the strongest possible team might walk 
around the school encouraging very tall students to try out, because being tall is statistically, but not perfectly, 
correlated with basketball talent (especially, one might think, among young children.) 
95 One potential problem with SD that has not gotten much attention is the worry some socially salient groups 
may be of a special sort, such that it is inappropriate to assign individuals to them if they do not first assign 
themselves.  If race is a socially salient group of this sort then we would not know, in many cases, whether or 
not an individual is of a particular race and so it would be wrong (and perhaps racist) to draw such inferences.  
Of course, holding this view would require subscribing to a sort of racial voluntarism that perhaps just amounts 
to denying that racial groups are socially salient categories and can ever be used for any purposes.  Though this 
would not just be a problem for RRP but for any policy that uses racial categories, it would explain why RRP is 
an especially worrisome form of SD.   
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unconvinced. 96   But, those analyses that have concentrated on articulating the contingent 
moral wrongness of RRP have also fallen short.  In particular, they have failed to capture an 
important moral distinction between RRP when used against blacks and when used against 
other socially salient racial groups in the U.S.  Although I recognize that RRP can be used 
against any racial group to bad effect, I argue that its tendency to perpetuate disparities 
threatens blacks’ right to formal equality of opportunity.  Thus, there is an additional (albeit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 In this I follow Lippert-Rasmussen (2007) who considers and rejects three attempts to show that SD is 
intrinsically morally wrong. They are as follows: (1) we all have a right to be treated as individuals (on the basis 
of our individual properties) and SD violates that right because it treats us on the basis of properties that pertain 
to a socially salient group to which we belong.  Thus, SD is a failure to respect each person as an individual; (2) 
SD violates a right to equal treatment.  When SD is practiced, individuals who have equal abilities are less 
likely to receive some benefit or avoid some harm for the irrelevant reason (given their equal abilities) that they 
do not belong to the socially salient group; (3) SD violates a right to fair treatment. Although I can be treated 
worse on the basis of what I choose to do, it violates my rights to treat me worse on the basis of what others 
choose to do.  I am not responsible for their behavior and so I should suffer no ill treatment because of it.  
Lippert-Rasmussen rejects the first by presenting several instances in which an individual is subject to SD 
without an apparent violation of his rights. For example, a police investigation of a hate crime might 
concentrate on interviewing suspects who are a different race from the victim because statistically speaking, it is 
unlikely that a hate crime would be committed by a member of the victim’s own race.  Those suspects have 
been subjected to SD and yet their rights do not appear to be violated.  Lippert-Rasmussen also contends that 
most regulations are based on generalizations (regulations involving the age at one can drive, rent a car, or see a 
certain kind of film) and it would be strange to think that all of these regulations are violating some fundamental 
right to be treated as individuals.  While, as Lippert-Rasmussen acknowledges, it might be morally preferable to 
treat each other as individuals so that we all receive the treatment we deserve, there is no fundamental right to 
such treatment.  Against the second suggestion, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that unequal treatment is not always 
morally objectionable because at times unequal treatment serves to promote equal opportunities.  Though this 
may seem to take on board unnecessary baggage about nature of equality (indeed, Lippert-Rasmussen cites 
Dworkin, who is hardly an uncontroversial subject in the literature on equality and equal opportunity), if the 
argument I offered above is right then guaranteeing minimal equal treatment (for example, the opportunity to a 
fair trial regardless of one’s race) might, at times, require differential treatment (treating blacks preferentially 
with respect to the distribution of goods and services).  Against the third suggestion, that statistical 
discrimination is unfair and therefore intrinsically morally wrong, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that there are 
instances in which we think it is right, and not unfair, for a particular group to accept some small, 
uncompensated burden in order to secure a much greater benefit for another group.  Lippert-Rasmussen takes 
this point as intuitive, but I’m not sure that it is. However, on all but the most extreme forms of libertarianism, 
there is some caveat allowing for small, uncompensated harms to one group in order to avoid catastrophic 
harms to another.  And, as I argued above, any conception of justice that takes equality of opportunity as one of 
its ideals must admit that there are times when securing these rights for all necessitates imposing some burdens 
on a few (making them less well off than they would have been were the rights of others not fully respected) 
and this is not thought to be unfair.   
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contingent) reason not to practice RRP against blacks given current social and economic 
conditions.97   
5.1  The Contingent Moral Wrongness of Statistical Discrimination 
Those who favor democratic equality have suggested that RRP is wrong because it 
stigmatizes an already marginalized or disadvantaged group.  It either expresses that we do 
not, or makes it the case that we cannot, relate as equals to one another.98  For example, when 
the police single out black Americans as the likely perpetrators of certain crimes it creates or 
emphasizes an already existing association between blackness and criminality.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Lippert-Rasmussen (2007) offers the insightful suggestion that the wrong of certain forms of SD may be a 
matter of recognizing how the facts upon which the instance of SD relies came to be true.  He presents two 
ways of understanding this worry.  The first way is where SD becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.  For example, 
suppose police officers believe that blacks are more likely than other groups to be hostile towards and use force 
against police officers.  Thus, police officers approach blacks more aggressively and are more likely to use 
forceful methods of containment against blacks than against other racial groups.  Observing and experiencing 
the hostility of these officers in their interactions with blacks angers and scares blacks and so they begin to 
respond to police officers with more hostility.  It would be inappropriate, Lippert-Rasmussen argues, for the 
police to appeal to this statistical fact as the reason for their discriminatory policy because it is the result of 
unjustified differential treatment.  The second problem with using some social facts as a basis for SD is that 
they may obtain as the result of some other, unjust action. For example, suppose that blacks are more likely to 
sell illegal drugs than other groups because living in a racist society has severely limited their employment 
opportunities.  Though targeting blacks on the basis of these statistical facts will greatly increase the chances 
that the police will catch drug dealers, it would be inappropriate for them to do so because some of those who 
benefit from this statistical discrimination (whites) will have also played an integral role in unjustly bringing 
about the fact that blacks are more likely to deal drugs.  Though I think Lippert-Rasmussen is right to argue that 
these are worries for statistical discrimination and I am generally sympathetic to his analysis, in trying to justify 
the harm of RRP to negative liberty theorists his argument runs up against a number of potentially fatal 
problems.  Perhaps most devastating is the following: so long as the people employing (or benefiting from) the 
statistical data did not themselves perpetrate the original injustice, why would it be inappropriate for them to 
rely on that information?  One can agree that blacks ought to be compensated for past injustices but still 
maintain, while it might be supererogatory to refrain from acting on those social facts, given their origin it is not 
required. That some of the people who perpetrated the initial injustice were also police or also white does not 
seem sufficient reason for others who are police or white to abstain from using SD.  And, even if such a solution 
is workable in the case of police in negative feedback loops (because they are all members of a discreet 
institution and contributed directly to the particular social fact upon which they are now acting) without a 
complex, and I think implausible, theory of collective responsibility whites could not be thought to be 
responsible for the crimes of past whites and the link between particular social facts and past injustices would 
need extensive spelling out (though I find such links intuitively quite plausible).   
98 For a comprehensive articulation of the ideal of democratic equality and its relation to worries of racial 
stigmatization see Anderson (2010), especially footnote 11. 
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Consequently, others might be more likely to see blacks as criminals even when the statistics 
do not support such a perception.  The harms this might cause are too numerous to mention, 
but some recent victims of such stigmatization likely include Trayvon Martin, Jonathan 
Ferrell and Jordan Davis. Nevertheless, there may be instances in which the benefit of 
singling out a particular racial group for RRP would outweigh the harm caused by 
stigmatization and its contribution to inequality.99   
The objection I offer to RRP is a species of this more general worry about the dangers 
of stigmatization.  However, unlike other critiques of this kind, it relies on a fairly minimal 
view of what a commitment to formal equality of opportunity entails—It must be the case 
that laws that declare the equal legal status of racial groups are enforceable.  
RRP against blacks necessarily entails singling blacks out (because they are black) for 
some worse treatment than other racial groups.  This may well lead to some overall societal 
benefit but it causes some harm to the individual black person (even though that harm may be 
perfectly justified, in a broader sense).  For example, imagine (contrary to fact) that blacks 
are more likely than whites to possess and distribute small qualities of marijuana.  Targeting 
blacks for this crime would be case of RRP, but it would also burden those blacks who are 
arrested with legal fees, court dates, fines, jail time and criminal records.  This, in addition to 
contributing directly to the perpetuation of negative stereotypes or stigma against black 
Americans (for example, the perception that blacks are naturally more criminal), would also 
likely perpetuate social and economic inequalities between blacks and whites.  For example, 
regardless of whether or not they are convicted, blacks who have to appear in court might 
miss work, sacrificing wages or even their job, and pay expensive legal fees, diminishing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Though I disagree, there were certainly some who argued this was the case for Middle Eastern individuals 
boarding planes in the days after the September 11, 2001 attacks. 
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savings or increasing debt.  Perpetuating these inequalities will, in turn, contribute to creating 
or maintaining a more racist population.  And, as with colorblind policies, the dangers of 
these persistent racist attitudes include ongoing or increased discrimination and the 
destabilization of anti-discrimination laws.100  
Naturally, as in the case of colorblind policies, the effect that any particular state 
policy might have on the racist attitudes of the population would need to be weighed against 
other liberties.  If formal equality of opportunity is indeed a demand of liberal justice then it 
cannot be sacrificed wholesale for some other social good.  But, for pragmatic purposes, 
there may be times when it must be traded to some limited extent in order to secure some 
other, equally or more important social good.  Thus, in times of national emergency, for 
example, some increase in racist attitudes might be acceptable (provided it does not sink 
below a point where the laws become unstable) in order to protect the population from a 
greater threat.  For example, the police might have engaged in RRP by pulling over only 
black men, if they had known that the DC sniper was black.  In that case, the potential benefit 
of stopping the murders could have outweighed the harm of perpetuating racial disparities (if, 
for example, pulling over more black men led to a greater number of arrests of black men 
during that time period).  Importantly, not every racial group faces this threat when it is 
profiled, and so the danger of profiling blacks may be greater than the danger of profiling 
other racial groups. Racial disparities between blacks and whites are greater and more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 One might object that the worry I have identified for RRP and colorblindness is not just a problem for these 
policies but could be leveled against any policy likely to perpetuate economic and social disparities between 
whites and blacks.  I agree.  If I have not exhausted the logical space of potential public policies by describing 
those that employ colorblindness, preferential treatment, racism and RRP and there remains some other set of 
policies that could perpetuate or exacerbate economic and social disparities between blacks and whites then it 
too would be subject to these worries.  In singling out colorblindness and RRP my goal is to highlight two types 
of policies that are sometimes thought to pose no threat of racism (or the racist status of which is highly 
contested) and argue that, in fact, they do.  But I remain open to the suggestion that there might be other policies 
that are problematic in the same way.   
	   114 
persistent than between whites and other racial groups and so, RRP should be exercised with 
particular caution against blacks.  Indeed, it may be, and likely is the case, that anti-
discrimination laws are already unstable for the black population (and so preferential 
treatment is needed to correct this injustice).  
This account, like others that emphasize the potential problems RRP can cause for 
equality of opportunity also explains why RRP may be wrong when carried out by the state 
but need not be wrong (and is certainly less wrong) when performed by individuals.  In other 
words, RRP is an institutional failure and perhaps also, in some circumstances, a form of 
institutional racism.  When racist attitudes increase to the point that anti-discrimination laws 
are no longer stable, the state has failed in an important duty to its black citizens. The state 
expresses disregard for the rights of its black citizens whether it contributes to these attitudes 
by maintaining racial disparities or simply sits by idly, watching as they develop.  The same 
is not true for the individual nor the private corporation.  Though they contribute to the 
stigmatization of blacks when they engage in RRP, they are not tasked with maintaining a 
sufficient level of non-racist attitudes of the citizenry.  (Although they may, like Jackson, 
take it on a personal moral duty and so feel guilt or pain when they contribute to 
stigmatization, if only by expressing it in their own minds.)101 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 I lump private citizens and corporations together here, but I am not sure that is appropriate.  It may be that 
corporations have a duty not only to obey the laws of the country in which they operate, but also not to perform 
actions that indirectly undermine those laws.  Though I do not have space to pursue this complication here, I 
want to flag it as a potential disanalogy between, say, the confession by Rev. Jackson that began this section and 
Cornel West’s famous anecdote that he was unable to catch a cab in NYC, despite the fact that he was a fairly 
wealthy, well-dressed, Harvard professor.   
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6.  Conclusion 
Many will find this hard to swallow that assent to mere formal equality of opportunity 
commits one to preferential treatment for black Americans, And those who want to hold onto 
formal equality of opportunity might refuse to move from one to the other, just as some 
could, as I admitted earlier, deny the force of Rawls’ argument from formal to fair 
opportunity.  But, it is important to see that while extending preferential treatment to black 
Americans in the way that I have suggested here would certainly entail a somewhat different 
distribution procedure for resources than is currently employed, it is not nearly as radical a 
redistribution as Rawls’.  Assenting to equality of fair opportunity requires those who have 
done well in order to provide for their children’s future realize that their children are no more 
deserving of the money they have saved for them than any other children.  My argument 
requires that individuals agree to the more modest claim that, because they occupy a 
privileged position, they are not entitled to the same share of some government goods and 
services as those who do not.  They might still be entitled to any private advantages they 
have accrued.  Showing that they are not would require additional argumentation.   
While the intention of this article, which was to advance an argument that appeals to a 
wide spectrum of liberal thinkers, focused on the contribution that colorblind policies and 
RRP make to racist attitudes and the destabilization of anti-discrimination laws, I want to end 
by acknowledging that there are other, serious concerns one might have with a state that 
creates policies which it knows foster racist attitudes against its black citizens.  Even if such 
a state were able to effectively protect blacks against any increases in discrimination and 
enforce anti-discrimination legislation, we might still worry that such policies are extremely 
disrespectful. We can imagine a state in which all of the non-black citizens harbor anti-black 
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racist attitudes but only exhibit those attitudes in settings in which no blacks are present.  
They hold private rallies, perhaps, where they chant anti-black racist slogans and reenact 
lynchings.  The proceedings are secret and blacks incur no harm, psychological or otherwise, 
from their occurrence. Perhaps some would argue, in this hypothetical scenario, that blacks 
experience no actual disrespect.  But, I think we might still have worries about the character 
of a state that not only tolerates these activities but, supplies the slogans and the rope.  When 
the state takes actions that create and foster anti-black racist attitudes, it seems to me that it 
disrespects black people even if it does them no harm.   
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